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The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) set out a test in Maximillian 
Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner for deciding whether a third country’s 
level of data protection is adequate under Article 25 of the European Union’s 
Directive 95/46/EC (Directive 95/46).  The CJEU declared that such a decision 
requires a finding that the level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms in 
the laws and practices of the third country is “essentially equivalent” to that 
guaranteed within the European Union under that Directive read in light of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter).  Given the 
CJEU’s invalidation of the European Commission decision underlying the EU-US 
Safe Harbour Framework, the Commission and supervisory authorities are now 
called upon to examine the legal order in the United States and compare its level of 
protection with that within the European Union. The legal order and corresponding 
substantive protection of each jurisdiction may not be assumed. 
 
This report, “Essentially Equivalent: a comparison of the legal orders for data 
protection in the European Union and United States,” provides a roadmap and 
resource for the requisite comparison.  Following the analysis laid out by the CJEU in 
Schrems, the report shows how privacy values, deeply embedded in US law and 
practice, have resulted in a system that protects fundamental rights and freedoms 
and meets the test of essential equivalency.   
 
The US system is not identical to that in the EU because, as a common-law country, 
the United States has evolved a multidimensional system of federal and state laws 
and jurisprudence rather than a single omnibus law comparable to Directive 95/46 
(read in light of the Charter).  This body of laws ensures that government access to 
data for law-enforcement and intelligence purposes is limited to what is necessary 
and proportionate.  In addition, it governs the private sector and impels it to adopt 
strong privacy practices that, especially when reinforced by legally-binding 
commitments (pursuant to a Safe Harbour Framework or individualised data transfer 
mechanisms), correspond to the principles of Directive 95/46.  Taken together, the 
practical effect of these laws and practices is to provide EU citizens, whose data is 
transferred to the United States, with a level of protection that is essentially 
equivalent to what these citizens receive under the legal order in the EU.  (The report 
refers to the level of protection in the EU as the EU Benchmark). 
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Notable privacy protections under the US legal order begin with the Bill of Rights of 
the US Constitution, which protects the American people against unreasonable 
government searches and seizures and which has been interpreted as protecting 
interests in individual autonomy and dignity against government interference.  The 
US Congress declared in the Privacy Act of 1974 that “the right to privacy is a 
personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States.” 
Moreover, in legislation of 2004 and 2007, the Congress affirmed that any enlarged 
power of electronic surveillance  
 
“calls for an enhanced system of checks and balances to protect the precious 
liberties that are vital to our way of life and to ensure that the Government 
uses its powers for the purposes for which the powers were given. … [and 
that] if our liberties are curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling to 
defend ….[and further, that] actions the executive branch takes to protect the 
Nation from terrorism [must be]… balanced with the need to protect privacy 
and civil liberties.”1  
 
And in a 2014 decision, the US Supreme Court denied the US government access to 
the electronic data stored in a smart phone because, in the words of the Chief 
Justice of the United States, “[p]rivacy comes at a cost.”2 
 
Foreign citizens also receive protection against US surveillance.  The Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and other statutes dictate the procedures with 
which law enforcement and the intelligence agencies must comply to collect, retain, 
and disseminate data transferred to the US.  Executive orders further ensure that 
foreign citizens receive comparable privacy protections to those received by US 
citizens for communications collected outside the US and outside of FISA’s reach.  
Specifically, a 2014 presidential order, binding on the government, directed the 
Nation’s intelligence agencies that “[a]ll persons should be treated with dignity and 
respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and all 
persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal 
information.”3  This order is one of many checks and balances the US has added to 
surveillance safeguards, including terminating the bulk collection of telephone 
metadata under FISA.  And US courts have held expressly that a key statute 
affecting the data of EU citizens stored in the US, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, protects “any person, including foreign citizens.”  This statute provides 
one of several means of legal redress with respect to government surveillance.4  
 
This report begins by analysing the Schrems judgment to specify what must be 
compared with respect to the US legal order, and to establish the EU Benchmark for 
the level of protection for privacy and personal data in the EU legal order.  For the 
                                                 
1 Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 801, 121 Stat. 353 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; 
emphases added); Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1061(a)(2), (2004). 
2 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473,  2493 (2014).  
3 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28 (Jan. 17, 2014), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-28.pdf. 
4 Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 671 F.3d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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EU legal order, the analysis begins, as the Schrems judgment did, with Articles 7 
and 8 of the Charter.  These articles establish respect for private life and protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of data as fundamental rights.  The 
analysis cannot end there, however, because the Charter applies only to EU law, 
and the Treaty on European Union makes national security the sole responsibility of 
the Member States, as allowed for in Article 13 of the present Directive 95/46 and 
Article 21 of the proposed General Data Protection Regulation.   
 
Moreover, the privacy and data protection rights in Articles 7 and 8 must be balanced 
and applied in line with Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  Limitations may be imposed on the exercise of these rights where the 
limitations are provided for by law, when they respect the essence of these rights 
and freedoms, and when, subject to the principle of proportionality, they are 
necessary to and genuinely meet the objectives of general interest recognised by the 
EU or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Subject to general principles of necessity and proportionality, therefore, EU law 
permits Member States a margin of discretion in the performance of essential state 
functions, including taking measures that balance data privacy rights with other 
fundamental rights protected by the Charter and measures to protect national 
security.  Accordingly, the comparison of this legal order with the US legal order 
must be complete, accurate, and fair, with due consideration to international trade 
law obligations of the EU and Member States not to discriminate, and to practices as 
well as laws. 
   
The report then looks at the contours of surveillance laws in both the US and EU in 
light of the basic requirements of the Charter as enunciated in Schrems and prior 
judgments and the margin of discretion under EU law.  For the EU legal order, it 
looks at the scope of analogous laws in several Member States (which are partly 
outside the scope of EU law and its Charter of Fundamental Rights) and the range of 
protections and constraints applicable to the Member States in the area of national 
security.  For the US legal order, the report focuses on the scope of the surveillance 
laws that may most affect personal data of European citizens that is transferred to 
the US and the protections that embody the principles of necessity and 
proportionality.  Finally, although the CJEU did not consider the Safe Harbour 
principles themselves, the report also looks at the enforceability of the principles as 
well as the US legal order in the commercial arena in light of the criteria that have 
been applied in EU adequacy decisions involving third countries. 
 
The comparison is a complex undertaking.  As the European Union does not have 
competence with regard to national security, establishing the level of protection 
under the legal order for surveillance within the EU requires examination of the laws 
and practices of each of the Member States.  Correspondingly, an assessment of the 
sectoral and federal system of privacy protection in the US requires examination of a 
range of federal laws as well as those of 50 states and the enforcement practices of 
numerous federal and state agencies. 
 
This report is necessarily an overview of the relevant requirements, considerations, 
and practices.  Given the breadth and complexity involved, it does not provide a 
comprehensive analysis of all relevant laws.  It has been prepared in the wake of the 
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Schrems judgment to inform in a timely way the imminent debates on any new EU-
US agreement with respect to transatlantic data transfers and other adequacy 
determinations.  To these ends, the report intends to provide a thorough and 
thoughtful comparison that, while not complete in every detail, presents a fair picture 
of the level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms for data and privacy in 
the United States as compared to the EU legal order. 
 
This report provides substantial support for the proposition that the US legal order for 
privacy and data protection embodies fundamental rights consistent with the Charter, 
principles of proportionality, and checks and balances in both form and substance, 
and that these protections of privacy and data protection rights are essentially 
equivalent to those in the EU. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In its 6 October 2015 decision in Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner,5 the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) did not rule that US data privacy 
protections are inferior to those in the EU.  Rather, it ruled that, in its initial decision 
approving the Safe Harbour Framework (Decision 2000/520/EC),6and in the 
intervening years, the European Commission had not considered various safeguards 
for privacy and data protection in the US legal system, and thus had not ensured that 
EU citizens were adequately protected when their data is transferred to the US.  The 
CJEU’s judgment specified that the proper test for adequate protection would entail a 
finding that the level of privacy and data protection under the US legal system is 
“essentially equivalent” to that in the EU.  
This report provides an in-depth survey designed to compare the legal orders for 
data protection in the European Union and the United States, and to explore how the 
US data protection regime is essentially equivalent to that of the EU under Directive 
95/46/EC (Directive 95/46)7 ‒ especially when supplementary principles, 
commitments, and enforcement such as those under the Safe Harbour framework 
are taken into account.  
 On this basis, the European Commission should formally recognise that EU citizens 
are adequately protected when their personal data is transferred to the US.  Such 
recognition would establish the most straightforward legal basis to sustain 
transatlantic data flows and mitigate the disruption of global commerce and 
cooperation that continues in the wake of the Schrems decision.  Taking such a 
decision, however, requires a conscientious analysis of the law and practices in both 
the US and EU.   
The detailed analysis below proceeds in three parts.  First, the report reviews the 
“essentially equivalent” test under EU law to establish the analytical framework.  
Second, it compares the EU and US legal orders on government surveillance, which 
were central to the allegations influencing Mr. Schrems’s complaint in Ireland.  This 
comparison examines eight illustrative EU Member States as diverse and concrete 
examples of the operation of safeguards against abuse of surveillance powers under 
the EU legal order.  These are Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland, and the UK.  The comparison shows that US surveillance of 
European personal data transferred to the US is not “mass and undifferentiated,” and 
that the US safeguards are at least as strong as those in effect in the EU.  Finally, 
the report explores the broad protection of data privacy in the commercial sector 
                                                 
5 CJEU 6 October 2015, Case C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. 
6 Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles 
and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce (2000/520/EC), 
OJ 2000 L215/7. 
7 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, OJ 1995 L281/31, as amended. 
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under the US legal system, and assesses its alignment with principles of EU law 
applied in the Commission on the “adequacy” of third countries.   
This review demonstrates that the legal orders for data protection in the EU and US 
are essentially equivalent.  In brief, the report substantiates that: 
(a) notwithstanding differences in legal systems and aspects of data and 
privacy protection, there is a comprehensive system in the US to regulate and 
protect data privacy, particularly with regard to the most sensitive categories 
of personal data such as financial, medical, electronic communications, and 
children’s data;  
(b) there is broad and effective public and private enforcement in the US with 
regard to data privacy in the commercial sector; and  
(c) there are substantial and effective safeguards, checks, balances, 
independent oversight and legal redress (including for EU citizens) applicable 
to electronic surveillance conducted by the US for national security and law 
enforcement purposes, and the applicable legal authorities and surveillance 
practices are at least as protective and focused as those under the EU legal 
order.   
In all, there is a compelling ‒ and at least sufficient ‒ basis to find that the US legal 
order for privacy and data protection is essentially equivalent to that of the EU.   
PART ONE: 
The “essentially equivalent” test outlined by the CJEU calls for a thorough and 
balanced comparison of the legal order in both the EU and the US 
It is important to be precise about what the CJEU’s Schrems judgment held.  The 
CJEU did not pass judgment on the Safe Harbour Framework itself, or even on the 
US data protection regime, but rather determined that the 2000 European 
Commission decision underlying the approval of the EU-US Safe Harbour decision 
failed to engage in a thorough enough analysis under EU law.  This in turn resulted 
in the CJEU’s invalidation of the decision approving the Safe Harbour Framework, 
which was designed to protect the data privacy rights of EU citizens whose data is 
transferred to the United States.  
According to the CJEU, the Commission had failed in particular to establish that the 
level of protection of EU fundamental rights of privacy and data protection in the 
legal order of the United States is “essentially equivalent” to that guaranteed within 
the European Union.  The CJEU decision and other CJEU rulings, together with case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that addresses surveillance by 
Member States, provide a legal framework for the analysis necessary to evaluate 
essential equivalence: a thorough and balanced comparison of both the law and 
practices in the respective compared jurisdictions.  Part One of the report elaborates 
this framework under EU law. 
 3 
datamatters.sidley.com   
The report examines the concrete ways in which the EU legal order protects the 
rights and freedoms of data subjects when measures are taken to pursue recognized 
public policy goals such as national security, for which EU Member States (rather 
than the EU itself) retain sovereignty.  To establish an “EU Benchmark” by which to 
compare the equivalency of US law, the report uses four criteria, derived from both 
the CJEU and the ECtHR case law, that govern the discretion of EU Member States 
with respect to national and public security.    
Finally, the report notes that application of the “essentially equivalent” test must take 
into account the commitments of the EU and its Member States under international 
trade laws. These commitments require that the EU and its Member States accord 
no less favorable treatment to US goods, US services, and US service providers 
than they accord other WTO members or Member States unless the discrimination 
can be justified as strictly necessary and proportionate for legitimate regulatory 
purposes.  
The CJEU does not require that, to meet the “essentially equivalent” test, a level of 
protection be identical to that guaranteed in the EU legal order but, rather, that it be 
essentially equivalent in practice and effect, in substance rather than form.  This 
focus on substance and effect provides the framework for analysis in the remainder 
of the report, which demonstrates that the US legal regime for privacy and data 
protection satisfies the necessary criteria. 
PART TWO: 
Comparison of the legal orders on government surveillance shows that US 
surveillance of European personal data transferred to the US is not “mass and 
undifferentiated” and is consistent  with the legal order within the EU 
Based on the principles enunciated in Schrems together with the decisions of the 
ECtHR relating to surveillance, the four main criteria to establish the EU Benchmark 
are the following: 
1. Specific legal authority.  Surveillance measures must be based on 
clearly stated legal authority.  The legal bases or purposes for surveillance 
must be clearly spelled out.  These purposes must be for legitimate aims of a 
serious nature with an objective reasonable basis in facts.  There must be 
objective criteria by which to limit the discretion of authorities.  
2. Limited scope.  The amount of data collected or subject to retention 
requirements must not go beyond what is necessary to accomplish the 
purpose of the surveillance and cannot be generalised or indiscriminate.  
Discriminants (or particular search terms, “keywords”, or “selectors” for 
surveillance purposes) must be established with due care and be consistent 
with the specified purposes for surveillance.  The period of retention must be 
reasonable and finite.  
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3. Oversight.  There should be some combination of executive, legislative, 
judicial, and expert oversight for approval and review of surveillance 
measures. 
4. Legal remedies and redress.  The public should be informed about 
surveillance laws and have some opportunity for access and rectification, and 
for judicial redress.  If necessary for legitimate aims of surveillance, 
surveillance can be secret, in which event greater oversight or more general 
legal redress is necessary.  
These criteria give substance to the principle of proportionality as implemented 
within the EU legal order.  The application of this principle takes into consideration 
the “margin of discretion” granted to EU Member States by the ECtHR and the 
division of powers in the European Union.  This discretion explicitly recognizes law 
enforcement needs and national security interests of the State pursuant to enduring 
Member State sovereignty. 
Part Two of the report considers how the laws relating to government surveillance in 
each of the Illustrative Member States address the four criteria above.  It is clear 
from this survey that the EU legal order on surveillance reflects variety and wide 
discretion as to the necessity of surveillance and the safeguards to limit interference 
with rights and freedoms.   
Each of the Illustrative Member States authorizes various forms of surveillance by 
intelligence services  in the interests of the State (i.e., for the purposes of “national 
security” or “State security”) and by the judicial system for criminal justice purposes 
(whether by intelligence services or law enforcement).  For State interests, 
surveillance is authorized for electronic communications occurring both within and 
outside the jurisdiction of the Member State.  The Illustrative Member States differ in 
the extent to which they specify and limit the purposes for implementing surveillance 
measures (with France having the most comprehensive list of State security interests 
that permit electronic surveillance).  Several Illustrative Member States expressly 
authorise surveillance for the “economic interest” of the State. 
Generally, the types of data covered by the surveillance laws of the Illustrative 
Member States are similar.  In some of the Illustrative Member States, there are 
statutory distinctions among types of data.  For example, four Illustrative Member 
States distinguish “metadata” from other types of data, allowing easier access to 
metadata.  
All Illustrative Member States permit targeted surveillance, including targeted 
surveillance in order to prevent a crime that has not already been committed.  The 
level of suspicion required to justify the surveillance varies among the Illustrative 
Member States, and in some cases is not explicitly provided for.  In four of the 
Illustrative Member States, interception of communications that are not targeted at a 
specific individual or organization is permitted via use of keywords or other methods 
of filtering.  
Provisions relating to the retention of data obtained by surveillance measures vary 
among the laws of the Illustrative Member States.  Only three have prescriptive 
retention periods.  Indeed, the majority of the Illustrative Member States still 
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prescribe the retention of data by telecommunications providers despite the CJEU 
finding Directive 2006/24/EC to be invalid.  None of the surveillance laws of the 
Illustrative Member States contains detailed provisions on maintaining security of the 
data obtained via surveillance measures. 
The oversight for approval and review of surveillance measures varies considerably 
among the Illustrative Member States.  Whilst the majority have some combination of 
different degrees of executive, legislative, judicial or expert oversight, there are often 
specific exemptions to permit surveillance without prior authorization, only two 
require judicial authorization for intelligence surveillance, and most place such 
authorization in the hands of government ministers.  As with oversight, the remedies 
and forms of redress available vary significantly among the Illustrative Member 
States.  One commonality is that, for national security purposes, all Illustrative 
Member States allow restrictions on notifying data subjects that they are or have 
been the targets of surveillance, as well as on access to data by the targets of 
surveillance. 
Part Two of this report also examines the corresponding provisions of the US legal 
order that authorise law enforcement and the intelligence agencies to conduct 
electronic surveillance, as well as the checks and balances in place to ensure that 
such surveillance is conducted only when necessary and in a proportionate manner.  
These laws and safeguards fall well within the range of discretion established by the 
EU Benchmark.  
The US legal order embodies a robust system of checks and balances rooted in the 
US Constitution, which protects the right of the people to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, which has been interpreted to protect “expectations of 
privacy” from government interference.  These principles are thoroughly embedded 
in the checks and balances imposed on the powers of the US to conduct electronic 
surveillance. Indeed, in a 2014 decision involving digital information on a smart 
phone, the US Supreme Court denied the government access to the electronic data 
despite acknowledging its value to law enforcement because, in the words of the 
Chief Justice of the United States, “[p]rivacy comes at a cost.”  
The report specifically describes the Wiretap Act, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), and 
the USA PATRIOT Act (as amended recently by the USA FREEDOM Act), which 
authorise US intelligence agencies to intercept and collect the contents of 
communications and metadata.   
These statutes, as described below in detail, actually prohibit the type of mass and 
indiscriminate surveillance feared by the CJEU in Schrems.  To the contrary, these 
rules require both law enforcement and intelligence agencies to demonstrate a 
specific need for the information to be collected.  The Wiretap Act and Title I of FISA, 
for example, require the government to demonstrate to an independent, neutral 
magistrate that it has “probable cause” to believe that the communications sought 
relate to criminal activity or foreign intelligence.  Significantly, the relevant, neutral 
magistrate whose approval is required in each case is always a judge independent of 
the executive branch and, in the case of surveillance requests submitted by federal 
law enforcement or the intelligence agencies, a federal judge whose independence 
is further secured by holding life tenure.  Section 702 of FISA, which authorises the 
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PRISM programme, and Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act likewise require the 
use of individualised selectors developed pursuant to court-approved processes. 
The discussion further describes the safeguards and constraints in these legal 
authorities, including minimisation procedures that limit the retention and 
dissemination of collected communications, and it also highlights the additional 
protections and oversight mechanisms imposed by the President on the use of such 
power, including Executive Order 12,333 and Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28.  
The latter order extends the privacy protections for Americans to citizens of all 
countries outside the US directing the Nation’s intelligence agencies that “[a]ll 
persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or 
wherever they might reside, and all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the 
handling of their personal information.” 
This legal order operates under comprehensive and elaborate constraints on the 
scope of the government’s collection, retention, access, and use of individuals’ 
private communications and data.  These limitations include an outright ban on 
collecting communications to suppress speech or solely to benefit the economic 
interests of American corporations.  They also impose temporal limits on surveillance 
authorisations, requiring the government to demonstrate any continuing need for 
previously approved information requests, and require data minimization and data 
security precautions to ensure that the information collected remains protected and 
respectful of privacy interests. 
Moreover, various oversight bodies exist to monitor and police the limits placed upon 
the government.  The most important of these groups is the federal judiciary, which 
has the power to hold surveillance activities to be unlawful ‒ as it has done even in 
times of war.  The executive branch too has significant internal compliance and 
auditing mechanisms in place, as well as embedded privacy and civil liberties 
officials and powerful and autonomous inspectors general. And Congress has also 
established powerful independent oversight bodies within the executive branch itself, 
including, most significantly, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, an 
independent agency with full access and subpoena authority, in addition to its own 
oversight role.  
PART THREE: 
A strong body of statutory law, common law, regulatory enforcement, 
litigation, and privacy and data protection practices, especially when coupled 
with binding adherence to EU data protection principles, ensure that EU 
citizens whose data is transferred to the US receive protection essentially 
equivalent to what they receive in the EU 
Part Three of the report maps the US privacy protection regime to the EU’s privacy 
principles.  The Article 29 Working Party articulated the essential elements of 
Directive 95/46 as purpose limitation, data quality and proportionality, transparency, 
security, access and rectification, and restrictions on onward transfer.  In addition to 
these principles, the report also assesses how the US legal order fulfils objectives of 
a data protection system to (i) deliver robust data protection compliance; (ii) provide 
support to individual data subjects in the exercise of their rights; and (iii) provide 
appropriate redress to the injured parties.  
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The common principles underlying the EU and the US data protection regimes are 
no accident.  The development of both EU and US privacy and data protection law 
reflect historical cross-pollination of foundational concepts of liberty and human 
dignity, and principles of fair information practices in the modern era of computer 
processing.  These are reflected in the legal orders of both jurisdictions.   
US federal and state privacy laws, regulations, common law, and privacy practices 
on the ground establish a comprehensive privacy regime that aligns with EU law and 
meets the substance of Directive 95/46.  The most sensitive data – such as financial, 
medical, health, electronic communications, and children’s information – are 
protected by nearly two dozen federal sector-specific laws and numerous state laws.  
Almost all US states enforce broad data security and data breach notification laws 
that apply to sensitive personal data.  These specific laws are backstopped by the 
broad reach of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which is the lead privacy 
enforcement agency in the US and exercises authority to protect consumers from 
unfair and deceptive practices or acts to regulate a broad range of activity involving 
data processing.  
Companies that disregard the US privacy and data protection regime will face 
sanction on multiple, simultaneous fronts.  US privacy and data protection laws are 
enforced by federal regulatory agencies, federal prosecutors, state Attorneys 
General and other state regulators.  In addition to the FTC, federal enforcers are 
found in an expanding network of agencies with sector-specific expertise as well as 
in the US Department of Justice.  Beyond federal powers, state law may afford data 
subjects regulatory protection and causes of action for legal redress.  Many states 
have created formal units charged with privacy oversight. State Attorneys General 
often cooperate in joint enforcement actions against companies that experience data 
breaches or violate consumer privacy rights.  Coordinated and comprehensive 
privacy regulation combined with active enforcement and sizable fines establish a 
strong deterrent to motivate compliance with US privacy and security requirements ‒ 
perhaps even stronger than in the EU.   
Assessing US privacy protections within the structure of EU data protection law is 
necessarily complex and challenging.  But both systems are rooted in the adoption of 
the Fair Information Practice Principles.  In some respects, such as data security and 
data breach notification, the US system may even be considered stronger; and ‒ 
viewed as a whole and in substance rather than form ‒ the US privacy regime is 
effectively consistent with the EU’s.   
The US system is designed to target, in particular, the protection of sensitive data, 
such as financial, health, electronic communications, and children’s data, while 
providing a baseline of protections for all other types of data through the general 
enforcement authority of the FTC, state Attorneys General, and other federal and 
state regulators.  This complex body of law includes, by way of example of sectoral 
laws, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (governing electronic 
communications), the privacy provisions of the Communications Act (governing 
personal information maintained by telecommunications providers), the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) (protecting against computer crimes), the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) (governing the collection of personal data 
from children online and parental notice and consent), the Family Educational Rights 
and Privacy Act (FERPA) (governing educational records), the Fair Credit Reporting 
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Act (FCRA) (governing consumer reports including those used to make critical 
eligibility determinations), the privacy and security provisions (Title V) of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) (governing financial information), and the privacy and 
security provisions of and regulations issued pursuant to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (governing health and insurance 
information).   
Enforcement by the FTC and by other public and private actors is authorised by, 
among other laws, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (prohibiting unfair 
or deceptive business practices and which is used to enforce principles of notice and 
choice as well as reasonable information security practices), state “Little FTC Acts” 
or state “UDAP” statutes (which also prohibit unfair or deceptive acts and practices) 
and negligence or privacy torts under state law (including causes of action to recover 
for “public disclosure of private facts” and “intrusion upon seclusion”). With this 
flexible and dynamic regulatory structure and the growing privacy practices on the 
ground, the US privacy regime fulfils the promise of privacy and data protections that 
closely align with those in the EU. 
A comprehensive review of the US privacy legal regime also must extend beyond 
laws on the books to include the prevailing practices that serve to protect privacy and 
data protection rights.  Virtually all US companies engaged in online commerce post 
privacy policies to inform consumers of their data practices and privacy 
commitments.  US industries have developed detailed codes of conduct and privacy 
principles (which often, when issued publicly, take on legally binding force) to guide 
the processing of personal data, increase data security, and establish greater 
transparency and control for data subjects.  US companies are led by a contingent of 
increasingly respected and senior privacy professionals trained in data privacy and 
security with a growing share of budgetary authority. 
The report furnishes a template and a resource for applying the CJEU’s “Essentially 
Equivalent” Test and to make the findings required by the Schrems judgment in 
order to approve a new, strengthened transatlantic data transfer framework for 
companies that bind themselves to adhere to the basic principles of Directive 95/46.  
Similarly, it furnishes evidence on which in individual cases a data protection 
authority or national court can find that the level of privacy and data protection in the 
US is equivalent to that of a particular Member State. 
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PART ONE: 
 
THE “ESSENTIALLY EQUIVALENT” TEST OUTLINED BY THE CJEU CALLS 
FOR A THOROUGH AND BALANCED COMPARISON OF THE LEGAL ORDER IN 
BOTH THE EU AND THE US 
1.1 The CJEU’s “Essentially Equivalent” Test Requires A Level Of 
Protection That Is Not Identical To That Guaranteed In The EU Legal 
Order But That Is Essentially Equivalent In Practice And Effect 
In Schrems,8 the CJEU articulated the “essentially equivalent” test for adequacy in 
interpreting Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46,9 which enables the European 
Commission to find that a third country ensures an adequate level of data protection.  
The CJEU interpreted the meaning of the term “adequate” in Article 25 and applied 
this interpretation to the validity of the Commission’s Safe Harbour Decision 
(2000/520/EC).10  
Reading Article 25(6) of Directive as consistent with Article 8(1) of the Charter,11 the 
CJEU construed this provision as “intended to ensure that the high level of that 
protection continues when personal data is transferred to a third country.”12 To 
achieve this purpose, the CJEU ruled:  
“The term ‘adequate level of protection’ must be understood as requiring the 
third country in fact to ensure, by reason of its domestic law or its international 
commitments, a level of protection of fundamental freedoms that is essentially 
equivalent[13] to that guaranteed within the European Union by virtue of 
Directive 95/46 read in the light of the Charter.”14  
                                                 
8  CJEU 6 October 2015, Case C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. 
9  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, OJ 1995 L281/31, as amended. 
10  Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles 
and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce (2000/520/EC), 
OJ 2000 L215/7 (hereinafter, Safe Harbour Decision). 
11  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2012 C326/395. 
12 Schrems, para. 71. 
13 Versions of the Schrems  judgment  in other languages use different definitions of these terms, but 
only the English version is authentic because English was the language of the proceedings before the 
referring Court. See Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012 (OJ 2012 L 
265), as amended on 18 June 2013 (OJ 2013 L 173), Articles 37(3) and 41. 
14 Schrems, para. 73. 
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Given the large number of persons potentially affected by an Article 25(6) Decision, 
the Commission’s review under the “essentially equivalent” test should be “strict.”15  
The CJEU explained this test for adequacy in terms that are especially relevant to 
the differences between the US and EU legal systems and the ways these systems 
address privacy and data protection.  The CJEU made clear that the third country 
“cannot be required to ensure a level of protection identical to that guaranteed in the 
EU legal order” and that “the means to which that third country has recourse … for 
the purpose of ensuring such a level of protection may differ from those employed 
within the European Union ….”16  The CJEU underscored this latitude by referring to 
paragraph 141 of the Advocate General’s opinion,17 which states that after a “global 
assessment” the Commission can find a third country’s level of protection adequate 
“even though the manner in which that protection is implemented may differ from that 
generally encountered within the European Union.”18 
Rather than dwell on differences in form, the CJEU focused on the substance of the 
protection.  In assessing adequacy, the Commission must focus not only on “the 
content of the applicable rules in that country resulting from its domestic law or 
international commitments,” but also on “the practice designed to ensure compliance 
with those rules.”19  Different means of protection may be found adequate if they 
“prove, in practice, effective” to ensure essentially equivalent protection.20  
The Court also ruled that the Commission must “check periodically” whether the 
finding of adequacy is “still factually and legally justified,”21 taking account of “the 
circumstances that have arisen after that decision’s adoption.”22  
1.2 The CJEU Holds That The Safe Harbour Decision Should Have 
Contained Findings And Statements On The Limitations To US 
Surveillance, But Itself Makes No Such Assessment 
Having articulated what is required to determine the adequacy of data protection in a 
third country under Article 25(6), the CJEU then turned to assess whether the 
Commission’s Safe Harbour Decision met these requirements.  To understand how 
the CJEU’s judgment should be applied in future decisions under Article 25(6), it is 
important to analyse precisely what the CJEU did decide, and what it did not decide.   
                                                 
15 Id. para. 78. 
16 Id. para. 74. 
17 Opinion of A-G Bot of 23 September 2015, Case C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:627. 
18 Id. para. 141. 
19 Schrems, para. 75. 
20 Id. para. 74 (emphasis added). 
21 Id. para. 76. 
22 Id. para. 77. 
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Because the CJEU’s authority under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) is limited to answering questions regarding the 
interpretation and validity of EU laws presented to the CJEU by EU Member State 
courts, the CJEU did not engage in any fact-finding of its own.  The CJEU did not 
reach any conclusions regarding the US legal order or the extent to which that legal 
order lacks rules “intended to limit any interference” with data privacy rights.23  
Instead, the CJEU found that Decision 2000/520/EC and the Commission’s 
subsequent review of the Safe Harbour Framework failed to address these 
questions.24  
Thus, the CJEU simply concluded that the Commission had failed to meet its burden 
under Article 25(6).  As the Court articulated this burden in paragraph 96, the 
Commission “must find, duly stating reasons” that a third country in fact meets the 
“essentially equivalent” test.25  The Commission failed to do so because it “did not 
state, in Decision 2000/520, that the United States in fact ‘ensures’ an adequate 
level of protection by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments.”26  
More specifically, Annex I to the Safe Harbour Decision provided that “the 
applicability of the safe harbour principles may be limited … to the extent necessary 
to meet national security, public interest, or law enforcement requirements,”27 
paralleling the derogation in Articles 3(2) and 13 of Directive 95/46/EC.  According to 
the CJEU, this limitation in the Safe Harbour Decision “enables interference” with 
fundamental rights of EU data subjects, yet the decision does not contain any finding 
regarding the existence of rules adopted by the United States intended to limit any 
interference which the State entities of that country would be authorized to engage in 
when they pursue legitimate objectives, such as national security,”28 nor does the 
decision “refer to the existence of effective legal protection against interference of 
that kind.”29  
In addition, against the background of the CJEU’s conclusion that the Commission 
must check periodically whether its finding of adequacy is “still factually and legally 
justified,”30 the CJEU also took note of the Commission’s communications regarding 
review of the Safe Harbour Framework in 2013.31  The Court did not draw any 
                                                 
23 Id. para. 88. 
24 Id. paras. 88–89.  
25 Id. para. 96. 
26 Id. para. 97 (emphasis added). 
27 Safe Harbour Decision (2000/520/EC), OJ 2000 L215/7, Annex I. 
28 Schrems, para. 88 (emphasis added). 
29 Id. para. 89. 
30 Id. para. 76. 
31 Id. para. 90.  See also “Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows, accompanied by the “Report  on the 
Findings by the EU Co-chairs of the ad hoc EU-US Working Group on Data Protection 
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explicit conclusions from this reference, but the implication is that the Commission 
should have taken some further decision with regard to the Safe Harbour Framework 
in response to its review. 
It is because of this absence of findings and statements in the Safe Harbour 
Decision that the CJEU held that the Safe Harbour Decision is invalid “without there 
being any need to examine the content of the safe harbour principles.”32  It is 
essential to recognise that, while the CJEU set out general principles for the “level of 
protection … within the European Union” in paragraphs 91 to 95 of its judgment, it 
did not undertake any comparison with the US and thus provides no conclusion as to 
whether US laws in force today are “essentially equivalent” to the level of protection 
guaranteed in the EU legal order today.33   
That comparison is a task that will have to be carried out by the European 
Commission for an Article 25(6) decision on any new transatlantic data transfer 
framework.  A similar comparison34 will have to be carried out by DPAs faced with a 
claim from a data subject about infringement of their rights and freedoms in relation 
to a transfer of their personal data to the US, or a request from a company 
submitting transfer instruments to a DPA for approval under national laws 
implementing Directive 95/46. 
1.3 To Apply The “Essentially Equivalent” Test, The Full EU Benchmark 
Must Be Established, Taking Account Of The Boundaries Of The EU 
Legal Order, The Margin Of Discretion Granted To EU Member States, 
And International Trade Law Obligations 
The comparison that the Schrems judgment now demands of the Commission and 
DPAs calls for measuring the rules and practices in a third country against the “level 
of protection … within the European Union” or “in the EU legal order.”35  This 
comparison cannot be carried out without establishing what is the level of protection 
                                                                                                                                                        
(COM(2013)846 final, discussed in Schrems, paragraphs 11–16) and the Commission 
Communication on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and 
Companies Established in the EU (COM (2013)847 final, discussed in Schrems paragraphs 17–25). 
32 Schrems, para. 98. 
33 Id. para. 96. 
34  As discussed in Section 1.4.2 below, the “essentially equivalent” test can yield different results 
depending on the entity carrying out that test and the Member States involved.  
35  There is no indication in the Schrems judgment that the terms “in the EU legal order” and “within 
the European Union” have a different meaning.  Both terms presumably refer to the concept of the 
(E)EC/EU legal order established by the Treaties, (“ordre juridique”), which is separate from the legal 
orders of the Member States.  This concept was established in Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 
ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, ECR p. 1160,  and recalled in Opinion 2/2013, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 157: 
“As the Court of Justice has repeatedly held, the founding treaties of the EU, unlike ordinary 
international treaties, established a new legal order, possessing its own institutions, for the benefit of 
which the Member States thereof have limited their sovereign rights, in ever wider fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only those States but also their nationals (see, in particular, judgments 
in van Gend & Loos, 26/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, p. 12, and Costa v. ENEL, 6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, 
p. 593, and Opinion 1/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, para. 65).” 
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in the EU legal order.  Otherwise there can be no benchmark by which to judge the 
level of data protection in a third country. 
In the Schrems judgment, the CJEU laid out basic principles under its jurisprudence 
that have to be met by the European Union when it promulgates legislation that 
enables interference with fundamental rights.  
However, these principles do not go beyond stating that some standards and 
limitations need to be set, and that the principles of necessity and proportionality 
must be respected.  The CJEU did not address fully the boundaries of the “EU legal 
order” and the limits it places on various institutions.   
In particular, the CJEU did not address the margin of discretion granted to EU 
Member States when they engage in the difficult exercises of balancing fundamental 
rights to privacy with possibly conflicting interests requiring free movement of data36; 
when they balance fundamental rights with pursuing “legitimate objectives, such as 
national security”37; or when they balance fundamental rights with measures taken in 
the “fight against international terrorism in order to maintain international peace and 
security” or the “fight against serious crime in order to ensure public security.”38 In 
this respect, it may be noted that the CJEU recalled in Digital Rights Ireland that 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter do not contain all the fundamental rights that are 
relevant here.  The Charter also contains Article 6 which “lays down the right of any 
person not only to liberty, but also to security.”39   
The international trade law obligations of the EU and its Member States are another 
part of the EU legal order that affects how third countries are treated.  The CJEU did 
not address the impact of these obligations on third country adequacy 
determinations.   
This section reviews the principles of EU law set out in the Schrems judgment as 
well as these additional dimensions, including the standards for Member States set 
out in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the 
boundaries of the EU legal order, including international trade law.  Taken together, 
these bodies of law establish the “level of protection of fundamental rights … in the 
EU legal order” (the EU Benchmark).   
1.3.1 The CJEU’s Basic Principles Of Protection For Fundamental 
Rights And Freedoms 
The CJEU laid out five basic principles in paragraphs 91 to 95 of the Schrems 
judgment.  These principles are binding on the European Union when it takes action.  
As discussed in more detail below Part 1.3.2, these principles are not automatically 
                                                 
36 Schrems, para. 42. 
37 Id. para. 88. 
38 CJEU 8 April 2014, Joined Cases C-294/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, para. 42. (Digital Rights Ireland). 
39 Article 6 of the Charter reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.” 
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transferable to Member State laws, given that these states retain significant 
sovereignty in matters of national security, and the European Union must respect 
their laws regarding public security.  They are applicable to Member States when 
they implement Union law, so that they would apply where DPAs act under Article 28 
of Directive 95/46, which obliges DPAs to investigate claims from individuals 
regarding the lawfulness of data processing under national laws to protect 
recognised public policy goals such as national security allowed for in Article 13 of 
Directive 95/46. 
First Principle:  Clear And Precise Rules Imposing Minimum Safeguards 
Against Risks Of Abuse And Unlawful Access by Public 
Authorities 
In paragraph 91, the CJEU held that EU legislation enabling interference with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter “must lay down 
clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of a measure and 
imposing minimum safeguards ….”  The purpose of this precision and safeguards is 
to protect “against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and use of that 
data.”40  The Court added that “[t]he need for such safeguards is all the greater 
where personal data is subjected to automatic processing and where there is a 
significant risk of unlawful access to that data.”41   
This first principle is largely procedural, focused on the quality of laws.  The principle 
does not address the substantive standards contained in such rules and safeguards.   
Second Principle:  At The EU Level, Derogations And Limitations to 
Protection Must Apply Only In So Far As Is Strictly 
Necessary   
In paragraph 92, the CJEU held that “protection of the fundamental right to respect 
for private life at EU level requires derogations and limitations in relation to the 
protection of personal data to apply only in so far as is strictly necessary.”  This is a 
general reference to the principles of necessity and proportionality, which can be 
applied to a specific situation only once a particular policy aim has been determined, 
and the measures to attain that aim are assessed.  Part 1.3.3 below discusses the 
more detailed rules for assessing proportionality in individual situations set out in the 
case law of the ECtHR.   
Third Principle:  Storage Of All The Personal Data Of All Persons Whose 
Data Has Been Transferred, Without Any Differentiation, 
Limitation, Or Exception And Without Objective Criteria To 
Limit Public Authorities’ Access To Data Or Subsequent 
Use, Would Be Disproportionate 
Building on its application of the principle of proportionality in Digital Rights Ireland, 
the CJEU stated in paragraph 93 that mass storage of data without any limitations 
regarding public authorities’ access or subsequent use would be disproportionate:   
                                                 
40 Schrems, para. 91. 
41 Id.  
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“Legislation is not limited to what is strictly necessary where it authorises, on a 
generalised basis, storage of all the personal data of all the persons whose 
data has been transferred from the European Union to the United States 
without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of 
the objective pursued and without an objective criterion being laid down by 
which to determine the limits of the access of the public authorities to the 
data, and of its subsequent use, for purposes which are specific, strictly 
restricted and capable of justifying the interference which both access to that 
data and its use entail.” 
The CJEU cited Digital Rights Ireland to the same effect and, in fact, substantially 
paraphrased that judgment in the language above.42  The statement packs together 
a number of elements that also incorporate aspects of other principles:  (1) “storage 
of all the personal data of all the persons” whose data is transferred; (2) the absence 
of “any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in light of the objective 
pursued,” which closely resembles the second principle above; (3) the absence of 
“an objective criterion being laid down by which to determine the limits of the access 
of the public authorities to the data, and of its subsequent use,” which parallels the 
first principle; and (4) “for purposes which are specific, strictly restricted and capable 
of justifying the interference which both access to that data and its use entail.” 
This third principle provides a “checklist” of the types of minimum limitations or 
safeguards on interference with data protection rights that must be put in place.  A 
similar checklist appears in the political agreement on the General Data Protection 
Regulation.43 
Fourth Principle:  Public Authorities Must Not Have Access To Personal Data 
On A Generalised Basis  
In paragraph 94, the CJEU held that “[i]n particular, legislation permitting the public 
authorities to have access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic 
                                                 
42 The CJEU used almost identical terms in separate paragraphs in Digital Rights of Ireland, holding 
that it would be disproportionate to retain, “in a generalized manner, all persons and all means of 
electronic communications as well as all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or exception 
being made in the light of the objective of fighting against serious crime,” id. para. 57; any “substantial 
and procedural conditions relating to the access of the competent national authorities to the data and 
their subsequent use,” id. para. 60; “any objective criterion by which the number of persons 
authorised to access and subsequently use the data retained is limited to what is strictly necessary in 
the light of the objective pursued,” id. para. 62; or any “prior review carried out by a court or an 
independent administrative body whose decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to 
what is strictly necessary,” id.  
43 Interinstitutional File 2012/0011 (COB), No. 15039/15, 15 December 2015.  See Article 21(2) of the 
Draft Data Protection Regulation (corresponding to Article 13 of Directive 95/46),  which provides that 
Union or Member State law which restricts the scope of data privacy rights on recognised public policy 
grounds must “contain specific provisions at least, where relevant, as to the purposes of the 
processing or categories of processing, the categories of personal data, the scope of the restrictions 
introduced, the safeguards to prevent abuse or unlawful access or transfer; the specification of the 
controller or categories of controllers, the storage periods and the applicable safeguards taking into 
account the nature, scope and purposes of the processing or categories of processing and the risks 
for the rights and freedoms of data subjects; the right for data subjects to have a general indication 
about the restriction, unless this may be prejudicial to the purpose of the restriction.” 
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communications must be regarded as compromising the essence of the fundamental 
right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter.”   
This fourth principle follows logically from Digital Rights Ireland.  It provides that 
public authorities’ access to personal data must not be unlimited; there cannot be 
“generalised” access to “all” data stored of “all persons whose data is transferred.”44  
Fifth Principle:  There Must Be Some Possibility For An Individual To Pursue 
Legal Remedies Permitting Access, Rectification Or Erasure 
Of Personal Data 
In paragraph 95, the CJEU held that “legislation not providing for any possibility for 
an individual to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data 
relating to him, or to obtain the rectification or erasure of such data, does not respect 
the essence of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in 
Article 47 of the Charter.”  
Thus, the fifth principle obliges the EU, when it promulgates EU laws that enable 
interference with fundamental rights, to ensure that data subjects can have access to 
a tribunal to submit claims of violation of their fundamental rights. 
Such rights to redress are not absolute.45  As discussed in Part 1.3.2 below, Article 
13 of Directive 95/46 permits Member States to take measures limiting the right of 
data subjects to be informed of data processing and limiting their rights to access 
their personal data in a number of circumstances, including where such limitations 
are necessary and proportional to protect national or public security. 
1.3.2 The EU Legal Order Respects Member State Sovereignty in 
Setting Security And Other Recognised Public Policy Aims, 
Requiring Only That Measures Interfering With EU Rights Are 
Necessary And Proportionate 
Establishing the EU Benchmark requires scrutiny of the division of powers between 
EU and its Member States, and of the interaction of the Charter and the Treaty on 
European Union. 
Both Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems concerned laws promulgated by the EU 
legislator (Directive 2006/24/EC and Decision 2000/520/EC, respectively).  
Therefore, the Charter was directly relevant to the application and interpretation of 
these two instruments of EU law, pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter, which 
provides that “the provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union.”  As clarified by Schrems,46 EU legislation must 
be fully compliant with the Charter.  
                                                 
44 Schrems, para. 94. 
45 Generally, as the CJEU noted in its Grand Chamber judgment of 9 November 2010 in Cases C-
92/09 and C-93/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paragraph 48: “the right to the protection of personal data is 
not, however, an absolute right, but must be considered in relation to its function in society (see, to 
that effect, Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited)”.   
46 Schrems, para. 91. 
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By contrast, Member States are bound to the Charter “only when they are 
implementing Union law” as provided in Article 5147 of the Charter and CJEU Opinion 
2/13.48  The Charter is not applicable outside of the bounds of EU law.   
In turn, the protection of national security is substantially outside the bounds of EU 
law.  Pursuant to Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the EU must respect 
each Member State’s “essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial 
integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.  
In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.”  
The CJEU has itself recognized that each Member State has retained the freedom to 
determine the requirements of public policy and public security in accordance with its 
own sovereign needs.49   
The exercise of this freedom is subject to limits where Member State measures 
interfere with rights derived from the EU legal order, including free-movement rights 
and fundamental rights. Such interfering measures are subject to certain conditions 
laid down in the case law. They must be (i) applied in a non-discriminatory manner, 
(ii) justified by overriding requirements of public policy or public security, (iii) suitable 
for securing the attainment of the aim they pursue, and (iv) proportionate, i.e., they 
do not go beyond what is necessary to attain the stated aim.50 The last of these 
conditions – proportionality – is the most important in practice since, in matters of 
surveillance, the necessity of measures to protect national security or public safety is 
often assumed.51  Schrems and Digital Rights Ireland clearly strengthen these limits, 
but they do not alter the contours of the EU legal order. 
In its treatment of Member State essential functions, Directive 95/4652 follows these 
contours:  Member States set their policy goals, and EU law sets limits only to judge 
the necessity and proportionality of interference with rights derived from EU law:   
• Article 3(2) confirms the primacy of Member States to make public 
policy choices: “This Directive shall not apply to the processing of 
personal data in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope 
of Community law … and in any case to processing operations 
                                                 
47  Article 51 of the Charter provides: “(1) The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the 
institutions … of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States 
only when they are implementing Union law.  They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the 
principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and 
respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.  (2)  The Charter 
does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any 
new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.” 
48 CJEU 18 December 2013, Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 102. 
49 See e.g., CJEU 10 July 2008, C-33/07, Ministerul Administraţiei v. Jipa, ECLI:EU:C:2008:396, 
para. 23. 
50 Id. 
51  See, e.g., Digital Rights of Ireland, paras. 42–49. 
52 This approach is maintained in the political agreement on the General Data Protection Regulation.  
See supra note 43, at art. 21. 
 18 
datamatters.sidley.com   
concerning public security, defence, State security … and the activities 
of the State in areas of criminal law.”   
• Article 13 lays down a necessity-and-proportionality test: “Member 
States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of [data 
protection] when such a restriction constitutes a necessary measure to 
safeguard (a) national security; (b) defence; (c) public security; (d) the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal 
offences, … [and] (g) the protection of the data subject or of the rights 
and freedom of others.”  
The latitude that Member States enjoy under the EU legal order is enlarged by the 
comity that EU Member States must accord one another under the EU legal order.  
As noted by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13, “the principle of mutual trust” requires 
Member States “to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU 
law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law.”53 
Accordingly, Member States may not “demand a higher level of national protection of 
fundamental rights from another Member State than that provided by EU law,” nor 
may they “check whether that Member State has actually, in a specific case, 
observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU.”54  
The principle of mutual trust also is reflected in Directive 95/46.  Recital 3 to Directive 
95/46 declares that “personal data should be able to flow freely from one Member 
State to another” and, while Article 25 provides that Member States must verify the 
level of protection in a third country before permitting data transfers, no such 
verification is required for transfers within the EU.  As a result, data subjects in the 
EU are not protected against transfers to Member States whose surveillance laws 
may not meet the principles outlined in Schrems or ECtHR standards discussed 
below.55   
Arguably, the “essentially equivalent” test would go beyond the boundaries of the EU 
legal order to the extent it includes areas of law such as national security that are not 
part of EU law.  Directive 95/46 nevertheless provides a basis to invoke EU law: the 
reference to “national security” in Article 13 above, read in conjunction with Article 
28, which states that DPAs shall “hear claims for checks on the lawfulness of data 
processing lodged by any person when the national provisions adopted pursuant to 
Article 13 of this Directive apply.”  
It follows that, with respect to national security, the rights of EU data subjects within 
the EU may be limited on the grounds set out in Article 13 of Directive 95/46, and the 
main guarantee that data subjects have is that the “legislative measures to restrict 
the scope” of their rights must be “necessary” and proportionate.  Rights of legal 
                                                 
53 CJEU, Opinion 2/13, para. 191. 
54 Id.  
55 This does not mean that Member States can infringe fundamental rights without being challenged.  
For example, if Member State A considers that Member State B fails to fulfill its obligations under the 
TFEU (including failures to respect fundamental rights protected by EU law), Member State A can 
commence infringement proceedings before the CJEU or request the Commission do so.  
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redress may be limited in practice, as well, since Article 13 permits Member States, 
where necessary, to limit the right of the data subject to be informed of the 
processing of his or her data and to have access to that data.  These limits make up 
part of the EU Benchmark. 
1.3.3 ECtHR Case Law Confirms That Member States Have A Margin Of 
Discretion That Depends On The Degree Of Consensus Among 
ECHR Member States, And That EU Member States Comply With 
The Charter When They Stay Within This Margin Of Discretion  
The EU legal order also is shaped by the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).56  The case law of the ECtHR clarifies and supplements the case law of the 
CJEU, and informs the interpretation and application of the Charter by EU institutions 
and by Member States.  The key provision in this respect is Article 52 of the Charter, 
which provides that “[i]n so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to 
rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the said Convention.”57 
The CJEU has confirmed in a number of judgments that the interpretation of 
concepts in the Charter and interpretation of corresponding concepts by the ECtHR 
are the same.  In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU quotes ECtHR case law several 
times ‒ in defining the terms “interference with a fundamental right”58; the need for 
clear and precise rules,59 especially in case of automatic processing; and, crucially, 
in setting the standard for judicial review of compliance with the principle of 
proportionality and the margin of discretion (“the EU legislature’s discretion may 
prove to be limited, depending on a number of factors, including, in particular, the 
area concerned, the nature of the right at issue guaranteed by the Charter, the 
nature and seriousness of the interference and the object pursued by the 
interference”).60   
Thus, ECtHR case law helps to clarify and supplement the CJEU case law on the 
scope of rights and the boundaries of the EU legal order.  The ECtHR case law 
quoted in paragraph 54 of Digital Rights Ireland clarifies reasons for the Schrems 
principle that laws must be clear and precise.  For example, the ECtHR has 
repeatedly stated that a law which interferes with fundamental rights “must enable 
                                                 
56  Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR), Rome, 4.XI.1950, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
57 Charter, at art. 52. 
58 Digital Rights Ireland, para. 35 (citing ECtHR 26 March 1987, Leander v. Sweden, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:1987:0326JUD000924881, § 48; ECtHR 4 May 2000, Rotaru v. Romania, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2000:0504JUD002834195, § 46; and ECtHR 29 June 2006, Weber & Saravia v. 
Germany (admissibility decision), ECLI:CE:ECHR:2006:0629DEC005493400, § 79). 
59  Id. para. 54 (citing ECtHR 1 July 2008, Liberty & Others v. United Kingdom, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:0701JUD005824300, §§ 62 & 63; Rotaru, §§ 57–59; ECtHR 4 December 2008 
[GC] S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:1204JUD003056204, § 99). 
60 Id. para. 55 (citing S. & Marper, § 102). 
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the individual to regulate his conduct” (for example to avoid being subject to the 
interference).61   
The ECtHR case law quoted in paragraphs 54 and 55 of Digital Rights Ireland 
confirms that ECHR Member States have the power to interfere with fundamental 
rights on recognized public policy grounds to ensure the security of their population, 
provided such interference does not go beyond what is “necessary in a democratic 
society.”  In turn, these Member States have a margin of discretion to decide what is 
necessary in their democratic society.   
The width of this margin depends greatly on the degree of “consensus” among the 
Member States on a given issue.  This degree of consensus is generally determined 
by comparing the laws of the ECHR Member States.62  When there is wide 
divergence among the Member States’ laws as shown in Part 2.1, each Member 
State will have a significant margin of discretion.  As the ECtHR put it, “where there 
is no consensus … either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as 
to the best means of protecting it, the margin will be wider.”63   
Given the importance of the ECtHR’s case law on surveillance, the key judgments 
are recalled here.  The starting point for analysing the ECtHR case law on 
government surveillance is Article 8 ECHR, which provides:  
“1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.  
 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.” 
The seminal judgment of the ECtHR dealing with the compatibility of secret 
electronic surveillance with Article 8(2) ECHR is Klass & Others v. Germany,64 in 
which the Plenary Court ruled that EU Member States “must be able” to undertake 
secret surveillance of “subversive elements” to counter threats to the security of their 
citizens effectively.65  Member States have a “certain discretion” to choose the forms 
                                                 
61 This principle of “foreseeability” does not mean that individuals need to know when governments 
would intercept their communications. It only relates to the circumstances in which governments might 
intercept their communications.  See Weber & Saravia, § 93; Leander, § 51). 
62 See, e.g., S. & Marper, §§ 45–49, in which the ECtHR proceeds to analyse the laws regarding the 
compulsory taking of fingerprints in all of the Council of Europe member States. 
63See id. § 102.  Similar wording has been used in a series of cases since ECtHR 4 December 2007 
[GC], Dickson v. United Kingdom, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2007:1204JUD004436204, § 78. 
64 ECtHR [Plenary Court] 6 September 1978, Klass & Others v. Germany, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:1978:0906JUD000502971. 
65 Id. § 48. See also Article 4(2) TEU, Article 8 ECHR, Article 52 Charter, Articles 3(2) & 13 of 
Directive 95/46, and, most recently, ECtHR 12 January 2016, Application No. 37138/14, Szabó & 
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of surveillance to counter such threats, and the ECtHR stated specifically that it is 
“not for the Court” to determine the best policy.66  To ensure that the infringements 
upon data privacy rights do not go beyond what is “necessary in a democratic 
society,” a Member State must put in place sufficient safeguards against abuse.67  In 
Klass, the ECtHR confirmed that ideally oversight should be carried out by a judge, 
but a committee of parliament with broad enough representation could be considered 
sufficiently independent.68  
In Weber & Saravia v. Germany, the ECtHR once again reviewed the German G10 
law, but this time with regard to “strategic monitoring,”69 which was distinguished 
from “individual monitoring,” i.e., monitoring of individuals who “suspected of 
planning or having committed” certain grave offences.70  Strategic monitoring was 
done using “catchwords,” with interception limited to persons who “had to have used 
catchwords capable of triggering an investigation into the dangers listed in section 
3(1),” which include an armed attack, terrorism, trafficking in arms and certain 
sensitive technology, imports of substantial quantities of drugs, counterfeiting of 
money and money laundering; or persons who “had to be foreign nationals or 
companies whose telephone connections could be monitored deliberately in order to 
avoids such dangers.”71  
In ruling that the case against Germany was inadmissible, the Weber court 
confirmed that Member States have a “fairly wide margin of appreciation in choosing 
the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security,” and that 
                                                                                                                                                        
Vissy v. Hungary, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0112JUD003713814, § 68 (“[I]t is a natural consequence of 
the forms taken by present-day terrorism that governments resort to cutting-edge technologies in pre-
empting such attacks, including the massive monitoring of communications susceptible to containing 
indications of impending incidents.”) , and § 80, in which the Szabó Court confirms that the 
observations made in § 48 of Klass v. Germany “are equally valid in the present case.” 
66  Klass, § 49 (collecting further references), confirmed in ECtHR 4 December 2015 [GC], Roman 
Zakharov v. Russia, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2015:1204JUD004714306, § 232. See also ECtHR Research 
Division, National Security and European Case-Law, 2013, p. 4 (“Member States are recognized to 
have certain – even a large – measure of discretion when evaluating threats to national security.”). 
67 See the minimum safeguards formulated in Szabó, § 56: “In its case-law on secret measures of 
surveillance, the Court has developed the following minimum safeguards that should be set out in law 
in order to avoid abuses of power: the nature of offences which may give rise to an interception order; 
the definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration 
of telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; 
the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in 
which recordings may or must be erased or destroyed.”  
68 Klass, § 56. 
69 See Weber & Saravia, § 4 (“Strategic monitoring is aimed at collecting information by intercepting 
telecommunications in order to identify and avert serious dangers facing the Federal Republic of 
Germany ….”). 
70 Id. (“In contrast, so-called individual monitoring, that is, the interception of telecommunications of 
specific persons, serves to avert or investigate certain grave offences which the persons monitored 
are suspected of planning or having committed.”). 
71 Id. § 97. 
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“adequate and effective guarantees against abuse” were in place in Germany “to 
ensure that measures were not ordered haphazardly, irregularly or without due and 
proper consideration.”72 These guarantees included prior authorisation of 
interception requests by the President of the Federal Intelligence Service – an 
executive branch official – and the G10 commission; limitations on further use; 
provisions on destruction of data that were no longer needed; and notifications to 
data subjects in certain cases.73   
In Liberty & Others v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR dealt with the UK government’s 
access to “all commercial submarine cables having one terminal in the UK and 
carrying external commercial communications in Europe” so that “any person who 
sent or received any form of telecommunication outside the British Islands … could 
have had such a communication intercepted.”74 The key issue was not that the 
government had the technical ability to intercept communications; rather, it was that 
the “legal discretion to the executive for the physical capture … was virtually 
unfettered,”75 whilst the arrangements “to safeguard against abuse of power” were 
“not contained in legislation or otherwise made available to the public.”76   
Notably, the applicant mentioned the United States as an example of a country that 
had published “detailed information” on systems similar to the UK arrangements “for 
filtering and disseminating intercepted material.”77  The Liberty court in turn referred 
to the German G10 Act as an example of a system that provides a higher level of 
foreseeability by providing that monitoring could be carried out “only with the aid of 
search terms which served … the investigation of the dangers described in the 
monitoring order ….”78  
In Klass, the ECtHR stated that it will generally trust Council of Europe member 
States to abide by their laws,79 but “the possibility of improper action by a dishonest, 
negligent or over-zealous official can never be completely ruled out whatever the 
system.”80  Therefore, the more “prone to abuse” a surveillance method, the higher 
                                                 
72 Id. § 115. 
73 The German Constitutional Court noted that “in cases in which data were destroyed within three 
months there was justification for never notifying the persons concerned … if the data had not been 
used before their destruction.”  Id. § 136. 
74 Liberty, § 64.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. § 66. 
77 Id. § 45. 
78 Id. § 68. 
79 See Klass, § 59.  See also Opinion 2/13, para. 192:  “ Member States … may … not demand a 
higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State than that provided 
by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other Member State has 
actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU.” 
80 Klass, § 59.  
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the requirements will be in terms of ex ante authorisation by a court or independent 
body, ex post oversight, and measures to prevent unwarranted use of data.81   
With regard to legal redress, the ECtHR has recognised since Klass that secret 
surveillance can work only when it is secret: “the fact of not informing the 
individual … is this very fact which ensures the efficacy of the ‘interference.’”82  
Therefore, direct legal redress will be available “only in exceptional cases.”83  
The assessment of surveillance methods in EU Member States based on this case 
law requires a holistic view of both the surveillance methods, the safeguards against 
abuse, and remedies provided by national law.  This holistic view was explicitly 
mentioned in Klass84; in Weber85; and more recently in Kennedy v. United Kingdom: 
“The assessment depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, 
scope and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering 
them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the 
kind of remedy provided by the national law.”86  
The need for a holistic view of the threat, the surveillance methods, and the 
safeguards has been confirmed in the two most recent judgments of the ECtHR: the 
Grand Chamber judgment of 4 December 2015 in Roman Zakharov v. Russia, and 
the judgment of 16 January 2016 in Szabó & Vissy v. Hungary.   
In Zakharov, the ECtHR Grand Chamber dealt with technical measures granting 
intelligence services direct access to the content of all mobile phone 
communications.  The ECtHR noted several factors created risks of abuse, including 
authorities having “an almost unlimited degree of discretion in determining which 
events or acts constitute […] a threat”87; the absence of rules on discontinuation of 
intelligence surveillance when no longer necessary88; and shortcomings in the 
system of prior authorisation by judicial authorities, which were deprived of the power 
“to assess whether there is a sufficient factual basis to suspect the person,” and 
were not instructed “to verify the existence of a “reasonable suspicion.”  In addition, 
                                                 
81 See ECtHR 4 December 2015 [GC], Roman Zakharov v. Russia, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2015:1204JUD004714306, §§ 269–71 (discussing broad access to mobile 
telecommunications); Szabó & Vissy, § 73. 
82 Klass, § 58. 
83 Id. § 70.  Germany did, however, provide the possibility of complaining to the G10 Commission, id. 
§ 21, and obtaining review by the Constitutional Court, which is able to decide if national security 
permits communication of information to the data subject, id. § 23. 
84 Klass, §§ 49–50. 
85 Weber & Saravia, § 106.  
86 ECtHR 18 May 2010, Kennedy v. United Kingdom, Application No. 26839/05 [2010] ECHR 682, 
§ 153 (emphasis added).  The need for assessing all the measures of a Member State as a whole 
was confirmed again in Zakharov, § 232, and in Szabó & Vissy, § 57. 
87 Zakharov, § 248. 
88 Id. § 251. 
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the authorities had “an unlimited degree of discretion” to use an “urgent procedure,” 
which provided for ex post review by a court, but without the power to assess 
whether the use of the urgent procedure was justified or to decide whether the 
material obtained … is to be kept or destroyed.”89 In view of these shortcomings, the 
ECtHR ruled that the system was “prone to abuse” and decided to “examine with 
particular attention whether the supervision arrangements … are capable of ensuring 
that all interceptions are performed lawfully.”90   
The supervision arrangements, however, were not adequate.  First, intercepting 
agencies were not obliged to keep records,91 and with the exception of the initial 
authorisation, all supervision was kept within the executive branch of government, or 
involved prosecutors who were not sufficiently independent92 and did not have full 
access to documents.  In addition, interceptions would be inspected only in case of a 
complaint.93  Finally, the subjects of interception were deprived “of the effective 
possibility of challenging interceptions retrospectively.”94  In its conclusions, the 
ECtHR noted that “the shortcomings in the legal framework … appear to have an 
impact on the actual operation of the system of secret surveillance .…  The 
examples submitted … indicate the existence of arbitrary and abusive surveillance 
practices, which appear to be due to the inadequate safeguards provided by law.”95  
In this respect, the Court referred to reports about surveillance information sold in 
return for bribes.96  The overall conclusion was that the system did not meet the 
“quality of law” requirement as it was incapable of keeping the “interference” to what 
is “necessary in a democratic society.”97  The Zakharov judgment closely followed 
the reasoning in previous cases.  One noteworthy statement, however, is that 
notification of surveillance following the termination of surveillance did not 
necessarily include situations where “data are deleted” without being used.98  
The most recent judgment is Szabó, which dealt with the secret intelligence powers 
of Hungary’s Anti-Terrorism Task Force permitting a far-reaching combination of 
surveillance measures, including “secret house search and surveillance with 
recording, opening of letters and parcels, as well as checking and recording the 
contents of electronic or computerized communications, all this without consent of 
                                                 
89 Id. § 266. 
90 Id. § 271. 
91 Id. § 272. 
92 Id. § 280. 
93 Id. § 281. 
94 Id. § 300. 
95 Id. § 303. 
96 Id. § 197. 
97 Id. § 236. 
98 Id. § 287. 
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the persons concerned.”99  For intelligence surveillance (Section 7/E3 surveillance), 
the exercise of these powers was subject to “the condition that the necessary 
intelligence [could not] be obtained any other way. Otherwise, the law does not 
contain any particular rules on the circumstances in which this measure can be 
ordered.”100  Decisions authorising such surveillance were provided within the 
executive branch of government, and could be ordered for “person(s) concerned 
identified by name or as a range of persons, and/or any other information capable of 
identifying such person or persons.”101  The ECtHR expressed concern about “the 
absence of any clarification” as to how this category “is to be applied in practice,” 
and the Court considered the category “overly broad, because there is no 
requirement of any kind for the authorities to demonstrate the actual or presumed 
relation between the persons or range of persons ‘concerned’ and the prevention of 
any terrorist threat.”102  
In Section 73, the ECtHR stated that “a measure of secret surveillance can be found 
in compliance with the Convention only if it is strictly necessary, as a general 
consideration, for the safeguarding the democratic institutions and, moreover, if it is 
strictly necessary, as a particular consideration, for the obtaining of vital intelligence 
in an individual operation.”  It must be noted that these criteria are not self-standing 
criteria that, on their own, can lead to the ECtHR condoning or condemning a 
national system.  First, in the same Section 73, the ECtHR noted that a measure that 
does not correspond to these criteria will be “prone to abuse,” and, as noted in 
Zakharov, this means that the safeguards must be assessed with “particular 
attention.”103  Second, in the same section, the ECtHR noted the absence of prior 
judicial authorisation in Hungary, which would have served “to limit the law 
enforcement authorities in interpreting the “broad terms” mentioned above.  Third, 
there were insufficient additional safeguards to prevent abuse.  To the contrary, 
surveillance warrants could be repeatedly prolonged104 (§ 74); supervision was 
“eminently political”105 (§75); surveillance had “never been subjected to judicial 
control”106 (§76); and reporting obligations to a parliamentary committee did not 
convince the ECtHR “that this scrutiny is able to provide redress to any individual 
grievances caused by secret surveillance,” especially since “it does not appear that 
the committee has access in detail to relevant documents.”107 (§82).  Finally, there 
was no “subsequent notification of surveillance measures” that could have 
                                                 
99 Szabó, § 9. 
100 Id. § 12. 
101 Id. § 17 (quoting Section 57 of  the Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services). 
102 Id. § 67. 
103 See also id. § 78. 
104 Id. § 74. 
105 Id. § 75. 
106 Id. § 76. 
107 Id. § 82. 
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contributed to the effectiveness of remedies.108  Given the absence of any effective 
remedial measures, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8 
ECHR. 
It follows from the above that there is no single recipe of oversight measures that can 
ensure necessity and proportionality for all secret surveillance measures.  And 
indeed, as set out in more detail in Part 2.1, EU Member States have chosen widely 
varying rules for secret surveillance.   
Based on the requirement in Article 52(3) of the Charter that the scope of rights 
under the Charter shall be “the same” as those laid down in the Convention, it stands 
to reason that the margin of discretion under the Charter must be the same as the 
margin of discretion set out in the ECtHR case law.109  In this respect it is worth 
noting that the draft General Data Protection Regulation, as it currently stands, 
rephrases the proportionality test in terms very similar to those used by the ECtHR: 
“a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard” 
recognised public policy goals.110  
Therefore, the EU Benchmark must reflect that Member States comply with the 
Convention and the Charter when they stay within the margin of discretion permitted 
under ECtHR case law. 
1.3.4 In Practice, The “Essentially Equivalent” Test Means That US 
Laws And Practices Must Meet The Basic Principles Enunciated 
By EU Jurisprudence And, With Regard To Proportionality, Must 
Stay Within The Margin Of Discretion Accorded To EU Member 
States By The ECtHR 
Taking the five basic principles in Schrems together with the judgments of the 
ECtHR, especially as the latter pertain to surveillance in general and signals 
intelligence in particular, the safeguards called for under EU legal order relating to 
surveillance can be summarized as follows: 
1. Specific legal authority:  Surveillance measures must be based on 
clearly stated legal authority.  The legal bases or purposes for surveillance 
must be clearly spelled out.  These purposes must be for legitimate aims of a 
serious nature with an objective reasonable basis in facts. There must be 
objective criteria by which to limit the discretion of authorities.  
2. Limited scope: The amount of data collected or subject to retention 
requirements must not go beyond what is necessary to accomplish the 
purpose of the surveillance and cannot be generalized or indiscriminate.  
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that “this provision shall not prevent Union law providing more 
extensive protection”.  However, there is no such EU law, at least not in the area of national security.  
Indeed, Article 4(2) TFEU would require explicit approval from EU Member States to relinquish 
sovereignty in this regard. 
110 See supra note 43, at art. 21. 
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Discriminants must be established with due care and consistent with the 
specified purposes for surveillance.  The period of retention must be 
reasonable and finite.  
3. Oversight:  There should be some combination of executive, legislative, 
judicial, and expert oversight for approval and review of surveillance 
measures. 
4. Legal remedies and redress:  The public should be informed about 
surveillance laws and have some opportunity for access and rectification, and 
for judicial redress.  If necessary for legitimate aims of surveillance, 
surveillance can be secret, in which event greater oversight or more general 
legal redress are necessary.  
These four criteria, therefore, provide the criteria to establish the EU Benchmark. 
The EU legal order requires laws in EU Member States to fulfill these criteria with 
concrete measures. With regard to the degree of interference, Member State laws 
must be “necessary within a democratic society,” which means these laws must stay 
within the margin of discretion set out in the case law of the ECtHR.  This margin of 
discretion must be applied on the basis of a comparative review of Member State 
laws so the “degree of consensus” can be determined for different types of 
surveillance.  The EU Benchmark therefore must reflect the “bandwidth” within which 
Member States must stay.   
1.4 Application Of The “Essentially Equivalent” Test Must Take Into 
Account Differences In Decisionmaking Under Article 25, Essential 
Procedural Requirements, And International Obligations 
In applying the “essentially equivalent” test to determine the adequacy of privacy and 
data protection safeguards in the legal order of a third country in the context of 
particular data transfer mechanisms, the Commission and data protection authorities 
must meet certain requirements of EU law.  First, they must comply with Article 25 of 
Directive 95/46, which prescribes different decisions for the Commission and for 
supervising authorities.  Second, the manner in which those bodies make their 
decisions must meet essential procedural requirements.  And third, their decisions 
must take into account the international obligations of the EU and the Member 
States. 
In addition, Article 25 of Directive 95/46 and the Schrems judgment make clear that 
determining whether a third country provides an adequate level of protection is not 
an abstract question.  The CJEU calls on the European Commission (or a 
supervisory authority as the case may be) to make “findings, duly stating reasons,” 
which must be based on a complete examination of laws and international 
commitments in force, and on practices and their effect.  If the Commission or a 
Member State makes a finding that a third country “does not ensure an adequate 
level of protection” pursuant to Article 25(3) or (4), such a finding will have to take 
account of the full dimensions of the EU legal order.  Only then can the decision 
ensure equal treatment. 
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1.4.1 Differences Between Commission Decisions Under Article 25(6) 
And Individualised Adequacy Decisions Under Article 25(2) Give 
Rise To Different Application Of The “Essentially Equivalent” Test  
There are procedural differences between a Commission adequacy determination 
relating to a third country pursuant to Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46 and 
determinations by DPAs or national courts (or, companies in “self-assessment” 
countries, such as the UK111) must carry out with respect to specific transfers or sets 
of transfers under Article 25(2).   
When the European Commission prepares a Decision under Article 25(6), it will have 
to assess not only the level of protection ensured by the third country’s laws and 
practices, but also compare them to the level of protection in the EU legal order as a 
whole.  It will also have to take into account the additional level of protection granted 
by individual company commitments, such as a promise to adhere to the Safe 
Harbour Principles. 
When a DPA or a national court assesses data transfers to the US by a specific 
company, Article 25(2) of the Directive requires a more focused test than the general 
test under Article 25(6). In such individual cases, Article 25(2) requires a 
comparative assessment of “all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer 
operation.”  This includes not only the nature of the data and the purpose and 
duration of the proposed processing, but also the country of origin and country of 
final destination, and the rules of law, including general and sectoral rules, as well as 
professional rules and security measures in the third country. 
As a first step, the determination must assess the data protection laws and 
surveillance laws and practices applied in the particular (exporting) Member State. 
Under Directive 95/46, it is these laws (rather than the EU legal order as whole) that 
establish the actual level of data protection in that Member State. 
Second, “the nature of the data” must be assessed.  The nature of data can affect 
the “rules of law, both general and sectoral,” applicable before, and especially after 
the transfer to the US; as discussed in Part 3.3.1, particular US sectoral protections 
may apply to the data once they arrive in the US (for example, the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA) for consumer credit reporting data, or the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) for health data).  The nature of the data 
can also affect the risk of surveillance; not all data is the same in this regard, and a 
large proportion of the 4,000 companies that have relied on the 2000 Safe Harbour 
Framework do not transfer personal information of types (such as communications) 
that are targets of surveillance.  In addition, some types of records ‒ such as health 
research ‒ may present strong public interest reasons to permit a transfer due to 
their potential to better human life, without regard to the risk of surveillance. 
                                                 
111 In the UK, the Information Commissioner’s Office has provided detailed guidance on application of 
the adequacy assessment with criteria divided into two categories: “general adequacy criteria” and 
legal adequacy criteria. See Information Commissioner’s Office, Sending personal data outside the 
European Economic Area (Principle 8), https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-
protection/principle-8-international/. 
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Third, the impact of the transfer of the data to the US is also affected by the location 
where the data are being transferred, because it can trigger the application of 
specific state laws in the US.  Hence, a thorough determination should assess the 
privacy and data protections of states with jurisdiction over the data.  If the state of 
destination is California, for example, one of the more than 100 California state level 
laws containing data protection provisions may apply, as further discussed in Part 
3.3.1. 
A fourth step is to assess the safeguards, including any Binding Corporate Rules 
(BCRs) or other contractual clauses, put in place by the company to ensure 
compliance with the data protection principles set out in Chapter II of Directive 
95/46.  While, under Article 26(2), such safeguards can – indeed, are intended to – 
enable data transfers even where the third country does not ensure an adequate 
level of protection, in the US they serve to reinforce a high level of privacy rules and 
practice, backed up (as noted in Part 3.3.1) by a vigorous private enforcement 
climate.   
If, as this report concludes, the level of protection in the US in the case of secret 
surveillance is essentially equivalent to the EU Benchmark, an exporting Member 
State cannot legitimately argue that the transfer will lower the level of protection 
without specific evidence as to why the transfer, in the specific situation of that 
specific company, will expose the data subject to a reduction in the level of 
protection for their personal data.   
And even if the level of protection in the US for the data of that specific company 
would be lower than the EU Benchmark, a general prohibition on the data flows to 
the US still could not be imposed without evidence that the level of protection in the 
exporting Member State itself meets the EU Benchmark, and that the exporting 
Member State also objects to data transfers to other countries that are in a situation 
comparable to the US.  If these requirements are not met, the exporting Member 
State would be discriminating against companies that do business with the US, and 
this would potentially infringe the international commitments discussed below in Part 
1.4.3.112   
1.4.2 Application Of The “Essentially Equivalent” Test Must Be Based 
On Correct, Complete, And Accurate Facts 
The first requirement for proper application of the “essentially equivalent” test – 
whether in the general context of Article 25(6) or an individualised determination 
under Article 25(2) (as discussed above) – is that it is based on facts that are correct, 
complete, and substantiated.  For the European Commission, the obligation to 
assess thoroughly all of the relevant facts pertaining to all of the factors listed in 
Article 25(2) of Directive 95/46 was highlighted by the Schrems judgment.  Hence, it 
forms an “essential procedural requirement” within the meaning of the TFEU.113   
                                                 
112 See infra. 
113 TFEU, art. 263, para. 2.  See, by analogy, CJEU 24 October 2013, Case C-510/11 P, Kone and 
Others v. European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:696, para. 28, in which the CJEU confirmed the 
general obligation of the Commission to properly establish the relevant facts:  
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For supervising authories, the CJEU confirmed in Schrems that they must act with 
“all due diligence” when taking decisions pursuant to Article 28 of the Directive.114  
Generally, the obligation to carefully establish the relevant facts before taking 
administrative and judicial decisions affecting citizens and companies is firmly 
embedded in the legal traditions of all Illustrative Member States, and it is reflected in 
Article 41 of the Charter and the EU Code of Good Administrative Behaviour.115  
Moreover, a failure to establish the relevant facts could contribute to a finding that 
discrimination is arbitrary or unjustified within the meaning of GATT or GATS.116  
The obligation to properly establish the facts means, first, that a determination 
cannot be based simply on press reports, especially those that been retracted or 
proved wrong.  Likewise, a determination cannot be based on mere allegations, 
much less those that have proven to be inaccurate or unsubstantiated.  It follows 
directly from the language of Article 25(2) of the Directive (“the laws in force”), 
referred to in paragraphs 70 and 75 of Schrems, that the obligation to properly 
establish the facts also means, relying on information that is relevant and not 
outdated.  With regard to the US, this means that all recent changes in the laws and 
practices in the US must be taken into account:117 every “essentially equivalent” test 
must be ex nunc.  
1.4.3 The “Essentially Equivalent” Test Cannot Result In A Test That Is 
Stricter For Transfers To The US Than For Transfers To Other 
Member States Or Other WTO Countries Outside The EU 
The international commitments of the EU form a part of the EU legal order that have 
been reflected in previous Commission adequacy decisions under Article 25.  They 
must be reflected in future decisions of the Commission and DPAs. 
When the European Commission prepared the Safe Harbour Decision in 2000, it 
requested advice from the Article 31 Committee.118  On 31 May 2000, this 
Committee published its “Text On Non-Discrimination,”119 which stated:  
“[T]hird countries have raised concerns that enforcement actions in the EU 
may be more severe vis-à-vis third country entities than they are vis-à-vis EU 
                                                                                                                                                        
“Courts must, among other things, not only establish whether the evidence relied on is 
factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also ascertain whether that evidence contains 
all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation 
and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it.” 
114 Schrems, para. 63. 
115 European Commission, Code of Good Administrative Behaviour (2000), 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/code/_docs/code_en.pdf. 
116 See infra Part 1.4.3. 
117 See infra Part 2.2.1. 
118 Article 31 of Directive 95/46 provides that such a Committee shall be set up to assist the 
Commission. 
119  Advice from the Article 31 Committee of 31 May 2000, Text on non-discrimination. 
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data controllers and that there may also be discrimination between the entities 
from different third countries.  The Committee is confident that these concerns 
will prove to be unfounded ….  [T]he Directive’s enforcement should, in the 
Committee’s view, be impartial both as between different third countries and 
as between third countries’ and EU entities.”120  
In Recital 4 to the Safe Harbour Decision, as in its other adequacy decisions,121 the 
Commission noted that these decisions “should be enforced in a way that does not 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against or between third countries where like 
conditions prevail nor constitute a disguised barrier to trade taking into account the 
Community’s present international commitments.” 
The “present international commitments” referred to in Recital 4 are set out in the 
WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS).  Within their scope of application, GATT and GATS 
require the EU and its Member States to grant, as a rule, “Most Favoured Nation 
Treatment” (MFN) and “National Treatment,” and they must also “administer 
measures in a reasonable way.”122  This essentially means that, as a rule, the EU 
and its Member States may not accord less favourable treatment to US goods, US 
services, and US service providers than they do to like EU goods and suppliers, or to 
other third countries that are GATT or GATS members. When the EU or its Member 
States do restrict MFN or National Treatment, such restrictions may not amount to 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”123 
                                                 
120 Id. (emphasis added). 
121 E.g., Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data provided in Switzerland 
(2000/518/EC), OJ 2000 L215/1, recital (4); Commission Decision of 31 January 2011 pursuant to 
Directive 95/46?EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of 
personal data by the State of Israel with regard to automated processing of personal data 
(2011/61/EU), OJ 2011 L27/39, recital (4); and Commission Decision of 19 December 2012 pursuant 
to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of 
personal data by New Zealand (2013/65/EU), OJ 2013 L28/12, recital (4). 
122 GATS Articles II, XVII, XVI:2(a); GATT 1994, Articles I:1; III:4; X:3(a). 
123 GATS Article XIV(c)(ii) (“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures… necessary 
to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement including those relating to…  the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the 
processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual 
records and accounts”); GATT 1994, Article XX(d).   
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Discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable if a WTO Member does not provide some 
degree of certainty that the application of the measure will be applied in a fair and 
just way by the designated domestic bodies.124  Therefore, arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination would arise if a Member State knowingly and without any rational 
reason subjects data flows to the US to higher standards than data flows to other 
Member States or to other countries covered by an “Article 25(6) decision.”125  
Examination of the US legal order therefore must take into account recent Article 
25(6) decisions in which the European Commission has recognized that third 
countries are entitled to restrict data privacy rights on public policy grounds, provided 
that the public policy grounds are “similar in spirit” or “reflect” the provisions of 
Directive 95/46.  Restrictions of data protection rights permitting surveillance may be 
acceptable even if “there is no exact corresponding exception in the Directive.”  In 
Opinion 11/2011, for example, the Article 29 Working Party assessed a principle of 
New Zealand law permitting an agency to collect personal data without respecting 
the principle of fairness where “[t]he agency believes, on reasonable grounds, that 
compliance would prejudice the purposes of the collection.”126  The Article 29 
Working Party took a favourable view of this exception which was likely to be used in 
connection with monitoring and surveillance activities even though there was “no 
corresponding exception in the Directive”: 
“(viii) The agency believes, on reasonable grounds, that compliance would 
prejudice the purposes of the collection.  Although there is no exact 
corresponding exception in the Directive, this exception reflects the 
exceptions provided for in article 13(a) to (f) and is likely to be used in 
connection with monitoring and surveillance activities, in particular in the 
employment and law enforcement areas.” 
Compliance with GATT and GATS obligations would not permit applying a stricter 
standard to United States goods, services, or service providers without properly 
substantial grounds. 
  
  
                                                 
124 See Appellate Body Reports, US – Shrimp, para. 181 and EC – Seal Products, para. 5.328, stating 
that there is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination where exporting Members can in no way be 
certain that the relevant provisions or guidelines were applied in a fair and just manner by the 
appropriate governmental agencies of the importing Member. 
125 See Appellate Body Reports, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, paras. 229 & 246 and EC – Seal Products, 
para. 5.306, stating that there is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination when the reasons given for the 
discrimination bear no rational connection to the objective of the measure. 
126  Principle 4 of the New Zealand Privacy Act “covers the issue of fairness by providing that an 
agency may not collect personal information: (a) By unlawful means; or (b) By means that, in the 
circumstances of the case, -- (i) Are unfair; or (ii) Intrude to an unreasonable extent upon the personal 
affairs of the individual concerned.” Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2011/wp182_en.pdf. 
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PART TWO: 
 
COMPARISON OF THE LEGAL ORDERS ON GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
SHOWS THAT US SURVEILLANCE OF EUROPEAN PERSONAL DATA 
TRANSFERRED TO THE US IS NOT “MASS AND UNDIFFERENTIATED” AND IS 
CONSISTENT WITH THE LEGAL ORDER WITHIN THE EU 
Part One demonstrates that a decision under Article 25(2) or 25(6) of Directive 95/46 
must take full account of the EU legal order (including the interferences to data 
protection permitted under EU law) and that the standard applied to the United 
States cannot, as a rule, be stricter than the standard applicable to EU Member 
States or to WTO member countries (and in particular the third countries that are 
subject to an Article 25(6) Decision).  This chapter turns to comparison of the EU and 
US legal orders in the context of government surveillance.   
This part presents the results of a preliminary overview of surveillance laws in a 
sample consisting of eight Member States, four of the largest ones and four others: 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Poland, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom (Illustrative Member States).  It also benefits from the recent analysis 
across all Member States by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(FRA),127 as well as other, less-recent comparative reviews.   
This report then looks at how US surveillance laws fit within this bandwidth of 
Member State laws.  In conducting the comparison, the report focuses on US laws 
most likely to affect data of EU citizens transferred to the US and the analogous laws 
in the Illustrated Member States.  These are laws affecting electronic communication 
and, in particular, those laws affecting what the FRA categorized as “signals 
intelligence,” comprising the collection, processing, and analysis of information 
transmitted or stored in digital form.  The FRA used the following conceptual model 
of signals intelligence128:  
                                                 
127 Surveillance by intelligence services : fundamental rights safeguards and surveillance and 
remedies in the EU (November 2015) (FRA Report), 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/surveillance-intelligence-services. 
128  The FRA’s model was derived from a model published by the US National Research Council in a 
review of surveillance technologies undertaken at the request of President Obama.  See United 
States, National Research Council, Bulk Collection of Signals Intelligence:  Technical Options 28 
(2015), available for download at http://www.nap.edu/download.php?record_id=19414#. 
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The ECtHR has conducted some examination of collection of signals intelligence 
under the ECHR.  In Weber & Saravia v. Germany, the ECtHR ruled that Member 
States have a “fairly wide margin of appreciation in choosing the means for achieving 
the legitimate aim of protecting national security” through signals intelligence.129  The 
ECtHR does require that “there exist adequate and effective guarantees against 
abuse,”130 but using “catchwords” or “search terms” (i.e., selectors or discriminants) 
is a recognized method to maintain the proportionality of the interference.131   
The examination of Illustrative Member State signals intelligence laws and other key 
surveillance laws follows the criteria for the EU Benchmark established in Part 1.4.  
Parts 2.1 and 2.2 below examine how the Illustrative Member States and the US 
each implement these criteria to provide guarantees against abuse and maintain 
proportionality.  Part 2.3 then conducts a direct comparison to establish that 
safeguards against abuse of surveillance under the US legal order meet the 
“essentially equivalent” test.   
                                                 
129 ECLI:CE:ECHR:2006:0629DEC005493400, § 106. 
130 Id. 
131 Id.; see also Liberty v. United Kingdom, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2008:0701JUD005824300, § 68, in which 
the German model of applying search terms was held up as a model for the United Kingdom: “[T]he 
G10 Act stated that the Federal Intelligence Service was authorized to carry out monitoring of 
communications only with the aid of search terms which served, and were suitable for, the 
investigation of the dangers described in the monitoring order.” 
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2.1 The EU Legal Order On Surveillance Reflects Wide Discretion As To 
The Necessity Of Surveillance And Safeguards To Limit Interference 
With Rights And Freedoms 
2.1.1 Introduction  
The Illustrative Member States whose surveillance laws are examined in this section 
are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK.  
Together, these countries encompass more than two-thirds of the citizens of the EU.   
This section of the report looks at the laws of these Illustrative Member States 
respecting government surveillance by intelligence services and criminal justice 
systems in light of the four criteria above, distilled from the Schrems judgment and 
the ECtHR case law: (i) the specific legal authority for the surveillance measures; (ii) 
limits on the scope of data that may be collected and retained; (iii) oversight of the 
surveillance measures; and (iv) legal remedies and forms of redress available where 
surveillance measures may breach data protection and privacy rights.132  These 
criteria must be respected to justify state measures that enable interference with 
human rights in pursuit of legitimate goals such as state security or national security.  
For each one of these criteria, this section considers the various ways the laws of the 
Illustrative Member States address key aspects of the criteria.  The object of this 
overview is to look concretely at how these Member States implement their 
surveillance laws and give force to the EU fundamental principles of necessity and 
proportionality.   
As more fully discussed below, these principles are expressly referred to in some 
form in most of the Illustrative Member States’ surveillance laws, and some have 
proposed legislation with a view towards conforming their laws with these 
principles.133  The focus of this overview is on the specific measures the Illustrative 
Member States take to provide such adequate and effective guarantees and comply 
with the broad principles in their laws.   
As set out in more detail in Part 1.3.3 above, it has been well established since the 
ECtHR’s Plenary Court judgment of 6 September 1978 in Klass that EU Member 
States must be able to undertake secret surveillance to effectively counter threats to 
the security of their citizens.134  They have a wide margin of discretion to set the level 
                                                 
132 Schrems; see also supra Part 1.3.4. 
133 In France, for example, the principle of proportionality, in particular with respect to the risks to 
privacy, secrecy of correspondence and inviolability of the home; and encouraging the implementation 
of less intrusive surveillance measures where the same outcome can be achieved, were presented by 
the French Government as being the guiding concepts in the implementation of surveillance 
measures pursuant to the recently adopted Intelligence Law No. 2015-912 of 24 July 2015 on 
Intelligence (2015 Intelligence Law).  The aim of the 2015 Intelligence Law was to fill a legislative gap 
and provide a legal framework for the intelligence services activities in France.  Likewise, in the UK, 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) was implemented to consolidate UK 
surveillance laws and bring the laws into line with the obligations under the ECHR (as defined below) 
including the principles of necessity and proportionality.  RIPA Explanatory Notes. 
134 Klass, § 48:  “Democratic societies nowadays find themselves threatened by highly sophisticated 
forms of espionage and by terrorism, with the result that the State must be able, in order effectively to 
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of protection for their citizens in terms of national security and public safety, to 
evaluate threats,135 and to choose the forms of surveillance to counter such 
threats.136  The threats to security cannot be defined in advance, and the 
surveillance instruments to be used can therefore vary over time as well.   
The ECtHR has assessed several types of potentially intrusive surveillance 
measures, including direct access of intelligence services to all communications of a 
certain type, e.g., all phone conversations between two Member States,137 or 
technical access to all mobile phones.138  The ECtHR does not condemn any type of 
surveillance methods or measures as such.  Rather, the ECtHR assesses if such 
measures are “prone to abuse” and what measures are taken by the state to prevent 
such abuse.139  This assessment of the surveillance practice as a whole (i.e., 
including safeguards)140 determines whether a Member State limits interference with 
fundamental rights to what is “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning 
of Article 8 ECHR. 
The comparative overview that follows shows a broad consensus (upheld by the 
ECtHR) that national security and public safety can be protected by means of 
electronic surveillance. 
Each of the Illustrative Member States authorises and regulates various forms of 
surveillance by agencies for the purposes of intelligence and internal security under 
the heading of “national security” or “state security” as well as other interests of the 
state.  Each also authorises surveillance by the criminal justice system for criminal 
justice purposes to investigate and prosecute serious crimes.  The majority of the 
Illustrative Member States use advanced forms of surveillance, and they are 
                                                                                                                                                        
counter such threats, to undertake the secret surveillance of subversive elements operating within its 
jurisdiction.  The Court therefore has to accept that the existence of some legislation granting powers 
of secret surveillance over the mail, post and telecommunications.”  See also Article 4(2) TEU, Article 
8 ECHR, Article 52 Charter, Articles 3(2) and 13 of Directive 95/46. 
135 ECtHR, Research Division, National Security and European Case-Law 4 (2013) (“Member States 
are recognized to have certain – even a large – measure of discretion when evaluating threats to 
national security.”). 
136 Klass, § 49 (“As concerns the fixing of the conditions under which the system of surveillance is to 
be operated, the Court points out that that the domestic legislature enjoys a certain discretion.  It is 
certainly not for the Court to substitute for the assessment of the national authorities any other 
assessment of what might be the best policy in the field.”); id. (collecting further references).   
137 Liberty, § 64. 
138 Zakharov, § 270.   
139 Id. §§ 270–271.   
140 Kennedy, § 153 (“[P]owers to instruct secret surveillance of citizens are only tolerated under Article 
8 [of the] ECHR to the extent that they were strictly necessary for safeguarding democratic 
institutions.  In practice, this means that there must be adequate and effective guarantees against 
abuse.  The assessment depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope 
and duration of the possible measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities 
competent to authorise, carry out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the 
national law.”).  
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technically capable of intercepting any kind of communication in their territory.  The 
four largest Illustrative Member States (France, Germany, Poland, and the UK) and 
the Netherlands explicitly permit certain types of surveillance that are not targeted at 
identified suspected individuals, and these countries can apply “keywords” or 
“selectors” to large communications data flows crossing their territory.   
For the publicly-known surveillance programmes,141 each Illustrative Member State 
limits the use of surveillance through prior approvals – either from judicial authorities 
or from high-level government ministers.  Each has various forms of post-hoc 
oversight.  The standards required for approval of surveillance, the mechanisms of 
oversight, the permitted scope of surveillance, and the ability to seek effective and 
meaningful remedies for abuses of surveillance authority all vary significantly.  
After this overview, the next section of the report will conduct a similar overview of 
the legal order for surveillance in the US measured against the same criteria.  Then 
Section 2.3 will assess the range of variation among the measures taken in the 
Illustrative Member States to establish the EU Benchmark and apply this benchmark 
to the US legal order. 
2.1.2 Specific Legal Authority  
Surveillance measures must be based on clearly stated legal authority.  The 
legal basis or purposes for the types of surveillance undertaken must be 
clearly spelled out.  These purposes must be for legitimate aims of a serious 
nature with objective basis in facts.  There must be objective criteria by which 
to limit the discretion of authorities. 
All of the Illustrative Member States have detailed laws that enable surveillance by 
government bodies for intelligence and internal security, as well as judicial (or 
judicially supervised) surveillance for criminal justice or law enforcement purposes.  
In all Illustrative Member States surveillance of internal communications (i.e., 
communications originating from and received within the relevant Illustrative Member 
State) is carried out for internal security purposes either by law enforcement or by 
the intelligence services (or components of the military or other agencies that 
perform intelligence activities).  The intelligence services of all the Illustrative 
Member States also engage in surveillance of external communications (i.e., 
communications either originating from or received in a country other than the 
relevant Illustrative Member State).  Criminal justice surveillance is carried out by 
police services. 
In some of the Illustrative Member States, such as France, government surveillance 
is governed by a section of the Internal Security Code implementing two pieces of 
legislation, the 2015 Intelligence Law and Law No. 2015-1556 of 30 November 2015, 
concerning surveillance measures for international electronic communications.  In 
others, the surveillance framework is more complex and is comprised of a number of 
laws.  This is the case in Germany, Ireland, and Poland.  These laws often cover 
                                                 
141 FRA Report, supra note 127, at 17.  This report discusses only the forms of surveillance that are 
known publicly.  There have been reports of secret surveillance programs in Illustrative Member 
States that are not regulated by law. 
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specific sectors such as telecommunications or police forces.  Regardless of the 
form or scope of such laws, all are published in either the relevant Member State 
Official Journal or a similar publication, or codified or enacted as public statutes. 
A Wide Range of Purposes Permitting Surveillance 
The purposes for which surveillance measures may be undertaken vary among the 
Illustrative Member States but all permit surveillance by national intelligence 
agencies in the interests of “national security” or “state security.”  These terms are 
not defined in the EU legal order, and in Esbester v United Kingdom142 the European 
Commission HR judged that “national security” cannot be defined comprehensively.  
As summarised by the ECtHR’s Research Division, “Member States are recognized 
to have certain – even a large – measure of discretion when evaluating threats to 
national security.”143   
Indeed, the lack of a clear definition is seen as an advantage in some Illustrative 
Member States.  According to the UK’s Secret Service the lack of a definition 
ensures the necessary flexibility is retained in order to adapt to changing 
circumstances.144  The Article 29 Working Party consider it “necessary to take 
account of the political situation at the time the ‘choice’ is made, as well as the 
relevant actors,” when determining whether a surveillance measure falls within the 
ambit of national security.   
Although Ireland’s legislation is principally intended to deal with interceptions on a 
domestic basis,145 it has perhaps the broadest national security authority.  Against 
the backdrop of the security situation in Northern Ireland in recent decades, Ireland 
has long asserted the need and ability to intercept communications “in the interests 
of the security of the State” as well as “for the purpose of criminal investigation.”146 
The legislation does not spell out these purposes in particular detail, and much 
discretion is left to the relevant authorities. 
Italy also broadly authorises surveillance by its External Intelligence Agency “to 
defend the independence, integrity, and Security of the State,” and by its Internal 
Security Agency “to protect internal security and democratic institutions from any 
threat, criminal aggression, act of terrorism or activity aimed at subverting the 
constitutional order,” but provides some limit by requiring a strong demonstration of 
necessity as described below. 
                                                 
142 ECtHR 2 April 1993, Esbester v United Kingdom, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1993:0402DEC001860191. 
143 ECtHR, Research Division, National Security and European Case-Law 4 (2013). 
144 MI5, UK Secret Service, What Is National Security, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-
we-do/protecting-national-security.html (last accessed on 19 Jan. 2016). 
145 The Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008 provides mechanisms for the Irish authorities to 
authorize interceptions based on requests from foreign law enforcement agencies. 
146 Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages (Regulation) Act, 1993 (as 
amended), Articles 4 and 5. 
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Among the Illustrative Member States, France has the most comprehensive list of 
security interests that can be protected by means of surveillance measures.  The 
2015 Intelligence Law spells out a number of specific security interests relating to 
“fundamental interests of the Nation.”147  These are:  
“[N]ational independence, territory integrity, and national defence; major 
interests of foreign policy, execution of European and international 
commitments of France and prevention of any form of external political 
interference; major economic, industrial and scientific interests of France; 
terrorism prevention; prevention of attacks to the republican institutions, 
actions leading to the maintenance or reconstitution of groups dissolved under 
Article L. 212-1; collective violence that could seriously harm public peace, 
prevention of organised crime and prevention of the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction.” 
Even where laws in Illustrative Member States, other than Ireland, Italy, and France, 
refer broadly to “national security” or “state security,” they also include specific 
categories similar to those in French law.  Germany limits the use of “strategic 
intelligence” ‒ interception of telecommunications traffic to or from Germany and 
other countries (as distinguished from “individual measures”) ‒ to detecting and 
averting the danger of, inter alia, an armed attack against Germany, terrorism, arms 
proliferation, money counterfeiting that undermines the stability of the EURO, money 
laundering, human trafficking of substantial importance, cyber terrorism and 
cybercrime, and smuggling of narcotics of substantial importance into the EU.148  
In Poland, the Internal Security Agency may implement surveillance measures to 
identify, prevent, detect and prosecute perpetrators of crimes which include:  
“[E]spionage, terrorism, illegal disclosure or use of classified information and 
other crimes affecting the security of the state; those affecting the state’s 
economic interests; the corruption of public officials, where it can threaten the 
security of the state; crimes with regard to the production and marketing of 
goods, technologies and services of strategic importance for national security; 
the unlawful manufacture, possession and trade of weapons, munitions and 
explosives or weapons of mass destruction; and the trafficking of narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances, in international trade.”149 
In addition to national security interests, in Belgium, France, Poland, and the UK, 
surveillance is authorized in various terms for the economic interests of the nation.150  
                                                 
147 Internal Security Code, Article L. 811-3. 
148 Act on Restricting the Privacy of Correspondence, Posts and Telecommunications [Gesetz zur 
Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses (Article 10-Act)] 26 June 2001, 13 
August 1968, Section 5.   
149 Act on Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency of 24 May 2002, Article 5. 
150 Belgium – surveillance is authorised where relevant for “the scientific and economic potential of the 
State” - Intelligence and Security Services Act, 30 November 1998, Article 7-1o; France – surveillance 
is authorised where in the defence and promotion of “major economics, industrials and scientific 
interests of France” - Internal Security Code, Article L.  811-3; Germany – surveillance is authorised to 
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The Polish Constitutional Tribunal, however, recently found the ground of the “state’s 
economic interests” was not specific enough as it was not a defined concept and it 
was not clear in relation to what offenses this ground could relate.151  In so doing, the 
Tribunal established among other requirements a judicial limit on the purposes of 
surveillance, holding that surveillance measures must be used exclusively for the 
purpose of detecting, investigating and preventing serious crimes.152   
A Wide Range of Acts Permitting Law Enforcement Surveillance 
With regard to criminal justice surveillance, three of the Illustrative Member States 
(France, Poland, and the UK) have provisions expressly authorising the intelligence 
services to conduct surveillance for prevention or detection of crimes of specified 
kinds or gravity.  In France, the authorisation of administrative surveillance for the 
prevention and detection of crime is limited to the “prevention of organised crime and 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction.”153  In Poland, intelligence surveillance 
for the prevention and detection of crime is limited to “the unlawful manufacture, 
possession and trade of weapons, munitions and explosives or weapons of mass 
destruction; and the trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, in 
international trade.”154  In the UK, surveillance is authorised for the “prevention and 
detection of crime,”155 although the crime must be considered “serious” to justify the 
interception of communications or intrusive surveillance.156  Surveillance on these 
grounds includes establishing by whom, for what purpose, by what means and 
generally in what circumstances any crime was committed, the gathering of evidence 
for use in any legal proceedings and the apprehension of the person (or persons) by 
whom any crime was committed.157  No distinction is made as to which authorities 
can rely on these grounds to carry out the surveillance measures. 
                                                                                                                                                        
“prevent severe terrorist crimes intended to significantly impair or destroy the fundamental economic 
structures of a State or an international organization and which, given the nature or consequences of 
such offences, may seriously damage a State or an international organization” - Law on the 
Establishment of a Federal Criminal Police Office, 8 March 1951, Section 4a (2); Poland – 
surveillance is authorised to identify, prevent and detect crimes which “affect the State’s economic 
interests” – Article 5 of the Act on Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency, 24 May 
2002; UK – surveillance is authorised where it is necessary “for the economic well-being of the 
country” – RIPA, §§ 22(2), 28, 32 & 49.  Note that Article 8 ECHR specifically refers to the “economic 
well-being of the country.”   
151 Decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, 30 July 2014, case K 23/11. 
152 Id. 
153 Internal Security Code, Article L. 811-3. 
154 Act on Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency, 24 May 2002, Article 5. 
155 RIPA, §§ 22(2), 28 & 49.   
156 Id. §§ 5(3) & 32.  Surveillance is intrusive if it is covert and carried out in relation to an activity in a 
residential premises or private vehicle.  Intrusive surveillance must involve the presence of an 
individual or be carried out using a surveillance device, defined as “any apparatus designed or 
adapted for use in surveillance.”  Id. § 48(1). 
157 Id. § 81(5).   
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In other Illustrative Member States, (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the 
Netherlands) surveillance for prevention and detection of crime is authorized only in 
provisions governing the activities of law enforcement.  In Belgium, surveillance 
measures may only be used in the context of an ongoing criminal investigation in 
respect of certain types of serious criminal offence including, for example, acts of 
terrorism.  In Germany, the German Code of Criminal Procedure permits surveillance 
by law enforcement in relation to the “investigation of serious criminal offences.”158  
In Ireland, surveillance by the Commissioner of the Garda Siochána (Irish police 
force) is authorized for the “prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of a 
serious offence.”159 In Italy, surveillance as a means to gather evidence and 
preventive surveillance can be authorized only in respect of serious crimes.160  In the 
Netherlands, the police may conduct surveillance pursuant to the Criminal Procedure 
Code providing there is a link to a criminal offense, with the gravity of the offense 
determining what surveillance measures may be used. 
2.1.3 Limited Scope  
The amount of data collected or subject to retention requirements must not go 
beyond what is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the surveillance and 
cannot be generalized or indiscriminate.  Discriminants must be established 
with due care and consistent with the specified purposes for surveillance.  The 
period of retention must be reasonable and finite. 
Illustrative Member States Gather All Types of Data 
The types of data covered by the surveillance laws in each of the Illustrative Member 
States broadly include images, sounds, traffic data (i.e., data relating to the 
transmission of a communication), subscriber data (i.e., data held by or obtained 
from a communications service provider), usage data (i.e., data relating to the use 
made by a person of a communication service), and the content of communications.   
In several of the Illustrative Member States there are no statutory distinctions among 
types of data acquired.  However, the surveillance laws in Belgium, France, Poland, 
and the UK apply different terms to describe “metadata” – traffic, subscriber and 
                                                 
158 See e.g., Code of Criminal Procedure §§ 100a, 100c, 100f, 100g & 100h. 
159 A “serious offence” is defined as an offence: (a) “for which a person aged 21 years or over, of full 
capacity and not previously convicted may be punished by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or 
more; “ and (b)(i) “that involves loss of human life, serious personal injury or serious loss of or 
damage to property or a serious risk of any such loss, injury or damage; (ii) that results or is likely to 
result in substantial gain; or (iii) the facts and circumstances of which are such as to render it a 
specially serious case of its kind; and includes an act or omission done or made outside the State that 
would be a serious offence if done or made in the State: Provided, however, that an offence 
consisting of an attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit an offence shall not be a serious offence 
unless the offence which is the subject of the attempt, conspiracy or incitement is itself a serious 
offence.”  Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages (regulation) Act, 1993, 
Article 1. 
160 See, for surveillance as a means to gather evidence, Code of Criminal Procedure, D.P.R. n. 447 of 
22 September 1988, Article  266.  For preventive surveillance, see Implementing Provisions of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, Legislative Decree n. 271 of 28 July 1989, Article 226, and Code of 
Criminal Procedure, D.P.R. n. 447 of 22 September 1988, Articles 51/3-bis & 407/2(a). 
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usage data161 - and treat this data distinctly from other forms of data, in ways that 
make it more easily available.   
In Belgium, “identifying data” is typically captured via “specific intelligence methods.”  
Unlike the “extraordinary intelligence methods,” which capture the content of 
communications, the “specific intelligence methods” do not require a prior 
authorisation from the regular oversight body (the BIM-controlecommissie).162  
Likewise, in Poland, there is no requirement to obtain the approval of the District 
Court prior to collecting the “telecommunications data” (as there is for other data).163  
In France “connection data” is distinguished from data collected through security 
interceptions and tapping.  Pursuant to Article L. 822-2 of the Internal Security Code, 
the latter form of data must be destroyed 30 days after collection (albeit subject to 
exceptions where, for example, the data is encrypted164), whereas connection data 
can be retained for four years.165   
In the UK, while the interception of communications requires the issuance of a 
warrant by the Secretary of State, the acquisition of “communications data” can be 
authorized by a “designated person” (i.e. persons holding a prescribed office in a 
relevant public authority).166  In addition, the scope of the purposes for which 
communications data can be obtained extends considerably beyond the purposes for 
which other types of data can be obtained and includes where it is necessary “in the 
interests of public health and safety, to assess or collect tax, to prevent death or 
personal injury or for any other purpose specified in an order made by the Secretary 
of State.”167  RIPA also places no restrictions on the use of communications data 
other than where such data is obtained pursuant to an interception. 
Targeted And Non-Targeted Surveillance 
In considering how to distinguish between mass surveillance and targeted 
surveillance, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights looked at 
differences between surveillance that “presupposes prior suspicion of a targeted 
                                                 
161 Referred to as “identifying data” under Belgian law, “connection data” under French law, and 
“communications data” under English law.  In Polish surveillance laws, there is no single term used for 
metadata, and instead reference is usually made to the Articles in the Telecommunication Act, which 
list the types of metadata.  The only collective reference used is in the Police Act (Article 20c), in 
which metadata is referred to as “telecommunications data” and, as such, this report will adopt this 
terminology.   
162 Act on Special Intelligence Methods by the Intelligence and Security Services, 4 February 2010.  
163 Act on Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency, 24 May 2002, Article 28 (1). 
164 Internal Security Code, Article L.  822-2-I°. 
165 Id., Article L. 854-5.  The Internal Security Code provides for longer retention periods up to 8 years 
for data obtained from international electronic communications (i.e., emitted from abroad or received 
abroad). 
166 RIPA, § 22(3).  
167 Id. § 22(2). 
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individual or organisation” and surveillance measures that “start without prior 
suspicion or a specific target, which is defined after collection and filtration of certain 
data.”168  
The discussion below first looks at how the Illustrative Member States treat first the 
targeting of specific individuals or organizations, and then targeting based on 
collection and filtration of data.   
 Surveillance Not Targeted At Specific Individuals Or Organisations 
Five Member States (France, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, and the UK) permit 
interception of external communications that is not targeted at specific individuals.169  
In France, the 2015 Intelligence Law permits the government to oblige 
telecommunications providers and ISPs to set up automatic processing, based on 
predefined parameters that could detect a terrorist threat.170  These parameters are 
predefined in an authorisation granted by the Prime Minister; the 2015 Intelligence 
Law does not provide clarity as to what these parameters may be.  This law also 
authorises traffic signals intelligence and IMSI catchers, which allow the capture of 
data of any person located in a determined geographic area without that person’s 
knowledge.171 
In Germany, a Parliamentary Control Panel (described more fully below in Part 2.1.4) 
is responsible for approving important aspects of the strategic telecommunications 
surveillance undertaken by the Federal Intelligence Service (the “BND”).  This 
surveillance consists of surveillance of telecommunications traffic externally from and 
to Germany using specific format or content-related keywords.172   
In addition to specifying the keywords to be used by the BND, the written order 
approving the surveillance measure must specify the geographic region, the 
transmission paths that are subject to the surveillance measure, and the percentage 
of the overall transmission capacity to be monitored on the external 
                                                 
168 FRA Report, supra note 127, at 17 (“[I]f a significant portion of the data collected is not associated 
with current targets, it is bulk collection; otherwise, it is targeted.” (quoting United States, National 
Research Council, supra note 128, at 33. 
169 The interception of external communications that is not targeted at specific individuals may take 
place in other Illustrative Member States but the surveillance laws in those Member States do not 
provide sufficient details to enable a legal analysis of the procedure to be carried out. 
170  Internal Security Code, Article L.  851-3. 
171  Id., Article L.  851-6.  
172 Article 10-Act, 13 August 1968, §§ 5 & 8.  Although a literal interpretation of the Article 10-Act 
would permit the BND to perform signals intelligence activities abroad between two foreign countries 
or within one single foreign country without the intercepted signals being connected to Germany 
(except for the actual data processing), this provision has not been applied to such activities. 
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telecommunications transmission paths.  The BND may not monitor more than 20% 
of this capacity.173  
The keywords used must relate to the specific threat identified and must not go 
beyond the scope of the order.  Keywords using identifiers that lead to a targeted 
detection of specific telecommunications lines or that concern the core sphere of 
private life may not be used.  However, the latter restrictions do not apply to 
telecommunications outside Germany – including in other EU Member States –
provided such communications do not involve German nationals.174  Likewise, if the 
interception measure is intended to avert an existing danger for life or limb of a 
person (i.e., a Section 8-measure), the keywords may contain identifiers that lead to 
the identification of a specific telephone number or another identifier of the 
telecommunications line of the person abroad.175 
Certain measures not targeted to specific individuals or organizations are also 
permitted pursuant to the German Code of Criminal Procedure to the extent these 
are aimed at identifying potential suspects or a group of potential suspects.  The 
measures include the automatic comparison and transmission of personal data, the 
collection and processing of traffic data and the use of IMSI catchers.176 
In the Netherlands, the implementation of surveillance not targeted to specific 
individuals or organizations is permitted via the use of keywords pursuant to Article 
27(1) and Article 27(3) of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, without 
the prior authorisation of the relevant minister.177  Once the information is gathered, 
the list of keywords to be used for the “selection” of the data requires prior 
authorisation, and this can be granted by the relevant minister for a renewable period 
of one year, as opposed to a renewable period of three months where keywords are 
not used (as set out in Article 27(5)).   
In Poland, the Foreign Intelligence Agency is permitted to carry out signals 
intelligence178 activities outside of Poland, which are not targeted to specific 
individuals or organizations. 
In the UK, there is no requirement to specify an identifiable person or premises in a 
warrant which relates to the interception of an external communication (i.e., a 
                                                 
173 Id. § 10(4); for further information regarding the interpretation of the 20% cap see Prof. Dr. 
Matthias Bäcker, Strategische Telekommunikationsüberwachung auf dem Prüfstand, Kommunikation 
& Recht 9/2014, 556 (558). 
174 Id. § 5(2). 
175 Id. § 8. 
176 Code of Criminal Procedure, Sections 98a, 100g and 100i. 
177 Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, 7 February 2002, Article 27. Theoretically, any 
Minister can approve surveillance.  However, in practice this will usually be the Minister of Justice and 
Security, the Minister of Home Affairs or the Minister of Defence. In any case, it is required that the 
relevant Minister in each specific case takes the responsibility for authorisation. 
178 Signals intelligence is intelligence-gathering via the interception of communication and electronic 
signals. 
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communication either sent and/or received from outside of the UK).179  According to 
the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee, the Government’s 
Communications Headquarters uses mass surveillance “to investigate the 
communications of individuals already known to pose a threat or to generate new 
intelligence leads, for example to find terrorist plots, cyber attacks or other threats to 
national security.”180   
The surveillance measures in all of the Illustrative Member States may inadvertently 
capture the data of third parties who are not the target of the surveillance.  However, 
this is explicitly addressed in the surveillance laws only of some of the Illustrative 
Member States.   
In France, the electronic communications of an individual connected to a person 
under administrative surveillance who is deemed likely to provide the services with 
relevant information, may also be intercepted.181  
In Germany, the Act on the Protection of the Constitution permits the Federal Office 
for the Protection of the Constitution in certain circumstances to deploy technical 
measures to determine the location of an active mobile phone or to determine the 
device or card number of an active mobile phone.  Personal data of a third party 
captured in the course of such measure may be collected if for technical reasons the 
collection cannot be avoided and if necessary to achieve the purpose of the 
measure.  However, the personal data captured is subject to an absolute ban on 
use, and it must be deleted immediately after completion of the measure.182  
In Italy, where a third party communicates with the target of certain surveillance 
measures, it is likely that the third party’s contribution to the specific communication 
will become public during subsequent legal proceedings.183  
In the UK, there is no specific reference in RIPA to the capture of third-party data but 
paragraph 3.1 of the Communications Code states that consideration must be given 
to any actual or potential infringement of the privacy and other rights of individuals 
who are not the subject of the investigation. 
 Surveillance Targeted At Specific Individuals Or Organisations 
All Illustrative Member States permit targeted surveillance (i.e., surveillance of 
specific, identified individuals or organisations) including to prevent a crime where 
                                                 
179 RIPA §§ 8(4) & 8(5). 
180 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security: A Modern and 
Transparent Legal Framework 25 (12 March 2015). 
181 Internal Security Code, Article L.852-1-I°. 
182 [Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der Länder in Angelegenheiten des 
Verfassungsschutzes und über das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz 
(Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz - BVerfSchG)], 20 December 1990, § 9(4), http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bverfschg/index.html. 
183 Code of Criminal Procedure, D.P.R n. 447 of 22 September 1988, Articles 266 to 271. 
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one has not already been committed.  The threshold level of suspicion for targeted 
surveillance required in each of the Illustrative Member States varies and in some 
instances is not provided for, as in Poland and the UK.   
In Belgium, only to the extent that the surveillance is carried out by law enforcement 
do the surveillance laws expressly refer to a required level of suspicion.  To this end, 
the Special Methods of Investigation Act states only where there is a “serious 
indication” that the individual is involved in a criminal offense (that may or may not 
have already taken place) can that individual be targeted.184  In respect of 
surveillance measures carried out by the intelligence services, the surveillance laws 
do not explicitly refer to a required level of suspicion.  The intelligence services are 
permitted to carry out surveillance to the extent an activity “threatens or potentially 
could threaten,” for example, the internal or external interests of the state.185 
In France, the level of suspicion for administrative surveillance is not explicitly 
referred to in the surveillance laws beyond a requirement that the surveillance be 
justifiable. Surveillance measures can be implemented where, for example, an 
individual’s behaviour may pose a threat to certain fundamental interests such as, 
national security (i.e., there is no requirement for the crime to have been committed 
already).  In respect of judicial surveillance, there is however, no restriction as to the 
individuals who may be subject to surveillance, provided the surveillance measure 
aims at transcribing correspondence that is useful for the discovery of the truth as 
part of an investigation of felonies and misdemeanour for which the penalty is at 
least two years' imprisonment.186  The Cour de cassation, the highest judicial body, 
confirmed that individuals may be subject to interception even if they are not 
necessarily the individuals against whom there is prima facie evidence of guilt.187 
In Germany, the Code of Criminal Procedure requires “initial suspicion” for the 
implementation of surveillance measures against targeted individuals.  This means 
that the facts must indicate that a criminal offence has taken place.  The majority of 
types of surveillance are permissible only if the investigation of the facts or the 
determination of the whereabouts of the suspect would otherwise be rendered 
substantially more difficult or impossible.188  In addition, interceptions of individual 
telecommunications under the Article 10-Act (Section 3-measures) also require a 
certain level of suspicion, while none of the German laws covering strategic 
                                                 
184 Act on Special Methods of Investigation and Certain Other Methods of Investigation, 6 January 
2003, Article 4. 
185 Intelligence and Security Services Act, Articles 7 & 8. 
186 Criminal Procedure Code, Article 100. 
187 Case Bull.  crim.  1990, No. 286 of the Criminal Chamber of the Judicial Supreme Court, 17 July 
1990; Case Bull.  Crim.  1991 No.  465 of the Criminal Chamber of the Judicial Supreme Court, 9 
December 1991. 
188 See e.g., Code of Criminal Procedure, §§100a (1) No. 3, 100c (1) No. 4, 100f (1) & 100h (1). 
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communications surveillance (as distinguished from “individual measures”) expressly 
refer to a threshold level of suspicion.   
In Ireland, for surveillance justified by state security concerns or for the prevention of 
serious crime there must be “reasonable grounds for believing that particular 
activities that are endangering or likely to endanger the security of the State” are 
taking place or are proposed.  In addition, there must be a “reasonable prospect that 
the interception … would be of material assistance.”189  
In Italy, with respect to surveillance as a means to gather evidence in ongoing 
criminal investigations, there must be a “serious indication” that the crime has been 
committed.190  The level of suspicion for preventative surveillance (i.e., surveillance 
carried out before a criminal investigation is initiated or in some cases a crime is 
committed) is not explicitly referred to beyond a requirement that the available 
findings of the investigation justify the surveillance.191  
In the Netherlands, the intelligence services can implement surveillance measures 
where the actions of individuals or organizations lead to a “serious suspicion” that 
those actions pose a risk to the democratic rule of law, national security, or other 
important interests of the state.192  This implies that the surveillance measures can 
be implemented in advance of the action taking place. 
Duration Of Surveillance 
The duration for which surveillance measures can be authorized varies among the 
Illustrative Member States depending on a number of factors, including, for example, 
the type of data collected, the surveillance measure implemented, and the purpose 
for the surveillance. 
In Belgium, the Intelligence and Security Services Act, only specifies a duration for 
which “extraordinary intelligence methods” can be authorised. The duration is two 
months, and this can be renewed for a further two months by the head of the 
intelligence services, after having obtained the advice of the supervisory body (BIM-
controlecommissie).193 
In France and the UK, the period for which the authorisation is granted depends on 
the type of data being acquired. For example, in France, an authorisation for the 
acquisition of connection data by the intelligence services is usually granted for a 
period of four months whereas an authorisation for interception of “real-time” 
                                                 
189 Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages (Regulation) Act, 1993 (as 
amended), § 5. 
190 Code of Criminal Procedure, D.P.R. n. 447 of 22 September 1988, Article 267. 
191 Implementing Provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Legislative Decree n. 271 of 28 July 
1989,  Article 226. 
192 Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, 7 February 2002, Article 6(2)(a). 
193 Article 18/10 §§2 & 5 of the Intelligence- and Security Services Act. 
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connection data is usually only granted for two months and only where it is for the 
prevention of terrorism.194 In the UK, warrants authorising the interception of 
communications are usually valid for three months and can be renewed by the 
Secretary of State for a further three months when issued in pursuit of a serious 
crime, or six months where issued on national interest or economic well-being 
grounds.195 Authorisations in respect of communications data are valid for a 
maximum of one month but can be renewed for a further month.196 
In Germany, the authorisation for the intelligence services to intercept 
communications is normally valid for a renewable three-month period, regardless of 
whether measures for the purpose of intelligence or law enforcement are 
concerned.197 However, acoustic surveillance of the private home must be limited to 
a renewable period of one month.198  
In Ireland, authorisations to intercept communications may be granted for a 
maximum of three months, extendable for a maximum of three months at a time.199 
In Italy, the authorisation for surveillance varies according to the purpose of the 
surveillance. For surveillance used to gather evidence in a criminal investigation, 
authorisation is limited to 15 days or 40 days in cases where there is a serious 
likelihood of the crime being committed and where the surveillance is absolutely 
indispensable to continue the investigation.200 In both instances the duration can be 
extended by the Judge of Preliminary Investigations. In contrast, preventative 
surveillance may be authorised for a term of 40 days, which can be extended for 
additional terms of 20 days by the Chief Prosecutor (for law enforcement) or the 
General Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal of Rome (for the intelligence services).201 
In the Netherlands, the duration of the authorisation for surveillance by the 
intelligence services varies according to the type of surveillance. For example, the 
tapping of non-cable-bound telecommunications can be authorized for a renewable 
                                                 
194 Internal Security Code, Articles L. 821-4 & L. 851-2. The duration of surveillance may be extended 
for data obtained from international electronic communications to four months or one year, depending 
on the type of data. Internal Security Code, Articles L. 854-2-II° & L. 854-2-III°.  
195 RIPA § 9. 
196 Id. § 23. 
197 See e.g., Article 10-Act, §§ 8(1) & 10(5); BKAG § 20l (4); Code of Criminal Procedure Section 
100b (1). 
198 Code of Criminal Proceeding, § 100d. 
199 Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages (Regulation) Act, 1993, § 2(5). 
200 Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 267. 
201  Implementing Provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Legislative Decree n.  271 of 28 July 
1989,  Article 226 and Law Decree 27 July 2005, n. 144, converted by Law 31 July 2005 n. 155, Art. 
4. 
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period of three months. However, to the extent keywords are used, the authorisation 
can be granted for a period of one year.202 
In Poland, an authorisation for “operational control” by the intelligence services can 
be granted for a maximum of three months but this can be extended for a further 
three months with the consent of the Attorney General and the District Court in 
Warsaw.203 In justified cases, where in the course of “operational control” the 
intelligence services uncover new circumstances important for the prevention or 
detection of a crime or for establishing the identity of a perpetrator and obtaining 
evidence of a crime, an authorisation for “operational control” can be extended for a 
further specified period with the consent of the Attorney General and the District 
Court in Warsaw.204 
Professional Secrecy 
The concept of professional secrecy, or legal professional privilege as it is referred to 
in Ireland and the UK, introduces a specific limitation on the scope of surveillance.  In 
Kopp v Switzerland,205 the ECtHR accepted that “when national security is at stake 
there are no conversations for which surveillance should be prohibited but monitoring 
of this kind must be adequately supervised.”206  In Ireland and the UK, legal 
professional privilege and confidentiality are based on common law principles and 
are described as a fundamental feature of the rule of law.  In the other Illustrative 
Member States, professional secrecy is based upon statute or other professional 
codes.  In most of the Illustrative Member States the concept of professional secrecy 
is limited by one or more factors, for example, the professions covered or the type of 
surveillance for which the concept applies.   
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK impose statutory 
limitations for accessing communications that are subject to professional secrecy.  
However, the extent of these limitations varies among the Illustrative Member States, 
and these are not always applicable to all surveillance measures.   
In Belgium, intelligence agencies are permitted to make use of or exploit 
communications that are subject either to the professional secrecy of a lawyer or 
doctor, or the secrecy of a journalists’ sources only in exceptional circumstances.207  
In France, members of the parliament, judges, lawyers, and journalists cannot be 
subject to administrative surveillance measures in France for activities they pursue in 
                                                 
202 Article 27 of the Intelligence- and Security Services Act. 
203 Act on Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency, 24 May 2002, Article 27 (8). 
204 Id., Article 27 (9). 
205 ECtHR 25 March 1998, Kopp v Switzerland, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1998:0325JUD02322494. 
206 ECtHR, National Security and European Case-Law, supra note 143, at 10. 
207 Act on Special Intelligence Methods by the Intelligence & Security Services, 7 February 2010, 
Article 2-2o-2. 
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accordance with their mandate or profession.208 For judicial surveillance there are 
restrictions on intercepting telephone communications of members of the parliament, 
judges, and lawyers in certain circumstances.209 
In Germany, an exemption for professional secrecy is not consistently applied.  For 
example, there is an exemption found in Section 3 of the Article 10-Act,210 but there 
is no equivalent exemption in Sections 5 and 8 of the Article 10-Act, which refer to 
strategic telecommunications surveillance. 
In Italy, communications subject to professional secrecy cannot be recorded where 
the surveillance is authorised as a means of gathering evidence in criminal 
investigations.211  However, there is no equivalent exemption for surveillance 
conducted to investigate certain serious crimes by the police or the intelligence 
agencies.212 
In the Netherlands, data collected pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code cannot 
be the subject of surveillance measures where such data is subject to professional 
secrecy unless the person profiting from the professional secrecy is the subject of 
the investigation.  A recent summary judgment issued by the general court of The 
Hague ordered the Dutch State (i) to introduce a prior authorisation procedure before 
an independent body for the tapping of communications covered by legal privilege213; 
and (ii) to introduce an independent review before any data collected can be 
transferred to other government bodies (such as the public prosecutor).214  
In the UK, there is no professional secrecy exemption in RIPA.  In the recent case of 
Belhadj & Others,215 the Investigatory Powers Tribunal216 found that the UK 
Government’s regime for the interception, analysis, use, disclosure, and destruction 
of legally privileged communications contravened Article 8 of the ECHR.  
Subsequently, provisions addressing professional secrecy were included in the 
amended Codes of Conduct published by the UK’s Home Office in 2015. 
                                                 
208 Internal Security Code, Articles L. 821-7 and L. 854-3.  
209 Criminal Procedure Code, Article 100-7. 
210 See e.g., Article 10-Act, 13 August 1968, § 3(b). 
211 Code of Criminal Procedure, D.P.R. n. 447 of 22 September 1988, Articles. 200, 268 & 271. 
212 Implementing Provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Legislative Decree n.  271 of 28 July 
1989, n. 144, of 27 July 2005, converted by Law n. 155 of 31 July 2005.   
213 Rb. Den Haag, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7436, 1 Juli 2015, r.o. 4.13 and 4.14. 
214 Id. at 4.18. 
215 Belhadj & Others v the Security Service, SIS, GCHQ, Home Office & FCO (2015) IPT/13/132-9/H. 
216 The Investigatory Powers Tribunal is established under RIPA § 65(1).  
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Data Minimization 
The principle of data minimization (i.e., that the collection of data should be limited to 
what is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish a specified purpose) is not 
explicitly referred to in the surveillance laws of any of the Illustrative Member States. 
However, in the surveillance laws of Ireland, Poland, and the UK, there are indirect 
and limited references to the principle, as referred to below, and it is important to 
note that to the extent the surveillance activities are subject to applicable data 
protection laws, the processing of personal data will be subject to the general data 
protection principle of data minimization. Further, all the Illustrative Member States 
require that the surveillance should not be excessive in the circumstances. 
In Ireland, communications obtained via surveillance must not be copied to a greater 
extent than is necessary.217 Similarly, in the UK, the number of people who can 
access intercepted material (including communications data where such data is 
obtained pursuant to an interception of communications) and the extent to which the 
intercepted material is disclosed and copied is restricted to the minimum that is 
necessary.218 
In Poland, the data minimization principle seems to apply following collection, to the 
extent that the intelligence services are required to destroy all information obtained 
via “operational control” that is not relevant for the purpose for which it was initially 
obtained.219 
Retention And Storage 
While the surveillance laws in the majority of the Illustrative Member States have 
differing provisions on retention of data, as discussed further below, none of the 
Illustrative Member States in their surveillance laws provide for specific statutory 
safeguards relating to the actual security of the data obtained via authorized 
surveillance measures beyond, in some instances, a general requirement to store 
such data securely.   
Only in France and Germany do the surveillance laws include prescriptive retention 
periods, which vary according to the type of data collected.  In France, the retention 
periods vary from 30 days for data collected via interception of communications 
(subject to a limited number of exceptions including where, for example, the data is 
encrypted) to six years for encrypted data.220  However, these limits apply only with 
respect to administrative surveillance.  In addition, in France the National 
Commission of Control of the Intelligence Techniques (CNCTR) can recommend the 
                                                 
217 Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages (Regulation) Act, 1993, 
§ 12(1)(b)(i). 
218 RIPA § 15(2). 
219 Act on Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency, 24 May 2002, Article 27 (16). 
220 Internal Security Code, Article L. 854-5.  The Internal Security Code provides for longer retention 
periods up to 8 years for data obtained from international electronic communications (i.e., emitted 
from abroad or received abroad). 
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interruption of surveillance and the destruction of the data collected.221  In Germany, 
specific storage periods are provided for only in certain cases.  For example, the 
personal data of minors must be deleted after five years, but this limit does not apply 
where additional findings are obtained after the minor reaches the age of 16.222 
In the Netherlands, data acquired through tapping of non-cable-bound 
telecommunications223 (i.e., via a wireless connection) can be stored for a maximum 
of one year.  However, there are no further prescribed retention periods and other 
categories of data are subject to a general requirement of retention only for as long 
as necessary for the purpose or objective sought.  Retaining data for as long as 
necessary also applies in the other Illustrative Member States, except that in Poland 
there is no requirement for the intelligence agencies to delete data acquired from 
communications service providers once it is no longer necessary to retain such 
data.224  
All of the Illustrative Member States (with the exception of Ireland) require the 
destruction of surveillance data following the expiry of the applicable retention 
period, if there is one.  None of the surveillance laws specifies irreversible 
destruction. 
On 8 April 2014, the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland assessed the validity of Directive 
2006/24/EC, which obliged EU Member States to provide for retention of data by 
telecommunication providers for between 6 and 24 months.  The CJEU declared that 
Directive invalid for enabling interference with fundamental rights without providing, 
at the same time, measures to limit retention to the minimum necessary, to prevent 
abuse and to ensure data security.  Because of this absence, the interference was 
not a proportionate instrument to pursue the legitimate aim of fighting crime.225   
The Digital Rights Ireland judgment does not formally require Member States to 
repeal national laws adopted as a result of the Directive, and neither the Charter226 
nor the ECtHR would prohibit national laws permitting data retention in a system that 
limits retention to the extent necessary and provides for sufficient safeguards against 
abuse.   
                                                 
221 Internal Security Code, Article L. 833-6. 
222 The Act on the Protection of the Constitution, 27 September 1950, § 11. 
223 The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 lays down specific rights to implement 
surveillance measures for “non-cable-bound telecommunications.”  This relates specifically to 
telecommunications that take place through the use of satellites.  A legislative proposal amending the 
Intelligence and Security Services Act aims to introduce measures allowing the bulk surveillance of 
cable-bound communications.  This rationale for this proposal is that, at present, 90% of internet 
traffic makes use of cable. 
224 Act on Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency, 24 May 2002, Article 28. 
225 Joined cases C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources and C-594/12, Kärntner Landesregierung, Judgment of 8 April 2014. 
226 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 
326/02. 
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Five of the Illustrative Member States still provide for retention of data by 
telecommunication providers despite the Digital Rights Ireland judgment and 
decisions by some national courts invalidating some of these data retention laws for 
failing to comply with that judgment.227 
Other Illustrative Member States have acted to add safeguards to their data retention 
laws.  In Germany, the former law on data retention was annulled in 2010 by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court on the basis that it violated the German Basic 
Law,228 and the German Federal Council reintroduced a revised law on the retention 
of traffic and location data on 6 November 2015.229  Consistent with the Digital 
Rights Ireland judgment, the new law provides for shorter retention periods and a 
detailed list of the types of data that can be stored.230  
In both Belgium and the Netherlands, the existing data retention legislation has been 
declared invalid and new data retention laws have been proposed but not yet 
adopted.  Similarly, the English High Court in the recent case of Davis MP and 
Watson MP v. Home Secretary231 ruled that Sections 1 and 2 of the Data Retention 
and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 are incompatible with Articles 7 and 8 of the 
ECHR as these sections failed to provide adequate safeguards in respect of access 
to and use of communications data.  The ruling was suspended until 31 March 2016 
to give UK legislators time to implement appropriate safeguards.  However, following 
an appeal by the UK government, the case has been referred to the CJEU.232 
Other Member States have not acted to conform their laws with the Digital Rights of 
Ireland judgment.  Of the Illustrative Member States, France, Ireland, Italy, and 
Poland do not appear to have taken any action.  In Ireland, in particular, the 
Communications (Retention of Data) Act 2011 remains in effect with all the 
provisions identified in the CJEU judgment as grounds for the Directive’s invalidity.233  
                                                 
227 France – Code of Post and Electronic Communications; Ireland – Communications (Retention of 
Data) Act 2011; Italy – Legislative Decree n.  109 of 30 May 2008; Poland – Telecommunications Act 
of 16 July 2004; UK - Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. 
228  BVerfG, 1 BvR 256/08, BVerfGE 125, 260-385 of 2 March 2010. 
229  Bundesrat Beschluss, zum Gesetzes zur Einführung einer Speicherpflicht und einer 
Höchstspeicherfrist für Verkehrsdaten Ds 492/15 938 Sitzung, 6 November 2015 (Entwurf, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 18.  WP, Ds.  18/5088, 9 June 2015, amended by Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 
Ausschusses für Recht und Verbraucherschutz, Deutscher Bundestag, 18.  WP, Ds.  18/6931, 14 
October 2015). 
230  Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Einführung einer Speicherpflicht und einer 
Höchstspeicherfrist für Verkehrsdaten of 9 June 2015 (“New Law on Data Retention”), WP 18, Ds.  
18/5088, p. 12. 
231 David Davis MP & Tom Watson MP v. Home Secretary [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin). 
232 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Davis MP & Others, [2015] EWCA Civ 1185. 
233 This report does not assess minimization measures and safeguards that may be present in other 
laws in these Member States. 
 54 
datamatters.sidley.com   
Sharing Of Data 
Of the Illustrative Member States, only the surveillance laws in France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the UK make specific reference to sharing of data collected 
pursuant to surveillance measures.   
In France, once the authorisation of the administrative surveillance measures has 
been granted, access to and use of the data by national authorities is permitted so 
long as the access and use are in line with the goals set out in Article L. 811-3 of the 
Internal Security Code.234 
In Germany, personal data acquired pursuant to strategic telecommunications 
intelligence can be shared with foreign intelligence services in certain 
circumstances.235  Likewise, such data can be shared with certain German 
authorities236 providing specific criteria are fulfilled.  For the transfer of personal data 
acquired pursuant to a Section-5 measure,237 the transfer is permitted only if 
necessary for the fulfilment of the recipient’s duties, and use of the data by the 
recipient is restricted to the purpose for which it was transferred.238  Personal data 
acquired pursuant to a Section-8 measure239 can be transferred in order to prevent a 
crime, providing actual indications to justify the suspicion that someone is planning 
or committing a criminal offense, which is likely to contribute to the development or 
maintenance of the danger to life or limb of a person abroad.240  
Under the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, when the “proper task 
performance” so requires, the gathered data can be shared broadly including with 
other ministers, administrative bodies, persons, or agencies, and with foreign 
intelligence or security services. 
In the UK, RIPA has a similar provision on sharing of data, which applies in respect 
of the interception of communications.  It provides that the number of people who 
can access the intercepted material and the extent to which the intercepted material 
is disclosed and copied should be restricted to the minimum necessary.  There is no 
                                                 
234 Internal Security Code, Articles L. 822-3 & L. 854-6.  
235 Article 10-Act, 13 August 1968, § 7a. 
236 The applicable German authorities include the Chancellor’s Office, the constitutional protection 
authorities of the federal and state governments and the Military Counterintelligence Service, the 
Federal Office of Economics and Export Control, authorities carrying out preventive Police and law 
enforcement activities and the Federal Office for Information Security. 
237 A Section-5 measure is surveillance implemented to detect and avert the danger of, inter alia, an 
armed attack against Germany, international terrorism, arms proliferation, smuggling of narcotics of 
substantial importance into the EU, money counterfeiting  that undermines the stability of the Euro, 
money laundering, human trafficking of substantial importance, and cyber terrorism or cybercrime. 
238 Article 10-Act, 13 August 1968 §§ 7(5) & 7(6). 
239 A Section-8 measure is surveillance implemented where necessary to detect or avert an existing 
danger to life or limb of a person abroad, by which the interests of Germany are directly affected. 
240 Article 10-Act, 13 August 1968 § 8(6). 
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guidance on what should be considered necessary.241  In addition, there is no 
restriction on sharing data obtained from service providers with foreign governments. 
2.1.4 Oversight 
There should be some combination of executive, legislative, judicial and 
expert oversight for approval and review of surveillance measures. 
In the majority of the Illustrative Member States, there is some combination of 
executive control, legislative review, judicial review, and expert bodies that monitor 
surveillance measures both before and after implementation.  The systems of the 
Illustrative Member States vary greatly, and in several of the Member States 
supervisory control is exercised by non-judicial bodies.242  
Across the Illustrative Member States, there is a patchwork of judicial and non-
judicial processes for prior authorisation for certain surveillance measures, and 
within Member States, these can vary depending on the type of surveillance 
measure and type of data captured.   
There are often specific exemptions from prior authorisation, for example, in Belgium 
where no prior authorisation is required to carry out “ordinary intelligence methods” 
or “specific intelligence methods.” Likewise, in the Netherlands the intelligence 
services are permitted to receive and record non-cable bound, untargeted, cross-
border telecommunications without a prior authorisation.   
In addition, all Illustrative Member States have provisions allowing some surveillance 
in exigent circumstances without prior authorisation, provided it is limited, authorized, 
or subject to prompt review. 
In comparison to prior authorisation, the level of post-implementation review varies 
considerably among the Illustrative Member States depending on, the surveillance 
measures used, and the types of data collected. 
In Belgium, under the Act on Special Methods of Investigation (which governs the 
investigative powers of law enforcement),243 surveillance measures may be 
authorized only by the public prosecutor or, as the case may be, by the investigating 
judge (in the context of an ongoing criminal investigation).  Once an investigation is 
closed, the Chamber of Incrimination will review the legality of the surveillance 
                                                 
241 RIPA § 15(2).   
242 Since Klass, § 56, the ECtHR has taken the position that “although it is in principle desirable to 
entrust supervisory control to a judge, supervision by non-judicial bodies may be considered 
compatible with the Convention, provided that the supervisory body is independent of the authorities 
carrying out the surveillance, and is vested with sufficient powers and competence to exercise an 
effective and continuous control.”  See also Zakharov, § 275, and the list of bodies considered 
acceptable by the Court in § 278 of that same judgment, including bodies composed of members of 
parliament of both the majority and the opposition; persons qualified to hold judicial office.  By 
contrast, political appointees involved in surveillance, and prosecutors were not considered to be 
sufficiently independent. 
243 Act on Special Methods of Investigation and Certain Other Methods of Investigation, 6 January 
2003. 
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measures.  Where an investigation proceeds to a criminal trial, the criminal judge is 
also competent to review the legality of the surveillance measures used.  In 
instances where surveillance measures were used but no prosecution was made, 
the public prosecutor must send the relevant file to the Board of Public Prosecutors 
for their review. 
The Special Intelligence Methods Act (which governs the investigative powers of the 
intelligence and security services in Belgium) provides for two separate control 
mechanisms.  The first is a regular oversight body (BIM-controlecommissie), which 
consists of three members (a representative of the public prosecutor, a judge, and 
an investigation judge, who presides); they supervise the legality of the surveillance 
methods used and adherence to the principle of proportionality.  The second is the 
Permanent Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (Permanent 
Committee I), which monitors the appropriate implementation of the special 
intelligence methods both before and after implementation. 
The BIM-controlecommissie grants prior authorisation for “extraordinary intelligence 
methods” (i.e., those that apply in the case of a serious threat and may involve the 
interception of contents of communications).  If the BIM-controlecommissie does not 
give authorisation within four days, then the methods are assumed prohibited.  No 
prior authorisation is required with respect to “ordinary intelligence methods” or 
“specific intelligence methods,” but in cases of the latter, the intelligence services 
must provide the BIM-controlecommissie with a list of all the methods used in the 
preceding month. 
During an investigation, the BIM-controlecommissie has the right to enter the 
premises of the intelligence and security services to hear their employees.  When the 
BIM-controlecommissie establishes an infringement of the Special Intelligence 
Methods Act, it will prohibit further use of the relevant data and will inform the 
Permanent Committee I of its findings. 
The Permanent Committee I monitors compliance with the Special Intelligence 
Methods Act both during and at the end of the surveillance.  The investigations by 
the Permanent Committee I may be initiated in several ways, including on its own 
initiative, at the request of the “Committee for the protection of the private life” 
(Commissie voor de bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer),244 or following a 
complaint from an interested party.  The Permanent Committee I reports to the 
judicial authorities (gerechtelijke overheden), and its activities are supervised by the 
Belgian Senate.  Investigations of the Permanent Committee I may result in the 
suspension of the surveillance measure or the subsequent use of data, or the 
destruction of such data.  Reports made by the Permanent Committee I are publicly 
available. 
In France, the implementation of surveillance measures in connection with criminal 
proceedings must be granted in advance and in writing by either the investigating 
judge (juge d’instruction) or the liberty and detention judge (juge des libertés et de la 
                                                 
244 The Committee for the protection of the private life is an independent body established by the 
Belgian Parliament.  The Committee consists of 16 members, of which the President of the Parliament 
is a permanent public official. 
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détention) based on a finding that the measures are useful to the discovery of the 
truth.245   
The implementation of surveillance measures for the intelligence services are 
subject to the prior authorisation of the Prime Minister, although the standards the 
Prime Minister must apply are not specified.  The Prime Minister’s decisions are 
subject to prior, non-binding review by the CNCTR.246  In an emergency the Prime 
Minister may grant an authorisation without first consulting the CNCTR, although the 
CNCTR must be informed of such a decision as soon as possible together with the 
basis of the emergency.247 
The CNCTR, an administrative authority that is independent from the executive, was 
established under the 2015 Intelligence Law to ensure that surveillance measures 
are carried out lawfully in France.248   
When giving an opinion on the implementation of a surveillance measure, the 
CNCTR assesses whether the request has been lodged according to the correct 
procedure and whether the request respects the right to privacy and the principle of 
proportionality.249  Should the CNCTR consider a surveillance measure unlawful, it 
can recommend that the surveillance be interrupted and the collected data 
destroyed.  The Prime Minister must immediately inform the CNCTR about how the 
recommendation was followed up.  If the CNCTR takes issue with the Prime 
Minister’s response to its recommendation, it can bring the case before the Council 
of State (a judicial authority).250  The CNCTR also has a right of permanent and 
general access to all data collected, as well as some general powers such as 
issuance of public reports or general comments to the Prime Minister.251 
The CNCTR publishes an annual report summarizing its activities.  It gives 
information on the number of: (i) requests and opinions delivered; (ii) claims 
submitted; (iii) recommendations to the Prime Minister and positive answers given to 
                                                 
245 Criminal Procedure Code. Article 100. 
246 The CNCTR comprises nine members: two members of the National Assembly (Assemblée 
nationale), two members of the Senate (Sénat), two members of the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat), 
two judges of the Judicial Supreme Court (Cour de cassation), and one expert in electronic 
communications.  The President of the CNCTR is appointed by the President of the Republic among 
the members of the CNCTR belonging to the Council of State or Judicial Supreme Court. See Internal 
Security Code, Article L. 831-1.  
247 Internal Security Code, Article L. 821-5.  
248 Id., Articles L.  833-1 & L.  833.2.  
249 Article L.  833-5 combined with Article L. 801-1 set the main principles of administrative 
surveillance: legitimate authority, legal procedures, justified goals linked with fundamental interests of 
France, and the principle of proportionality.   
250 Id., Article L.  833-8.  
251 Id., Article L.  833-2.  
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those recommendations; (iv) general opinions delivered on request to the 
government; and (v) challenges before the Council of State.252 
In Germany, the use of strategic telecommunications intelligence is subject to the 
approval of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, whereby the relevant 
telecommunications connections are determined in advance by both the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior and the Parliamentary Control Panel (PKGr).253  In cases of 
emergency, the competent federal ministry can make a preliminary determination of 
the relevant telecommunications connections.  The consent of the PKGr’s Chairman 
and deputy (as opposed to the entire PKGr) has to be obtained immediately as this 
preliminary determination will be null and void if the preliminary approval is not 
obtained within three days and if the consent of the entire PKGr is not provided 
within two weeks. 
Other than in cases of emergency, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior must 
inform the G-10 Commission of any surveillance order prior to its execution and at 
least on a monthly basis.  In cases of imminent danger (“exigent circumstance”), an 
order may be executed prior to informing the G-10 Commission.   
To the extent an information request is deemed not permissible or necessary, the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior is required to revoke its order immediately.  In cases 
where data has been captured in the meantime, such data must not be used and 
must be deleted immediately.  If a surveillance measure has been completed, the G 
10-Commission decides whether the person concerned can be notified.   
Surveillance measures carried out pursuant to the Article 10-Act are subject to the 
supervision of the PKGr and the G-10 Commission.  The members of the G-10 
Commission are appointed by the PKGr.  The G-10 Commission in turn operates in 
lieu of a court to assess the legality and necessity of surveillance measures; it is an 
independent body in that it must not receive instructions from the intelligence 
services or any other public body in the course of its decision-making.  The G-10 
Commission's power of review extends to the entire processing of personal data 
obtained by the Federal intelligence services pursuant to the Article 10-Act.  In 
principle, the G-10 Commission is exclusively competent to monitor the data 
processing of the services under its supervision.  However, it can request the 
Federal Commissioner for Data Protection to provide an opinion on data privacy-
related issues although, these opinions are non-binding recommendations in so far 
as they relate to surveillance.254   
The PKGr is responsible for scrutinizing the intelligence services’ work at a Federal 
level.  It also receives reports every six months from the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior on the implementation of the Article 10-Act, and it reports annually to the 
                                                 
252 Id., Article L.  833-9.   
253 The members of the Parliamentary Control Panel are appointed by the Bundestag at the beginning 
of each legislative period, requiring a majority vote for each elected member.  It is currently composed 
of nine members who belong to parties represented in the Bundestag.  The ratio of the members 
corresponds to the ratio of the parties in the Parliament. 
254 Article 10-Act, 13 August 1968, § 15(5). 
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Bundestag on the implementation and nature and scope of measures adopted under 
the Act.  The PKGr can request access to, inter alia, records and files of the 
intelligence services, may conduct interviews of members of the intelligence 
services, and has access to all departments of the intelligence services.  In 
exercising its supervisory duties, the PKGr may entrust an expert to carry out studies 
upon approval by a majority of two thirds of its members. 
In Ireland, the system in the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009 (which 
regulates surveillance authorized under the Interception Act) is subject to direct 
judicial control – applications for authorisations must be made and justified to the 
courts.   
In contrast, the authorisation system under the Interception Act remains outside prior 
judicial control and is instead under the political control of authorisation by the 
Taoiseach (Prime Minister).  This is despite a significant political scandal in 1983 
(one of the contributing factors to the adoption of the Interception Act) in which the 
government was found to have authorised the tapping of journalists’ phones around 
the time of a potential political leadership challenge.255 
A Designated Judge (a judge of the Irish High Court) with a general oversight 
function is in charge of writing an annual report for submission to the Taoiseach.256  
In addition, a judge of the lower Circuit Court is empowered as a Complaints Referee 
to investigate complaints by members of the public who believe their 
communications have been intercepted.  The Complaints Referee has the power to 
investigate, quash any invalid interception, report the matter to the Taoiseach, and 
recommend compensation.  As individuals typically do not know (and are not entitled 
to know) whether they have been the subject of surveillance and therefore may have 
no basis on which to contact the Complaints Referee, this Designated Judge system 
does not appear to have produced effective oversight in practice.   
In Italy, surveillance measures conducted in connection with criminal investigations 
are overseen by the Judge of Preliminary Investigations and the Public Prosecutor.  
Prior authorisation for the surveillance is granted by the Judge of Preliminary 
Investigations upon the request of the Public Prosecutor.  In cases of emergency, 
the Public Prosecutor can provisionally authorise the surveillance, subject to 
confirmation by the Judge of Preliminary Investigations.  If the Judge of Preliminary 
Investigations does not provide such confirmation, the data is immediately erased 
and cannot be used.257 
                                                 
255 ‘Ireland’s Watergate’:  How the Phone Tapping Scandal Would lEad to Haughey’s Downfall … 
Eventually, THE JOURNAL (27 Dec. 2013), http://www.thejournal.ie/what-was-the-phone-tapping-
scandal-1983-1232800-Dec2013/. 
256 The reports for 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 are available and often constitute just one page, 
concluding that “the relevant State authorities are in compliance,” without further elaboration or 
explanation of the powers assessed.  See, e.g., Report of the Designated Judge Pursuant to Section 
8(2) of the Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages (Regulation) Act 1993 
and Section 67(1) of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 (2010), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/58099350/Interception-and-Data-Retention-Annual-Report-2009-10. 
257 Code of Criminal Procedure, D.P.R n. 447 of 22 September 1988, Article 267. 
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Preventative surveillance carried out by the intelligence services is subject to 
oversight and prior authorisation by the General Prosecutor of the Court of Appeal of 
Rome.  The General Prosecutor is part of the judiciary branch and therefore 
independent from other government branches.258  The Prime Minister can authorise 
the Directors of the Secret Services to request the General Prosecutor to conduct 
preventive surveillance.   
The Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (COPASIR) exercises 
political oversight of preventative surveillance.  The COPASIR’s function is to ensure 
that the activities of the intelligence services are performed in compliance with the 
law and in the exclusive interest of the State and its institutions.259  In this respect, 
the COPASIR must regularly inform the Parliament and may hold hearings with the 
Prime Minister, the General Directors of the Secret Services, and the intelligence 
services’ agents.  In addition, the COPASIR can request documents from the 
intelligence services and inspect their offices.260 
The Prime Minister and the Department of Security Information (which oversees the 
activities of the intelligence services) have certain information obligations to the 
COPASIR.  In particular, the Prime Minister reports on the activities of the 
intelligence services every six months, and must inform the COPASIR every time a 
prosecutor is denied access to information on state secrecy grounds.261 
The Italian Data Protection Authority (the Garante) may also review from a data 
privacy perspective the surveillance measures and suggest remedies to the extent 
they are non-compliant with the applicable laws.  However, these communications 
from the Garante are not binding.  If the Garante’s review was initiated at the request 
of a third party, the Garante must notify that party of the outcome of the review.262  
The Garante can also initiate reviews autonomously, and there are examples of the 
Garante having exercised this authority in the past.   
In the Netherlands, the authorisation required in advance of conducting surveillance 
varies depending on the type of surveillance.  For example, for the seizure of letters 
and other physical mail a prior court authorisation is required, whereas for targeted 
tapping of non-cable-bound telecommunications (i.e., via a wireless connection), 
authorisation from the relevant minister is required.  Conversely, for tapping of non-
cable-bound cross-border telecommunications (i.e., telecommunications that 
originate outside of the Netherlands), no prior authorisation is required. 
To the extent the surveillance is conducted by the police, as a general rule, the 
public prosecutor can grant them prior authorisation for the surveillance.  However, 
in certain instances, such as for the recording of communications through telephone 
                                                 
258 Italian Constitution, Article 104. 
259 Law n. 124 of 3 August, Article 30. 
260 Id., Article 31. 
261 Id., Article 33. 
262 Legislative Decree n. 196 of 30 June 2003 (Data Protection Code), Article 160. 
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or other computerized devices, the prior authorisation of the judge of instruction 
(rechter commissaris) is required.263  As such, the type of authorisation required 
depends on the intrusiveness of the surveillance implemented. 
The general activities of the intelligence services (including the legality of 
surveillance measures used) are overseen by the Review Committee for the 
Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD).264  The CTIVD is an independent 
oversight body consisting of three members appointed by royal decree by the 
government from a list of candidates submitted by Parliament.  The CTIVD is 
required to inform and advise the relevant ministers concerning investigations and 
decisions following complaints and has the power to demand direct access to data 
that has been gathered, hear individuals under oath, and access any property 
(excluding residential property) without authorisation.265  The CTIVD is also required 
to publish an annual report.   
As part of the supervision of collection and use of police data, the Police Data Act 
provides that the person responsible for this gathering and subsequent use is 
required to keep a written account of: (i) the purpose of the investigation; (ii) the data 
gathered; (iii) the authorisations obtained; (iv) the automated use of the data; (v) 
each subsequent use of the police data; (vi) the transfer of data to other agencies; 
(vii) indications that use of data has taken place in an unlawful manner; and (vii) any 
automated comparison of data.266  The information is retained for periodic audits 
conducted by the Committee for the protection of personal data (College 
bescherming persoonsgegevens, CBP) and to respond to requests from individuals 
for their data.267 
The CBP acts as an independent oversight body.268  It consists at most of three 
people appointed by royal decree for a term of five years, which is renewable once, 
and it is assisted by an advisory committee.  The CBP’s supervisory powers are laid 
down in the Personal Data Protection Act apart from the internal supervision detailed 
above (e.g., periodic audits), the CBP is responsible for external supervision of 
collection and use of police data.269  The CBP has the authority to start investigations 
upon its own initiative, or it can be requested to do so.  If an infringement is found, 
                                                 
263 The judge of instruction is a single judge within a specific case.  The judge takes a particular role 
within proceedings, e.g., to take a decision in respect of the use of surveillance measures. 
264 The CTIVD (Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten) was 
established in 2002 and assigned pursuant to the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002. 
265 Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, 7 February 2002, Articles 73–77.  
266 Police Data Act, 21 July 2007, Article 32(1).  
267 Id., Articles 25 & 33. 
268 Personal Data Protection Act, 6 July 2000, Article 52.  
269 Id., Article 35. 
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the CBP has the power to order a cease and desist, or to lay down an administrative 
fine.270 
In Poland, prior authorisation for surveillance is granted by the Attorney General.  In 
cases of emergency, where delay would cause loss of information or erasure or 
destruction of evidence of a crime and with the prior written consent of the Attorney 
General, the head of the Internal Security Agency may authorise surveillance by 
submitting an application to the District Court in Warsaw, requesting a decision on 
the matter.  If the court does not approve the request within five days, the head of 
the Internal Security Agency must suspend the surveillance immediately.  No prior 
authorisation is required to the extent the data collected is deemed indispensible for 
the performance of the intelligence services duties (e.g., telecommunications 
data).271 
In the UK, the authorisation required for surveillance measures varies depending on 
the surveillance measure and the type of data captured.  For interception of 
communications, a warrant must be issued by the Secretary of State (usually the 
Home Secretary or the Foreign Secretary)272 or, where the Secretary of State is 
absent, a senior official under the authority of the Secretary of State.  Exceptions 
apply where both the sender and recipient consent to the interception or where the 
Secretary of State has issued regulations authorising interception by a system 
controller for specified lawful business practices.273  The interception of external 
communications requires, in addition to a warrant, a certificate from the Secretary of 
State describing the material that may be examined and confirming the necessity of 
the interception.274  
The acquisition of “communications data” (as the UK refers to metadata) does not 
require the issuance of a warrant, and a designated person holding a prescribed 
office within the relevant public authority seeking the data may grant an authorisation 
or give a notice to a communications service provider requiring it to obtain and 
disclose specified communications data.  An authorisation will be required only in 
exceptional circumstances, for example where the provider is not capable of 
obtaining the communications data.  The Secretary of State can restrict the types of 
data that may be accessed by a public authority as well as the purposes for which 
the data may be used.275  The Protection of Freedom Act 2012 amended RIPA by 
inserting two new sections that now require the Magistrate Court’s approval only with 
                                                 
270 The CBP has in the past exercised this authority.  For example, in 2015 the CBP commenced an 
investigation into the use of telephone numbers of people close to a football stadium following riots 
between fans.  Text messages were sent to 17,000 people that were in the area of the stadium after 
requesting these telephone numbers from a telecommunications provider. 
271 Act on Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency, 24 May 2002, Article 28. 
272 Ian Brown, Government Access to Private-Sector Data in the United Kingdom, 2 INTERNATIONAL 
DATA PRIVACY LAW 230 (2012), http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/4/230.full.pdf+html 
273 RIPA §§ 3 & 4(2).  
274 Id. § 8(4).  
275 Id. § 25(3).  
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respect to a local authority’s issuance of an authorisation or notice to obtain 
communications data.276 
Directed surveillance is covert but not intrusive (i.e., it should be carried out in a 
public place or via a remote location) and must be authorized by a designated 
person.277  Only those authorities listed in Schedule 1 of RIPA are permitted to carry 
out directed surveillance.  Authorisations for intrusive surveillance may be granted by 
the Secretary of State or a senior authorising officer.278  Depending on the senior 
authorising officer, prior approval for the authorisation may be required from the 
Office of Surveillance Commissioners.279 
The office of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (IOCC) was 
established to review the exercise and performance of the powers and duties 
established under RIPA.280  The IOCC reports directly to the Prime Minister at least 
twice a year and the Prime Minister presents a copy of the reports (which may be 
redacted) to Parliament.281  The IOCC “cannot disclose the details of any individual 
warrant or communications data acquisition.”282  RIPA also provides for the 
appointment of an Intelligence Services Commissioner (ISC) to supervise the 
activities of the intelligence services.  The ISC has similar reporting obligations to 
those of the IOCC.  The Office of Surveillance Commissioners oversees the use of 
covert surveillance (including directed and intrusive surveillance) by all public 
authorities based in the UK, but does not oversee the intelligence services.  The 
Office of Surveillance Commissioners also oversees the operation of Part III of RIPA 
(i.e., access to protected electronic information which has, for example, been 
subjected to encryption).  Notably, neither of these entities has within their remit a 
duty to oversee or review access to communications data (metadata).   
The UK also has an Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), which consists of ten 
Members appointed by Her Majesty The Queen, who must be senior members of the 
legal profession, including a President and Vice-President who both must have held 
high judicial office.  The IPT has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine 
complaints about conduct in connection with covert techniques by a public authority 
regulated under RIPA or a wider human rights breach by the intelligence agencies.  
Indeed, the IPT is the only appropriate tribunal in relation to proceedings for actions 
incompatible with the ECHR.  In addition, the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) 
hears appeals from individuals in respect of decisions issued by the Information 
                                                 
276 Id. §§ 23A & 23B.  
277 Directed surveillance must be carried out for the purposes of a specific investigation or operation 
and be likely to result in the obtaining of information about a person’s private or family life. 
278 RIPA § 32.  
279 Id. § 36.  
280 Id. § 57.  
281 Id. § 58(6).   
282 David Anderson Q.C., A Question of Trust – Report of the Investigatory Powers Review 119 
(2015). 
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Commissioner’s Office in response to a freedom of information request.  This tribunal 
is independent of the government. 
2.1.5 Legal Remedies And Redress 
The public should be informed about surveillance laws and have some 
opportunity for access and rectification, and for judicial redress.  If necessary 
for legitimate aims of surveillance, surveillance can be secret, in which event 
oversight or more general legal redress are necessary.   
The EU legal order recognizes that, in the context of surveillance and investigations, 
the principle of access and rectification can be limited by the need to maintain the 
effectiveness of necessary surveillance measures.  In practice, the available 
remedies in the Illustrative Member States vary significantly from judicial 
mechanisms with proceedings brought before the national courts to ones that use 
non-judicial bodies, such as DPAs, ombudsmen, and parliamentary committees. 
In addition, pursuit of a legal remedy or redress in relation to national surveillance 
faces practical limitations.  First, access to alternative non-judicial remedies is 
constrained by broad exemptions for national security and limited powers of DPAs or 
other remedial authorities in the field of national security.  Second, the secret nature 
of most surveillance means that an individual is likely to be unaware of the factual 
basis for a claim.  And third, a lack of information raises difficulties in terms of legal 
standing and obtaining evidence, and results in limited case law.   
These limitations add to the role of effective oversight mechanisms to identify and 
rectify potential abuse of surveillance powers.   
Preconditions To Remedial Action – Informing The Individual And Rights Of 
Access 
The ECtHR has recognized that “the fact that persons concerned by such measures 
are not subsequently notified once surveillance has ceased cannot by itself warrant 
the conclusion that the interference was not ‘necessary in a democratic society,’ as it 
is the ‘very absence of knowledge of surveillance which ensures the efficacy of the 
interference.’”283  Indeed, legal frameworks in all the Illustrative Member States allow 
restrictions on access to knowledge of surveillance and the right of access to data on 
the basis of exemptions under national security laws.  There is no uniformity on how 
these restrictions are applied. 
In most of the Illustrative Member States, the national laws do not provide an 
obligation to inform the individual about surveillance activities or a right of access to 
their personal data held by surveillance bodies; in some, the obligation to inform and 
rights of access are explicitly restricted because of rules applicable to classified 
documents and official secrets; and only a small number of Illustrative Member 
States allow for indirect and restricted access through supervisory authorities.  But 
even in those Member States, there are exceptions notably with regard to security 
surveillance outside the scope of law enforcement. 
                                                 
283 Weber & Saravia, § 135 (citing Klass, § 58).   
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In Belgium, access to personal data must be refused if the data is classified pursuant 
to Article 3 of the Classification Act284 (i.e., for a variety of national interests).  
Similarly, in Ireland, data protection safeguards do not apply to personal data that in 
the opinion of the Minister for Justice or the Minister for Defence are, or at any time 
were, kept for the purpose of safeguarding the security of the State.285  In addition, a 
telecommunications provider is prohibited under the Interception Act from disclosing 
information relating to requests for information made by the police or confirming 
whether such requests have been made. 
In Germany, a general right to access and rectify data collected by a public authority 
explicitly excludes activities of the federal intelligence services.286  Likewise, in the 
Netherlands, the intelligence services may set aside the obligations under the Dutch 
Personal Data Protection Act that relate to notification and access to data.287  
In Poland and in the UK, the right to information and right to access are not 
expressly provided for in the surveillance laws, except that in the UK, the 
Communications Code explicitly acknowledges the exemption to subject access 
rights possible under Sections 28 and 29 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (i.e., where 
personal data is processed for the purposes of the prevention and detection of crime 
or safeguarding national security).  Section 28(2) of the Data Protection Act 1998 
states that a ministerial certificate stating such an exemption is required will be 
conclusive evidence of this fact.288  However, in the case of Norman Baker MP v 
Secretary of State,289 the Information Tribunal (for national security appeals)290 
quashed a ministerial certificate, ruling that whilst it may be reasonable to refuse to 
release information where this would be prejudicial to national security, a blanket 
policy to this effect is unreasonable and applications should be considered on an 
individual basis.  The reasoning for the quashing of the certificate included that 
“limited evidence as to the practice in other countries did not identify anywhere 
                                                 
284 Act on the Classification and the Security Authorisation, Security Certificates and Security Advice 
(Classification Act), 11 December 1998, Article 3. 
285 Ireland Data Protection Act 1988 (as amended), § 1(4)(a). 
286 See, e.g., BVerfSchG, 27 September 1950, § 27; The Act on the Military Counterintelligence 
Service [Gesetz über den militärischen Abschirmdienst (MAD-Gesetz - MADG)] 20 December 1990, § 
13; the Act on the Federal Intelligence Service [Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND-
Gesetz - BNDG)] 20 December 1990, § 11 of the BNDG. 
287 Personal Data Protection Act, 14 January 2003, Article 43. 
288 Communications Code, paras. 7.5 and 7.6.  The UK Anderson Report recommends that an 
Independent Surveillance and Intelligence Commission be created that would be in charge of 
informing an individual of an error on the part of the public authority or communication service 
provider and notifying individuals of their right to lodge an application to the IPT, on their own initiative 
or at the suggestion of the public authority or communication service provider.  Anderson, A Question 
of Trust – Report of the Investigatory Powers Review, supra note 282, at 303. 
289 Norman Baker MP v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] U.K.H.R.R. 1275. 
290 In 2010 the Information Tribunal became part of the General Regulatory Chamber of the First-tier 
Tribunal (Information Rights).  This Chamber hears appeals from notices issued by the Information 
Commissioner regarding breaches of UK data privacy laws. 
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where an identical unchallengeable exemption was permitted.  Notably the practice 
in the [US] was more considerate of individual rights than the practice in the [UK] 
exemplified in these proceedings.”291 
In allowing for secrecy during and after the conduct of surveillance, the ECtHR has 
also stated that “as soon as notification can be made without jeopardizing the pur-
pose of the surveillance after its termination, information should be provided to the 
persons concerned ....”292  Several Illustrative Member States have provisions that 
allow notification of surveillance some time after it has occurred, at least with respect 
to law enforcement surveillance. 
In Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, individuals are notified or information is 
provided at the end of the surveillance on the assumption that up to that time the 
threat to national security will persist throughout the surveillance period.   
In Belgium, under the Special Intelligence Methods Act an individual is to be 
informed, upon request, five years after the surveillance has ended.  In 2011 the 
Belgian Constitutional Court declared this provision unconstitutional and called for 
the intelligence services to take the initiative to inform the data subjects regardless of 
whether a subject has made such a request.293  
In Germany, the Federal Data Protection Act (the BDSG)294 provides for the right of 
access to personal data collected by a public authority and to seek the correction, 
erasure, and blocking of such data regardless of whether a data subject is a 
citizen.295  In the context of criminal investigations in Germany, the investigating 
authorities have to provide information to a person concerned, upon request, unless 
otherwise regulated in the law.296  One exception to this obligation applies to 
information requests on pending proceedings initiated less than six months before 
the request for information is filed.  In addition, the German Code of Criminal 
Procedure requires investigating authorities to inform certain individuals concerned 
by a measure as soon as such notification does not endanger the purpose of the 
investigation; the life, physical integrity, and personal liberty of another person; or 
significant assets.297  A similar provision is included in the Law on the Establishment 
of a Federal Criminal Police Office (the BKAG).298  However, while the German Code 
                                                 
291 Norman Baker, U.K.H.R.R. 1275, para. 113(i). 
292 ECtHR 28 June 2007, Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v 
Bulgaria, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2007:0628JUD006254000. 
293 Belgium Constitutional Court No 145/2011, 22 September 2011. 
294 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG), published on 14 January 2003 (Federal Law Gazette I page 
66) was last amended by Article 1 of the law dated 25 February 2015, (Federal Law Gazette I page 
162). 
295 BDSG, 14 January 2003, §§ 19 & 20.  
296 Code of Criminal Procedure, § 491. 
297  Id., §§ 101(4) & (5).  
298 The Law on the Establishment of a Federal Criminal Police Office, 7 July 1997, § 20w (1) No. 7 & 
(2). 
 67 
datamatters.sidley.com   
of Criminal Procedure also requires that the individual be informed about applicable 
legal remedies, the BKAG does not.   
In Italy, where surveillance is used as a means to gather evidence in an ongoing 
criminal investigation, counsel for the subject under investigation is notified 
immediately.299  However, there is no equivalent provision in the surveillance laws 
governing disclosure of preventative surveillance.   
In the Netherlands, individuals are notified five years after the intelligence security 
services have carried out special surveillance measures, such as opening letters, 
intercepting telecommunications and intercepting non-cable bound 
telecommunications.  However, the notification may be postponed if the data is still 
needed in the investigation.300   
Of the Illustrative Member States, only in Germany do the surveillance laws 
distinguish between the obligation to inform an individual in a case of targeted 
surveillance as against the obligation to do so when an individual is targeted as a 
result of signals intelligence.  In Germany, the obligation to inform does not apply to 
data that are immediately deleted after they have been captured through the use of 
selectors used in signals intelligence.301  
Belgium, France, and Italy provide for limited and indirect access through inquiry by 
data protection authorities.  In Belgium, a request for access can be made to the 
Privacy Commissioner.302 The access to personal data must be refused when the 
data is classified according to Article 3 of the Classification Act (e.g., if the data could 
harm the internal or external security of the state).  However, the Privacy 
Commissioner cannot make binding decisions. 
In France, where the processing of the personal data involves state security, defence 
or public safety, individuals have only a “right of indirect access.”  In practice, this 
means that the request to access and check the data must be made to the French 
Data Protection Authority (CNIL).  After investigations, the applicant is informed that 
necessary investigations have been carried out; the extent that the CNIL establishes, 
with the agreement of the data controller, that the disclosure of data does not 
undermine the purposes for its collection, i.e., the state security, the defence or 
public safety, the data may be disclosed to the applicant.303  
In Italy, interested persons can seek the erasure of any data being used or stored 
illegally from the competent court or the Garante.304   
                                                 
299 Code of Criminal Procedure, D.P.R. n. 447 of 22 September 1998, Article 268. 
300 The Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, 7 February 2002, Article 47.  
301 FRA Report, supra note 127, at 65. 
302 Article 13 of the Access to Personal Data Act (Wet verstrekking persoonsgegevens). 
303 Law No.  78-17 on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties, 6 January 1978, Article 
41. 
304 Legislative Decree n. 196 of 30 June 2003 (Data Protection Code), Articles 141 & 145. 
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Judicial And Non-Judicial Remedies 
In the Illustrative Member States, the national courts present a means by which 
individuals can seek remedies for breach of their data protection and privacy rights in 
some cases (but generally individuals cannot sue to obtain access to their personal 
data gathered in security surveillance).  The national laws and court procedures of 
the Illustrative Member States determine which courts (if any) are competent to 
review surveillance complaints.  In addition, in some of the Illustrative Member 
States, forms of redress are available from non-judicial bodies such as DPAs, 
ombudsmen, and parliamentary committees.  However, for non-judicial bodies there 
can be questions concerning their independence, particularly where they also have 
power to issue warrants and, in the case of DPAs, their powers over intelligence 
services often are limited and usually deal with administrative processes rather than 
the substantive basis for the surveillance. 
Further, while redress from non-judicial authorities may be more accessible, faster, 
and cheaper, as there is less procedure than with the courts, the degree to which 
these bodies can provide an effective remedy depends on factors such as their 
specialized knowledge, powers to investigate, and whether their decisions are 
actually binding; in many cases non-judicial authorities only are able to make non-
binding recommendations. 
In Belgium, the Permanent Committee I was introduced to deal with national 
surveillance cases.  The Permanent Committee I has a quasi-judicial function, 
investigating complaints and rules on the legality of intelligence measures; it has the 
power to order cessation when it observes that the surveillance measures are no 
longer useful, when the threat that justified the surveillance measure has subsided or 
when it has observed an “illegality.”305  The Permanent Committee I has specialized 
expertise in surveillance. 
In France, any individual who wants to verify that surveillance measures against him 
or her were lawfully carried out may request the CNCTR conduct such 
verifications.306  Once notified by the CNCTR that such verifications have been 
carried out, the individual may challenge the implementation of the surveillance 
measure before the Council of State, the highest administrative tribunal in France.307  
The Council of State checks if all of the legal procedures have been followed in the 
particular case, if the data collected is correct, and if the retention period has 
expired.  It can then inform the applicant that all of the verifications have been made.  
If something unlawful has been undertaken, the Council of State can order measures 
to rectify this and provide the applicant with the requisite information without giving 
any information that would undermine the secrecy of national defence.308   
                                                 
305 Intelligence and Security Services Act, 30 November 1998, Article 18/10. 
306 Internal Security Code, Articles L.  833-4 & L. 854-6.  
307 Id., Article L.  841-1. 
308 See also discussion of “right of indirect access” via the CNIL, supra Part 2.1.5. 
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In Germany, Section 13 of the Article 10-Act provides that legal action against orders 
pursuant to Section 3 (individual measures) and Section 5 (strategic 
telecommunications intelligence) and their enforcement is not permitted prior to the 
notification of the person concerned.  This means that an interested party may 
challenge the legality of an order and its implementation before a court only after 
being informed about the measure.  In cases of strategic telecommunications 
intelligence (Section 5 and 8 of the Article 10-Act), notification takes place only if the 
personal data was not deleted immediately.309  In 2013, approximately twelve judicial 
claims against individual measures (Section 3) were pending, while one legal action 
against strategic surveillance measures pursuant to Section 5 of the Article 10-Act 
was filed before the highest administrative court, the Federal Administrative Court.310  
No legal action has been reported in connection with Section 8 measures (i.e., 
surveillance implemented where necessary to detect or avert an existing danger to 
life or limb of a person abroad, by which the interests of Germany are directly 
affected).311 
With respect to non-judicial remedies, interested parties also can bring a complaint 
before the G-10 Commission if they suspect interferences by an intelligence 
service312 with the right of privacy of correspondence, posts, and 
telecommunications.  In 2013, the G-10 Commission received 21 such complaints 
linked to targeted surveillance, but found no violation.  No complaints against 
strategic surveillance were reported. 
In Ireland, as mentioned above, a Complaints Referee consisting of a lower Circuit 
Court judge is empowered to investigate complaints by members of the public who 
believe their communications have been intercepted.  The Complaints Referee has 
power to investigate, quash any invalid interception, report the matter to the Prime 
minister, and recommend compensation.  A Designated Judge of the High Court also 
exercises a more general oversight function.   
In Italy, the Code of Criminal Procedure governs surveillance as a means to gather 
evidence in criminal investigations which is subject to oversight of the judge 
presiding over the investigation.  A person under investigation has a right of access 
to the data collected and can petition the judge to see that the data is deleted on 
data protection grounds once no longer necessary in the context of the 
                                                 
309 Article 10-Act, 13 August 1968, § 12 (2). 
310  See G 10-Commission Report 2013, at 8.  In the meantime, the Federal Administrative Court 
issued a judgment in this case, rejecting the applicant’s request to determine the illegality of the 
measure in question.  See Decision of the Federal Administrative Court of 28 May 2014, BVerwG 6 
CN 1.13.  The court concluded that the applicant did not provide sufficient proof that he was affected 
by the strategic telecommunications intelligence measure, specifically, that the telecommunications 
connection of the applicant was detected in the course of the measure. 
311 Article 10-Act, 13 August 1968, § 8(1). 
312 Id. § 15(5)(1). 
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investigation.313  A similar right exists where data is held by police and individuals 
also can seek damages for data that was processed illegally.314 
The Garante may review how the intelligence services collect data and, where the 
collection is not in compliance with Italian data protection laws, may issue only non-
binding recommendations to the intelligence services.315 The scope and rules of the 
Garante’s review of the intelligence service’s files are regulated by a (non-public) 
memorandum of understanding signed in 2013 by the Garante and the intelligence 
services.316   
In the Netherlands, under the Administrative Law Act individuals can bring 
proceedings against decisions that affect them directly.  Individuals bring 
proceedings in the administrative authority with jurisdiction in their place of 
residence.  Individuals also have the right to complain to the ombudsman about 
activities of ministers and persons employed by the intelligence services.317  In 
addition, the CTIVD acts as an independent complaints advisory committee with 
complaints made first to the relevant minister who decides whether or not to send the 
complaint to the CTIVD which then investigates and provides an advisory opinion to 
both the relevant minister and the complainant.318  Neither the ombudsman nor the 
CTIVD have remedial powers.   
In Poland, individuals can bring a complaint to the Human Rights Defender, the 
constitutional authority for legal control and protection of individuals’ rights and 
freedoms – irrespective of whether or not the individual is a citizen.  The Human 
Rights Defender is an ombudsman, independent from other governmental 
authorities.  In order to fulfil its tasks effectively, the Human Rights Defender is 
vested with investigative powers and the power to initiate civil and administrative 
proceedings.  However, it does not have the power to impose sanctions. 
In the UK, the IPT was established to deal with complaints from individuals against 
surveillance and consists of specialist lawyers; it is not a court and is strictly limited 
to assessing whether legislation has been complied with and authorities have acted 
reasonably.319  There is no right of appeal against decisions of the IPT320 and “the 
                                                 
313 Code of Criminal Procedure, Articles 268, 269 & 271.  
314 Legislative Decree n. 196 of 30 June 2003 (Data Protection Code).  Articles 15, 53, 141 & 145. 
315 Id., Article 60. 
316 Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Press Release, 11 November 2013. 
317 Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002, 7 February 2002, Article 83(1). 
318 CTIVD (2015), at 19. 
319 The UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation recommended that the IPT should have its 
jurisdiction expanded and given power to make declarations of incompatibility and that its rulings 
should be subject to appeal on points of law.  Anderson, A Question of Trust – Report of the 
Investigatory Powers Review, supra note 282, at 305. 
320 RIPA §§ 65–68. 
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reasons for or explanation of the decision are not normally given.”321  Issues of 
national security are explicitly outside the mandate of the UK Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration322 and oversight bodies in the UK have no remedial 
powers.  Individuals can also appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) 
against a decision issued by the Information Commissioner’s Office in respect of a 
freedom of information request.   
2.2 US Surveillance Laws Embody A System Of Checks And Balances 
2.2.1 Overview And Background 
Government’s power to conduct surveillance springs from two essential aspects of 
sovereignty: the duty to ensure domestic peace323 and the right of self-defence.324  
Two separate arms of the government in the United States carry out these functions: 
(1) law enforcement, which includes the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as 
well as state and local police; and (2) intelligence services, which include the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), components of the 
FBI, and a number of other agencies, many of which are not directly relevant to 
electronic communications.325  These are referred to collectively in the US as the 
Intelligence Community.326   
The government’s surveillance powers, as in other democratic countries, are limited 
and controlled.  A system of substantive and structural checks and balances limits 
the intrusion of government surveillance and subjects such surveillance to oversight 
for approval and review.  These safeguards originate in protections for American 
citizens and people in the US in the federal constitution, particularly the First and 
Fourth Amendments,327 and go on to include federal statutes ‒ most notably, when it 
                                                 
321 Anderson, A Question of Trust – Report of the Investigatory Powers Review, supra note 282, at 
122. 
322 Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, 22 March 1967, § 5. 
323 See, e.g., Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 382, 386 (1608); United States v. United States Dist. 
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972) (Keith) (“[T]he most basic function of any government is to provide 
for the security of the individual and his [or her] property.”).  
Keith stands as a landmark decision in American surveillance law. The government in that criminal 
case sought to withhold records and logs relating to electronic surveillance on national-security 
grounds. The district court judge (by whose name the case is known) nonetheless ordered the 
records released. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that domestic national-security investigations 
must comply with the Fourth Amendment. Keith, 407 U.S. at 320; see generally Trevor W. Morrison, 
The Story of United States v. United States District Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power, in 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 287–326 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley, eds. 2009). 
324 See, e.g., United Nations Charter, art. 51 (1945); Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
paras. 35, 50 (recognising sovereign nations’ right to self defence). 
325 The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) oversees the Intelligence Community. 
326 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4). 
327 The relevant provisions of the federal constitution bind all government actors in the United States, 
including state law-enforcement officials. See U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the 
laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof … shall be the supreme law of 
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comes to electronic data, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act328 and the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978329 ‒ and executive orders that bind the 
federal government.330 
The First Amendment guarantees freedoms of speech, of the press, of association, 
and of religion.331 It stems from the American founders’ concerns with the use of 
official powers for religious and political persecution in Europe and in the colonies, 
and thus prevents gathering evidence and conducting prosecutions based solely on 
the exercise of those protected freedoms.332 
The Fourth Amendment “was the founding generation’s response to the reviled 
‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British 
officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of 
criminal activity.”333  This constitutional provision ensures “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”334  Today, it 
                                                                                                                                                        
the land.”); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 32–33 (1963) (making reasonableness requirement of 
Fourth Amendment applicable to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (exclusionary 
rule); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) 
(freedom of assembly); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666–67 (1925) (freedom of speech).  
Each state, however, has its own constitution, which may provide additional limits to government 
power and protections for persons within its borders. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 
548, 554 (Mass. 1985) (requiring additional indicia of reliability to obtain a warrant than federal law 
requires); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 498–502 (1977) (collecting cases). 
328 Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). ECPA includes the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2522, and the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712. 
329 Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified, as amended, at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c). 
330 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981); Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28 
(2014) (PPD-28), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-
policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities. 
331 U.S. Const. amend. I; see also Keith, 407 U.S. at 314 (“The price of lawful public dissent must not 
be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized 
official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private 
conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free society.” 
(emphasis added)). 
332 See, e.g., Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1964); Nat’l Ass’n for the 
Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Smith v. People of Cal., 361 
U.S. 147, 151 (1959). 
333 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014). 
334 U.S. Const. amend. IV. These constitutional protections apply to United States citizens and those 
in the United States who have “developed sufficient connection with [the United States] to be 
considered part of [the national] community.”  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 
(1990). This includes foreign persons lawfully in the United States, particularly when government 
surveillance is conducted inside the United States. See id. at 271. 
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establishes generally that “a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”335  The government therefore cannot, as a matter of course, 
trespass upon a protected privacy interest without “[p]rior review by a neutral and 
detached magistrate” and the issuance of a warrant.336  Even in exceptional cases, 
these safeguards require that the conduct of surveillance – and all searches and 
seizures – are ajudged reasonable when they interfere with constitutionally protected 
privacy rights.337 
Establishing that surveillance is “reasonable” ‒ and, thus, permissible under the US 
legal order ‒ depends on standards analogous to the principles of necessity and 
proportionality, though these same words are not expressly required in US 
jurisprudence; nonetheless, the application of US law is consistent with these 
principles in effect.   
As a matter of constitutional law, in order to establish that surveillance is necessary, 
the government ‒ with few exceptions338 ‒ must present a sufficient factual predicate 
to a neutral magistrate that shows that a person or group has probably committed, is 
committing, or will commit a crime (or, in the foreign-intelligence context, that the 
person fits within specifically-defined foreign intelligence purposes) to engage in 
most electronic surveillance.339  Any form of surveillance in practical terms “is 
ordinarily [considered] unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing.”340  No warrant can issue short of such demonstration, and thus, no 
surveillance may proceed for the purpose of gathering information for the use of law 
enforcement.341 
Surveillance is proportionate under the US legal order when “the duty of Government 
to protect the domestic security” outweighs “the potential danger posed by 
                                                 
335 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Bond v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 334, 340–41 (2000) (adopting Justice Harlan’s test).  
336 Keith, 407 U.S. at 318; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (“A 
search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional, we have said, ‘when special needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.”’). 
337See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59–60 (1967) (holding that the interception of 
communications qualifies as a seizure); see also supra note 334 (describing reach of Fourth 
Amendment); infra text following note 345.  
338 See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 536 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (“One well-recognized exception applies 
when ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”); id. (noting that the need 
to provide “emergency aid,” to pursue a fleeing suspect, and “to prevent the imminent destruction of 
evidence” satisfies this standard). The government “bear[s] a heavy burden when attempting to 
demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches.”  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 
740, 749 (1984). 
339 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983). 
340 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
341 See, e.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657 (establishing the exclusionary rule, which prevents prosecutors 
from introducing evidence collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
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unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free expression.”342  The greater 
the protected privacy interest at stake, the stronger the government showing of 
necessity must be for it to be considered reasonable.343  Moreover, surveillance that 
is so intrusive that it ‘“shocks the conscience” and violates the “decencies of civilized 
conduct’” can never be justified and is thus per se illegal.344  No general necessity or 
national-security exemption exists to permit otherwise-unconstitutional surveillance 
programs, meaning that communications can be collected only within the 
constitutional structure, and private parties may not voluntarily conduct searches on 
the government’s behalf to surmount these restrictions.345 
These constitutional protections, by and large, apply to “US persons,” a term that 
encompasses foreign citizens lawfully in the US, and also to their data transmitted to 
and stored on servers in the US.  Beyond these constitutional requirements, statutes 
and executive orders impose additional restraints on the powers of law enforcement 
and the Intelligence Community to conduct surveillance, and many of these 
provisions apply comparably to US persons and to non-US persons (i.e., citizens of 
other countries when they are located outside the US). 
Development Of Electronic Surveillance Laws – Law Enforcement 
Surveillance is a valuable and legitimate tool for crime prevention and prosecution, 
and it is therefore employed by American law enforcement. Both constitutional 
protections and physical limitations have constrained these activities sufficiently 
through much of American history.  In the mid-twentieth century, when technological 
advances enabled surveillance on a more surreptitious and widespread basis,346 the 
courts applied the Fourth Amendment to electronic surveillance,347 and Congress 
enacted legislation to provide additional safeguards and oversight. 
Congress passed the Wiretap Act as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968.348  This act generally prohibits the interception of oral, wire, or 
electronic communications affecting interstate commerce and the use or disclosure 
                                                 
342 Keith, 407 U.S. at 314–15. 
343 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1968) (weighing reasonableness of proposed search 
and seizure in light of privacy interests). 
344 Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 
165, 172–723 (1952)).  
345 Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (Fourth Amendment protects 
against private party intrusions “if the private party acted as an instrument or agent of the 
Government”).  
346 Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (noting that “a constable secreted himself 
somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements of 
the coach's owner” would be the common-law equivalent of a GPS tracker); see also Peter P. Swire, 
The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1318–20 (2004) 
(noting abuses of wiretaps by Presidents Franklin Roosevelt through Richard Nixon). 
347 See, e.g., Keith, 407 U.S. at 318; Berger, 388 U.S. at 59–60; Katz, 389 U.S. at 354. 
348 Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified, as amended, at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522). 
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of such communications.349  It nonetheless permits law-enforcement officials ‒ 
federal, state, and local ‒ to conduct these activities under certain limited conditions.  
Specifically, these officials must obtain a “Title III warrant” from a neutral magistrate 
to intercept or interfere in any way with a real-time communication when any one 
party is located in the United States.350  To secure such a warrant, the government 
must submit an affidavit to a neutral magistrate that demonstrates (1) law 
enforcement has probable cause to believe that the intercepted communications will 
reveal evidence related to one of a few enumerated felonies (discussed below), (2) 
that other means of acquiring the communications have been exhausted, and (3) 
that the surveillance will be conducted in as limited a manner as possible.351  
Moreover, as a means of ensuring independent oversight, the act requires law 
enforcement and the courts to submit yearly public reports on the number of wiretaps 
nationwide and their usefulness,352 and it has empowered committees in Congress 
and independent watchdogs within the executive branch to monitor the government’s 
use of wiretaps between reports.353 
In 1986, as electronic communications began to rise with the advent of personal 
computing, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA).354  This statute, particularly the Stored Communications Act, prescribes 
additional protections for the content355 of such communications356 and for other non-
                                                 
349 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(1), (2) & (12); 2511(1).   
350 Id. §§ 2516, 2518.  
351 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516–18; US Dep’t of Justice, Wiretap Report 2014, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wiretap-report-2014. 
352 See, e.g., US Dep’t of Justice, Wiretap Report 2014, supra note 351. 
353 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 509 (note) (establishing the Department of Justice Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Office); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee (creating and empowering the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board); Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public Safety and 
Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (July 8, 2015); Oversight of the 
U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Jan. 29, 
2014); Video Laptop Surveillance: Does Title III Need to Be Updated: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (Mar. 29, 2010). 
354 Pub. L. No. 99–508 (1986). This statute, in part, provides statutory protections for privacy rights not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding 
that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in data voluntarily shared with a third 
party).  In ECPA, Congress also amended the Wiretap Act to apply explicitly to electronic 
communications.   
355 American law distinguishes between content and non-content communications; however, the 
definition of “content” is flexible and can change depending on the law at issue. For instance, in the 
law-enforcement context, “‘contents’ when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).  The text and, potentially, the subject line of an email would be 
considered content, but the timestamp and the “to” and “from” lines may not be treated as content 
under this statute. In contrast, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which governs 
the Intelligence Community, defines “conten[t]” to “include[] any information concerning the identity of 
the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication.”  50 U.S.C. § 1801(n). Thus, the “to” and “from” fields of an email message, denoting 
sender and receiver, would qualify as content under FISA.  
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content personal data in which people are not considered to have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, such as the “to” or 
“from” fields or the timestamp on an email.357  The government must demonstrate 
“probable cause” to a neutral magistrate to access the contents of stored electronic 
communications, including email messages,358 and it must otherwise initiate legal 
process ‒ through a court order or subpoena ‒ to compel disclosure of non-content 
personal data from telecommunications companies.359  
In addition to the judicial approval and review outlined above, US law enforcement’s 
surveillance activities are subject to various administrative controls as well as 
oversight from congressional committees and independent oversight boards.  These 
are discussed in greater detail in Part 2.2.4 below.   
Development Of Electronic Surveillance Laws – Intelligence  
The United States, like many countries, conducts surveillance for foreign-intelligence 
purposes, exercising its “inherent right” as a sovereign country to “tak[e] measures 
necessary” to defend itself.360  The Constitution places the authority to gather 
intelligence largely in the hands of the President as Chief Executive given the 
President’s primacy in the conduct of foreign affairs and status as Commander in 
Chief of the armed forces.361  This differs from law-enforcement powers, which are 
split between the federal government and the states.   
                                                                                                                                                        
356 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(determining that a warrant is necessary to search contents of emails under the Fourth Amendment). 
The text of ECPA purports to authorise government access to the contents of communications stored 
longer than 180 days without obtaining a warrant. See 18 U.S.C. §2703(d). In Warshak, a federal 
court of appeals concluded that such authorisation cannot be squared with the Fourth Amendment 
and that the government must obtain a search warrant. 631 F.3d at 288. The federal government has 
acceded to this ruling and now seeks a warrant before obtaining stored contents of communications. 
Members of Congress have introduced legislation that would codify the government’s position. See, 
e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2015, S. 356, 114th Cong. (2015); 
H.R. 283, 114th Cong. (2015). 
357 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a), 2703(d); Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(2).  ECPA also includes the Pen 
Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 et seq.  This provision governs the targeted collection of dialing, 
routing, addressing, or signaling information (e.g., telephone numbers) of calls to and from a particular 
number.  Id. § 3127(3).  It does not permit, under any circumstances, the collection of “contents of any 
communication.”  Id. § 3127(3) & (4). 
358 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
359 Id. § 2702(a) (“Except [with legal process] – a person or entity providing an electronic 
communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of 
a communication while in electronic storage by that service.”). 
360 United Nations Charter, art. 51 (1945). 
361 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States ….”); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1875) (“[The President] was 
undoubtedly authorized during the war, as commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, to 
employ secret agents to enter the revel lines and obtain information respecting the strength, 
resources, and movements of the enemy.”); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) 
(noting that the President “is bound to resist force by force” in protecting the United States). 
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The executive branch exercised this authority largely without oversight until the 
1970s.362  After it emerged that presidents, the FBI, and the CIA ordered surveillance 
on political adversaries, civil-rights leaders, and anti-war activists – domestically and 
abroad363 – Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.364  
FISA criminalizes intentionally engaging in “electronic surveillance” except as 
prescribed under FISA.365  The statute defines this term, in relevant part, as “the 
acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of”: 
 “[1] the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be 
received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United 
States,  
 [2] the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United 
States ... if such acquisition occurs in the United States ....”366   
This definition covers the interception of data on US territory that has been 
transmitted from Europe to the US. 
As with the Wiretap Act and ECPA, Congress created exceptions to the general 
prohibition and permits the Intelligence Community to engage in specified electronic 
surveillance.  It may collect, retain, and disseminate intercepted communications and 
data in accordance with the orders of a special court tasked with overseeing the 
Intelligence Community’s compliance with applicable law – the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC).367  The judges on this court are federal judges who have 
been previously nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate and, 
therefore, have lifetime judicial tenure368; the Chief Justice of the United States 
appoints them to the FISC for a specific term of up to seven years.369  They have 
authority to reject individual surveillance applications as well as broader authority to 
strike down government surveillance programs that violate constitutional and 
                                                 
362 Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel, ODNI, Privacy, Technology & National Security:  An Overview of 
Intelligence Collection (July 18, 2013) (“Prior to the passage of FISA in 1978, the collection of foreign 
intelligence was essentially unregulated by statutory law.  It was viewed as a core function of the 
Executive Branch.”), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/57724442606/privacy-technology-national-
security-an. 
363 See Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, supra note 346, at 1318–20 
(recounting abuses discovered by Church Committee).  
364 Pub. L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified, as amended, at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c). 
365 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e). 
366 Id. § 1801(f)(1)–(2).  ‘“Wire communication’ means any communication while it is being carried by 
a wire, cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common 
carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign 
communications.”  Id. § 1801(l).   
367 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a). 
368 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
369 50 U.S.C. § 1803. 
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statutory law.370  Recently, this court has appointed several respected attorneys as 
amici curiae, with the necessary security clearance, to brief the court on any civil 
liberties concerns that may arise with the government’s applications for surveillance 
approval.371  
FISA places significant limits in the government’s ability to conduct electronic 
surveillance.  These provisions are known as “FISA Title I.”372  They require the 
Attorney General ‒ the country’s top law-enforcement official ‒ to make an 
application to the FISC for a FISA warrant to intercept real-time communications.373  
The application must demonstrates, with particularity, facts showing that probable 
cause exists to believe that “the target of the [proposed] surveillance is a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power,”374 and the government must assert that it 
seeks to conduct this surveillance for the purpose of obtaining “foreign 
intelligence.”375 To intercept real-time communications for intelligence-gathering 
purposes, the Attorney General ‒ the country’s top law-enforcement official ‒ must 
make an application to the FISC that demonstrates, with particularity, facts showing 
that probable cause exists to believe that “the target of the surveillance is a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power,”376 and the government must assert that it 
seeks to conduct this surveillance for the purpose of obtaining “foreign 
intelligence.”377  
                                                 
370 See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion, [Caption Redacted], No. [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618 (FISA 
Ct. Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0716/October-2011-Bates-Opinion-
and%20Order-20140716.pdf (finding portions of the government’s Section 702 programme 
unconstitutional and in violation of statute); Charlie Savage, Power Wars 572 (2015) (describing 
Judge Bates’s memorandum opinion). 
371 Pub. L. No. 114–23, § 401, 129 Stat. 279 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(4)); FISC, Amici Curiae, 
http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/amici-curiae; Cody Poplin, Amicus Curiae for FISC Announced, Lawfare 
(Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/amici-curiae-fisc-announced. 
372 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1813.   
373 Id. § 1804(a). 
374 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a), (d); 1805(a)(2); see also David S. Kris & J. Douglas Wilson, National 
Security Investigations & Prosecutions § 6.2 (2d ed. 2012) (noting additional requirements and that, 
unlike Title III Warrants, the government must identify the target of the surveillance in a FISA 
application). 
375 FISA defines “foreign intelligence information” as “information that relates to … the ability of the 
United States to protect against actual or potential attack … of a foreign power …; sabotage, 
international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction …; or 
clandestine intelligence activities” or “information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory 
that relates to … the national defense or security of the United States; or the conduct of the foreign 
affairs of the United States.”  50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). 
376 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a), (d); 1805(a)(2); see also David S. Kris & J. Douglas Wilson, National 
Security Investigations & Prosecutions § 6.2 (2d ed. 2012) (noting additional requirements and that, 
unlike Title III Warrants, the government must identify the target of the surveillance). 
377 FISA defines “foreign intelligence information” as “information that relates to … the ability of the 
United States to protect against actual or potential attack … of a foreign power …; sabotage, 
international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction …; or 
clandestine intelligence activities” or “information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory 
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These protections, by and large, ensure that the most invasive surveillance ‒ 
interception of real-time wire communications378 ‒ is specially targeted and 
constrained and that oversight is provided.   
As in the law-enforcement context, however, the evolution of technology has given 
the government additional tools for which safeguards have not always kept pace.  
President Bush, for instance, ordered the Intelligence Community to use all options 
available to prevent another terrorist attack following September 11, 2001.379  The 
Intelligence Community thus began (or accelerated previous efforts at) collecting and 
analyzing data in bulk and monitoring communications between individuals in the 
United States and people abroad.380  Part of these efforts was the President’s 
Terrorist Surveillance Program381 under which the NSA eavesdropped on 
conversations in and passing through the United States without a warrant.382  The 
NSA also operated a programme of bulk-collection of telephone metadata383 – 
information such as the “originating and terminating telephone number” or “the time 
[and] duration of the call.”384 
                                                                                                                                                        
that relates to … the national defense or security of the United States; or the conduct of the foreign 
affairs of the United States.”  50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). 
378 See supra note 366. 
379 See President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 20, 2001) (“We will direct every 
resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of 
law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the destruction 
and to the defeat of the global terror network.”).  
380 See, e.g., Savage, Power Wars, supra note 370, at 180–82; Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board (PCLOB), Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Section 702 Report) 16–17 (July 2, 2014), 
https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf.  
381 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-without-courts.html 
(describing Terrorist Surveillance Program as based on the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers 
and the Authorization for Use of Military Force).  
382 Id.; See also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143–44 (2013) (“In the wake of the 
September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) 
to conduct warrantless wiretapping of telephone and e-mail communications where one party to the 
communication was located outside the United States and a participant in ‘the call was reasonably 
believed to be a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.”’ (citation 
omitted)); Inspectors General’s Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program 1 (July 
10, 2009), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0907.pdf (“One of the activities authorized as part of the 
[President’s Terrorist Surveillance Program] was the interception of the content of communications 
into and out of the United States where there was a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to 
the communication was a member of al-Qa'ida or related terrorist organizations.”). 
383 See Savage, Power Wars, supra note 370, at 192–93. 
384NSA Civil Liberties & Privacy Office, Transparency Report: The USA FREEDOM Act Business 
Records FISA Implementation 4 (Jan. 15, 2016).  Contrary to some media reports, see, e.g., Barton 
Gellman, U.S. Surveillance Architecture Includes Collection of Revealing Internet, Phone Metadata, 
WASH. POST (June 15, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-surveillance-
architecture-includes-collection-of-revealing-internet-phone-metadata/2013/06/15/e9bf004a-d511-
11e2-b05f-3ea3f0e7bb5a_story.html, the service providers did not generally provide the NSA with 
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Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001,385 updating various surveillance 
tools and making national-security investigations more efficient and effective.386  The 
Bush Administration took an extensive view of these authorities,387 but in 2005, 
authorisation for some of the tools, including emergency disclosure provisions, 
automatically expired.388  Congress later imposed additional limitations once the full 
implications of these surveillance programs became known.  The President and the 
Intelligence Community have since instituted further safeguards. 
For purposes of data transfers from Europe to the US, two sets of safeguards and 
limitations – both within FISA – are relevant.   
First, there is Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which governs the 
collection of the contents of stored communications in the US, i.e., data transmitted 
to US servers belonging to foreign persons outside the US ‒ and hence the personal 
data of EU data subjects that is transferred by data controllers for processing and 
storage in the US.389  This type of surveillance was previously overseen only by the 
Intelligence Community itself, but has more recently been placed within FISA and 
requires approval of the FISC.390   
Both the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) ‒ two 
cabinet-level officials ‒ must now certify under oath to the FISC that “a significant 
purpose of the acquisition [of the content of communications] is to obtain foreign 
intelligence,”391 that the acquisition will be done in accordance with court-approved 
                                                                                                                                                        
cellular location data – at the NSA’s request.  See Marcy Wheeler, AT&T Pull Cell Location for Its 
“Mobility Cell Data,” EMPTYWHEEL (Aug. 15, 2015), 
https://www.emptywheel.net/2015/08/15/2015/08/15/att-pulled-cell-location-for-its-mobility-cell-data/. 
385 Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 215 (2001), 115 Stat. 272.  
386 See US Dep’t of State, Five Myths Regarding Privacy and Law Enforcement Access to Personal 
Information in the European Union and the United States 7–8 (Oct. 29, 2012), 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/useu/231771/PDFs/Five%20Myths%20Regarding%20Privacy%20and
%20Law%20Enforcement_October%209_2012_pdf.pdf. 
387 See, e.g., Mem. from Jack L. Goldsmith, III, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Counsel, re: Review of 
the Legality of the STELLAR WIND Program (May 6, 2004), 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/a-memo-for-the-attorney-general-may-
2004/1226/ (justifying use of the President’s Terrorist Surveillance Program); US Dep’t of Justice, 
Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the Nat’l Sec. Agency Described by the President (Jan. 
19, 2006), https://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/doj11906wp.pdf.  
388 US Dep’t of Justice, USA PATRIOT Act: Sunsets Report (Apr. 2005), 
https://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/Sunsets_Report_Final.pdf; Charles Doyle, USA Patriot Act 
Sunset: Provisions That Expire on December 31, 2005, Cong. Research Serv. (Jan. 2, 2004), 
https://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/RL32186.pdf. 
389 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2438 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1881a). 
390 The Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–55, 121 Stat. 552, initially brought this type of 
surveillance under the FISC’s umbrella.  Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the FISA Amendments 
Act to place the authorisation on a more permanent footing. 
391 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g). 
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targeting procedures,392 and that court-approved minimization procedures will be 
followed to ensure that data is accessed, retained, and disseminated in a proper 
manner.393  The FISC must conclude that the government’s certifications are 
sufficient and that the targeting and minimization procedures meet statutory 
requirements.394  Only then may the Attorney General and the DNI order 
telecommunications carriers and other communications providers to disclose stored 
communications.395   
The Intelligence Community operates two programs pursuant to its Section 702 
authorities:  PRISM and Upstream.  Under PRISM, the government “tasks” or sends 
“selectors” – email addresses or telephone numbers, never keywords or names – to 
an electronic communications service provider, such as a telephone company or 
email provider.396  The service provider must then provide the government with all 
communications sent to or from that selector.397  These specific requests do not 
involve the collection of “all personal data of all persons whose data is transferred to 
United States,” as referred to in the Schrems judgment.398 
The other programme that Section 702 authorizes is Upstream.  Under this 
programme, the NSA collects emails and other electronic communications from “the 
providers that control the telecommunications ‘backbone’ over which 
communications transit[.]”399  As with PRISM, the NSA sends selectors to the 
providers; the providers then capture all of the communications and transactions 
related to those selectors going forward.400  For telephone communications (e.g., text 
messages), the providers send the NSA communications “to” and “from” the 
selector.401  For Internet transactions (e.g., emails), they send communications “to,” 
“from,” and “about” the selector, meaning that emails including the selected email 
                                                 
392 Id. § 1881a(d), (g). 
393 Id. §§ 1801(h), 1881a(e), (g). 
394 Id. § 1881a(i). 
395 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a), (h).  These orders are called “directives.” 
396 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 33–34. 
397 Id. 
398 See Peter Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013, 14–15 (Dec. 17, 
2015), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/White-Paper-Swire-US-EU-Surveillance.pdf; FRA 
Report, supra note 127, at 17 (recognising PRISM is “a targeted technology used to access court 
ordered foreign internet accounts”); Geoffrey Robertson QC, Final Opinion, para. 30 (14 January 
2016) (“One factual error made by the Court in Schrems – seemingly as a result of the ‘facts’ found by 
the Irish court – was to describe the PRISM programme as a bulk or ‘generalised’ data collection.  
This is not the case, and confuses PRISM with the bulk collection of metadata ....”). 
399 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 35; see also Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe 
Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013, supra note 398, at 17. 
400 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 35. 
401 Id. at 36. 
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address in the subject line or body of the email will also be collected.402  NSA 
analysts may then query these filtered communications, using only foreign-
intelligence related keywords, for relevant information.403  Upstream differs from 
PRISM mainly in the time period covered, as it seeks communications in real-time 
instead of stored communications; of the communications acquired under Section 
702, Upstream provides only ten percent.404Second, Congress has constrained the 
telephone metadata programme with the USA FREEDOM Act.405  That programme, 
originally covered by Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, permitted the 
government to collect telephone metadata in bulk from US carriers.  Now, the FBI – 
through the Department of Justice – must apply to the FISC for an order permitting 
the government to analyze the metadata connected to identified telephone numbers, 
which is stored by a telecommunications provider (as opposed to the data being 
collected in bulk and stored by the government).406  This application must include a 
“specific selection term” that “identifies a person, account, address, or personal 
device, or any other specific identifier”407 and contain “a statement of facts showing 
that: (i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the call detail records sought to 
be produced based on the specific selection term … are relevant to [an ongoing 
national-security] investigation; and (ii) there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that such specific selection term is associated with a foreign power engaged in 
international terrorism ….”408  If the court approves the specific selection term and 
grants the order, the telecommunications provider must produce the records linked 
to the specific selection term as well as records directly linked to those produced 
                                                 
402 Id. at 36–37. 
403 Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013, supra note 398, at 18–19; 
PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 55. 
The queries are monitored to ensure that they a not overbroad or related to improper purposes, “such 
as an analyst’s query to find information about a girlfriend[.]”  PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 
380, at 56; see also Andrea Peterson, LOVEINT:  When NSA Officers Use Their Spying Power On 
Love Interests, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/08/24/loveint-when-nsa-officers-use-their-spying-power-on-love-interests. 
404 Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013, supra note 398, at 17. 
405 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 114–23, § 109, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861). 
406 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a). FISA previously required the government to obtain an order from the FISC 
requiring the carriers to turn over all metadata directly to the government for storage and analysis.  
Under the USA FREEDOM Act, the carriers now store the data (without a retention requirement 
separate from the US consumer-protecting communications regulations, see 47 C.F.R. § 42.6), and 
the Intelligence Community requests certain data to analyze.  The government thus collects only 
targeted data; indeed, the USA FREEDOM Act explicitly forbids bulk collection under FISA.  
407 Pub. L. No. 114–23, § 107 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861(k)).  This provision mirrors the 
requirement under Section 702 that the government provide a “selector.”  It has been reported that 
“only about three hundred new numbers” are added per year under this programme.  See Savage, 
Power Wars, supra note 370, at 607.  The FISC approves these new numbers.  Id. 
408 Pub. L. No. 114–23 § 101 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)).  
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records.409  These changes make bulk collection of metadata under FISA 
impermissible.   
These programmes, as of July 2013, had led to 54 “success stories” for US national 
security and that of other countries ‒ most of them within the EU.410  Specifically, 
Senator Feinstein – who chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee – reported that 
these programmes have disprupted 13 events in the United States, 25 in Europe, 
five in Africa, and 11 in Asia.411  
All communications and data collected under FISA (FISA Title I, Section 702, and 
Section 215) are subject to minimization procedures.412  These procedures govern 
and limit the intelligence agencies’ storage and dissemination of collected data.413 
This trio of FISA provisions and their corresponding protections control the 
government’s access to data in the US that has been transmitted from Europe to 
American persons, businesses, and servers.  They generally do not govern the 
intelligence community’s surveillance activities abroad or its collection of data not 
being sent to the United States.  The executive branch undertakes these non-FISA, 
or “signals intelligence,” activities pursuant to the President’s inherent constitutional 
authority.414  Nonetheless, the executive branch has issued two consequential, 
binding, and directly relevant orders – Executive Order 12,333 and Presidential 
Policy Directive/PPD-28 (PPD-28) – to prevent abuses that may stem from these 
national security powers and to protect the privacy rights of all.   
Executive Order 12,333, originally issued by President Reagan and added to by 
subsequent presidents,415 permits the Intelligence Community to collect information 
                                                 
409 Id. § 101 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)); NSA Civil Liberties & Privacy Office, USA FREEDOM 
Transparency Report, supra note 384, at 5. 
410 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 109–10 
411 Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security:  Oversight of FISA (Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act) Surveillance Programs:  Hearing of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (July 31, 
2013) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
412 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a)(3); 1861(c); 1881a(c). 
413 See, e.g., NSA, Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security Agency in connection with 
Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ppd-
28/2014%20NSA%20702%20Minimization%20Procedures.pdf; FBI, Presidential Policy Directive 28 
Policies and Procedures (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/fbis-policies-and-
procedures-presidential-policy-directive-28-1; CIA, Signals Intelligence Activities Guidelines (Feb. 2, 
2015), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ppd-28/CIA.pdf; Off. of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, 
Minimization Procedures (July 24, 2014), http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/0928/2014%20NSA%20702%20Minimization%20Procedures.pdf. 
414 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the 
United States.”); see supra note 361.  Due to the statutory restraints in FISA and the Wiretap Act, 
these activities cannot include “electronic surveillance” or an “intercept.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e). 
415 Exec. Order 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981) (amended by Exec. Order 13,284 (2003), Exec. 
Order 13355 (2004), Exec. Order 13,470 (2008)).  This Executive Order – and not the FISC – governs 
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“concerning United States persons” only for foreign-intelligence and 
counterintelligence purposes.416  Further, the order requires the Intelligence 
Community to promulgate guidelines that govern the collection, processing, 
retention, and dissemination of foreign intelligence not collected pursuant to FISA.417  
These guidelines must be approved by the Attorney General, and they provide 
significant restraints on the Intelligence Community’s acquisition and handling of 
both American and European data.418  
President Obama has further expanded upon these limitations in PPD-28.419  This 
directive sets a number of requirements for foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence: 
•  “The collection of signals intelligence shall be authorized by statute or Executive 
Order, proclamation, or other Presidential directive”; 
• “Privacy and civil liberties shall be integral considerations in the planning of U.S. 
signals intelligence activities”;   
• “Signals intelligence shall be collected exclusively where there is a foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence purpose to support national and departmental 
missions and not for any other purposes.”420   
To reinforce these requirements (and consistent with the the recommendations of the UN 
Human Rights Council that national security intelligence not contravene human rights and 
that counter-intelligence surveillance is “used exclusively for these purposes”421), ‘“[signals 
intelligence] information about the routine activities of a foreign person’ would not be 
considered foreign intelligence.”422  It prohibits the collection of signals intelligence to 
“suppres[s] or burde[n] criticism or dissent, or [to] disadvantag[e] persons based on their 
ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion.”423  
PPD-28 further sets out transparency requirements and retention limitations, and it 
declares that “these polices and procedures are to be applied equally to the personal 
                                                                                                                                                        
the collection, storage, and dissemination by the Intelligence Community of data that is not received, 
stored, or processed in the United States.  It does not authorise the conduct of any surveillance. 
416 Id. §§ 1.12(b) (detailing responsibilities of NSA); 2.3 (collection limitations).   
417 See, e.g., United States Signals Intelligence Directive USSID SP0018 (Jan. 25, 2011).  
418 Id. 
419 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28 (Jan. 17, 2014), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-28.pdf. 
420 Id. § 1(a)–(b); see also Robert Litt, Gen. Counsel, ODNI, Prepared Remarks on Signals 
Intelligence Reform at Brookings Institute (Feb. 4, 2015) (“Signals intelligence will be collected only 
when there is a valid foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose.”). 
421 FRA Report, supra note 127, at 18. 
422 Litt, Prepared Remarks on Signals Intelligence Reform, supra note 420. 
423 PPD-28 § 1(b); cf. FRA Report, supra note 127, at 13 (describing UN good practices). 
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information of all persons, regardless of nationality.”424  It requires application of 
minimization procedures comparable to those promulgated under Executive Order 
12,333 to information on non-US persons, living outside of the United States.425  The 
Intelligence Community, in the months following PPD-28’s release, promulgated and 
released guidelines and procedures implementing the President’s orders.426 
As noted above, FISA’s provisions govern the US intelligence agencies’ collection, 
retention, and dissemination in the US of data transmitted to US persons and stored 
in US servers.  That said, the extraterritorial protections provided by Executive Order 
12,333 and, particularly, PPD-28 have not yet been emulated by other responsible 
actors on the world stage.  “[E]very nation recognizes legal distinctions between 
citizens and non-citizens,”427  In taking these steps to establish safeguards for non-
citizens, the US has initiated new norms for protection of rights and freedoms and 
global rule of law among democratic nations. 
President Obama’s actions were based on the recommendations of a special review 
committee, appointed by the President, to conduct a thorough and unrestricted 
assessment of United States’s intelligence and surveillance capabilities and the best 
means of maintaining public trust in the government’s use of those tools.428  This 
exceptional review process was in addition to the ongoing oversight by the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), agency inspectors general, agency 
civil liberties officers, and outside groups. 
With each of the above specific legal authorities and others, the United States 
government has limited the scope of its surveillance activities, as well as its 
processing, retention, and dissemination of collected data.  It has imposed rigorous 
oversight for approval and review of each of these surveillance activities.  And, in the 
event of government overreach, it has provided for legal remedies and redress so 
that Congress and individuals may hold the executive branch to account. 
                                                 
424 Id. § 4(a)(i). 
425 See id. §§ 1(d), 4(a)(i); see also Robertson, Opinion, supra note 398, at para. 33 (noting that “the 
requirement under [Executive Order 12,333] that intelligence agencies use ‘the least restrictive means 
feasible’ applies to all intelligence gathering activities irrespective of the citizenship of the targets”).   
426 See, e.g., NSA, Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security Agency in connection with 
Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ppd-
28/2014%20NSA%20702%20Minimization%20Procedures.pdf; FBI, Presidential Policy Directive 28 
Policies and Procedures (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/fbis-policies-and-
procedures-presidential-policy-directive-28-1; CIA, Signals Intelligence Activities Guidelines (Feb. 2, 
2015), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ppd-28/CIA.pdf; Off. of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, 
Minimization Procedures (July 24, 2014), http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/0928/2014%20NSA%20702%20Minimization%20Procedures.pdf.  
427 Litt, Privacy, Technology & National Security, supra note 362. 
428 See President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, Liberty and 
Security in a Changing World (Dec. 12, 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf; President Barack 
Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press Conference (Aug. 9, 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-president-press-conference. 
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With this background, this report looks in greater detail at these main US 
surveillance programs and authorities in light of the four criteria distilled from basic 
requirements of the EU legal order for surveillance, as described in Part One of this 
report and applied to EU surveillance in the preceding section.  As with the EU legal 
order, it goes through each of these criteria to examine concrete safeguards to limit 
interference with rights and freedoms.   
2.2.2 Specific Legal Authority 
Surveillance measures must be based on clearly stated legal authority.  
The legal basis or purposes for the types of surveillance undertaken 
must be clearly spelled out.  These purposes must be for legitimate 
aims of a serious nature with objective basis in facts. There must be 
objective criteria by which to limit the discretion of authorities. 
As discussed above, the US legal order authorizes both law enforcement and the 
Intelligence Community to conduct surveillance, but only within constitutional, 
statutory, and executive limits and only for specific purposes.  These legal sources 
and justifications are available to the public and open to legal challenges.  Together, 
they guide authorities’ access, collection, analysis, storage, and dissemination of 
European citizens’ data within the United States. 
Law Enforcement 
All sovereign powers share a responsibility to ensure the safety of those within their 
borders, and a basic function of the US government, like ‘“any government[,] is to 
provide for the security of the individual and of his [or her] property.”’429  Doing so 
means preventing criminal acts and punishing those who commit them. 
Electronic surveillance is a response to “[t]he marked acceleration in technological 
developments[,] and sophistication in their use [that] ha[s] resulted in new techniques 
for the planning, commission, and concealment of criminal activities.”430  Congress 
has responded to this threat with the Wiretap Act and ECPA, which permit the 
“prudent and lawful employment of those very techniques which are employed 
against the Government and its law abiding citizens.”431  They make it possible “to 
combat successfully certain forms of crime.”432  
                                                 
429 Keith, 407 U.S. at 312 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., 
dissenting)). 
430 Id.; see also Danny Yadron, Alistair Barr & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Paris Attacks Fan Encryption 
Debate, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/paris-attacks-fan-encryption-debate-
1447987407; David E. Sanger & Nicole Perloth, F.B.I. Chief Says Texas Gunman Used Encryption to 
Text Overseas Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/politics/fbi-chief-says-texas-gunman-used-encryption-to-text-
overseas-terrorist.html. 
431 Keith, 407 U.S. at 312. 
432 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 252 (1979). 
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The Wiretap Act and ECPA set out the conditions that justify law enforcement’s use 
of electronic surveillance to intercept or collect the contents of communications, i.e., 
a finding of probable cause.433  These statutes ‒ read against the backdrop of the 
Fourth Amendment ‒ provide the only means by which law enforcement may 
conduct electronic surveillance in the United States.   
Obtaining a Title III warrant requires law enforcement to demonstrate to a neutral 
magistrate that probable cause exists to believe that the particular communications 
are relevant to a crime,434 and that the crime being investigated is among an 
enumerated list of serious felonies, such as sabotage and espionage, offenses 
related to biological weapons, arson, kidnapping, murder, piracy, various forms of 
bribery, racketeering, human trafficking, and forced labour.435  This link can be 
demonstrated by tying the target, the telephone number used, or another aspect of 
the communication to the crime.  No matter how useful real-time interception of 
communications might be for investigations into lesser crimes, this type of 
interception is per se unavailable.   
The requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant ensures that the 
use of surveillance authority is reasonably necessary for the investigation of the 
serious crimes for which it is permitted.  “[P]robable cause is a fluid concept ‒ turning 
on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts[,]” but it generally 
requires “a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of 
wrongdoing.”436  This standard requires, at a minimum, individualized examination of 
the government’s information and reasons for the seizure of the communications by 
an independent court.437  And the Wiretap Act demands that this information be 
expressed in detail.438 
The Fourth Amendment mandates the same showing of probable cause (without 
being limited to certain crimes) to obtain the contents439 of stored communications, 
such as emails and voicemails.440  The government accordingly must show (and a 
neutral magistrate must find) that there is a substantial basis to believe that the 
communications to be collected relate to a crime. 
                                                 
433 See infra at Part 2.3.3. 
434 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. 
435 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1).  
436 Gates, 462 U.S. at 236–37 (alterations omitted). 
437 See US Dep’t of Justice, Electronic Surveillance Manual: Procedures and Case Law Forms 3–6 
(2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2014/10/29/elec-sur-
manual.pdf. 
438 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2518. 
439 See supra note 355 and accompanying text (describing distinction between content and non-
content information). 
440 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 88 
datamatters.sidley.com   
Collecting non-content information or metadata requires a lesser showing, but each 
avenue is subject to an oversight body.  For instance, a Section 2703(d) order may 
be based on “reasonable suspicion”441 to obtain stored metadata, a standard short of 
probable cause, but a neutral magistrate still must approve the collection.442  A 
subpoena does not necessitate the ex ante involvement of the judiciary, but a grand 
jury of ordinary citizens controls the use of the information and the target of the 
subpoena may challenge its issuance.443 
Each statute contains narrow exceptions to these collection requirements for exigent 
circumstances,444 but the invocation of such circumstances simultaneously triggers 
further oversight.445  For instance, the Wiretap Act permits “any investigative or law 
enforcement officer, specially designated by the Attorney General [or other high-
ranking prosecutors], who reasonably determines that [certain] emergency 
situation[s] exis[t] … to authorize … interception,” but such unilateral authorisation is 
contingent upon a successful application to a neutral magistrate within 48 hours.446  
If the application is subsequently denied, “the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication intercepted shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of 
[the Wiretap Act].”447  
No overriding “national security” or “executive privilege” exception exists that would 
permit ongoing large-scale surveillance by law enforcement without corresponding 
safeguards.   
Intelligence Community 
The President, as Chief Executive and commander-in-chief of the military and 
intelligence agencies,448 has the responsibility and the power to thwart attacks on 
national security.449  The President’s powers under the Constitution therefore 
                                                 
441 “Reasonable suspicion” and “probable cause” “are commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that 
deal with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
men, not legal technicians, act.”  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996).  They “acquire 
content only through application,” but the Supreme Court has described “reasonable suspicion” as 
having “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped [or searched] of 
criminal activity.”  Id. at 696.  “Probable cause,” on the other hand, requires “known facts and 
circumstances … sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found.”  Id. 
442 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
443 Fed. R. Crim. P. 17. 
444 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(7)(a) (Wiretap Act); 2702(c) (ECPA). 
445 See id. §§ 2518(7)(b) (Wiretap Act); 2702(d) (ECPA). 
446 Id. § 2518(7).  
447 Id. § 2518(7)(b). 
448 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the 
United States.”). 
449 Keith, 407 U.S. at 310. 
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encompass the power to initiate surveillance.  “Accurate and timely information about 
the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons 
and their agents is essential to informed decisionmaking in the areas of national 
defence and foreign relations,”450 and the United States government must also 
protect “against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means.”451  
Accordingly, the United States, like other nations, has gathered intelligence 
throughout its history.  Congress and various presidents have taken steps to 
circumscribe that power to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are considered, 
balanced, and protected. 
Most significant among these safeguards is FISA Title I.  This statute builds on the 
protections of the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution and permits 
“electronic surveillance” by the Intelligence Community only if a significant purpose is 
to obtain “foreign intelligence information.”452  This term is specifically defined to 
mean “information that relates to … the ability of the United States to protect 
against ‒ (A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power 
or an agent of a foreign power; (B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the 
international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; or (C) clandestine 
intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network.”453  The term “foreign 
intelligence information” also includes “information with respect to a foreign power or 
foreign territory that relates to … the national defense or the security of the United 
States; or … the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.”454  Executive 
Order 12,333, which binds the intelligence agencies whether FISA applies or not, 
defines “foreign intelligence” even more narrowly to include only “information relating 
to the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or 
persons.”455  Read literally, the italicised text could encompass all non-US persons, 
but ODNI has directed that “Intelligence Community elements should permanently 
retain or disseminate [a foreign person’s] information only if [it] relates to an 
authorized intelligence requirement [and] not solely because of the person’s non-
U.S. person status.”456  Moreover, the United States has also defined “intelligence 
related to national security” explicitly to include information involving “threats to the 
                                                 
450 Exec. Order 12,333 § 2.1; see also FRA Report, supra note 127, at 13 (“Intelligence services play 
an important role in protecting national security and upholding the rule of law.”). 
451 Keith, 407 U.S. at 310–11. 
452 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(A)–(B); 1805(a)(4). 
453 Id. § 1801(e)(1). 
454 Id. § 1801(e)(2). 
455 Exec. Order 12,333 § 3.4(d) (emphasis added); see also id. § 3.4(a) (defining “counterintelligence” 
to mean “information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other 
intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, 
organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, 
document or communications security programs”). 
456 ODNI, Safeguarding the Personal Information of All People:  A Status Report on the Development 
and Implementation of Procedures Under Presidential Policy Directive 28, at 5 (July 2014), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1017/PPD-28_Status_Report_Oct_2014.pdf. 
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United States, its people, property, or interests [and] the development, proliferation, 
or use of weapons of mass destruction[.]”457   
As in the law-enforcement context, the neutral magistrate (here, the FISC) must 
determine that probable cause exists to believe that the communications to be 
intercepted are linked to the approved purposes of foreign-intelligence 
surveillance.458  Unlike the law-enforcement context, however, the government must 
also show that there is a substantial factual nexus between the proffered target (as 
opposed to the target or an identified facility, such as a telephone number) and a 
foreign power, organisation, or person.459   
The Intelligence Community must similarly demonstrate that its proposed collection 
under Sections 702 and 215 are for valid foreign-intelligence purposes, 460 and with 
respect to Section 702, the NSA analysts must show that the targeted person is 
outside the United States.461 
Although these definitions and concepts leave some elasticity to meet extraordinary 
threats to national security, some justifications for surveillance are placed entirely 
outside the US legal order: “The United States shall not collect signals intelligence 
for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or for 
disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or 
religion.”462  This provides protection to all persons’ freedom of expression and 
guarantees equal protection.  Moreover, “[t]he collection of foreign private 
commercial information or trade secrets is authorized only to protect the national 
security of the United States or its partners and allies.  It is not an authorized foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence purpose to collect such information to afford a 
competitive advantage to US companies and US business sectors commercially.”463 
Finally, the Intelligence Community sets national priorities, through an interagency 
process involving the highest officials, in foreign-intelligence collection each year.464  
These priorities, encapsuled in the “National Intelligence Priorities Framework,” focus 
the government’s efforts and further place practical constraints and supervision on 
US surveillance activities. 
                                                 
457 50 U.S.C. § 3003(5)(B); see also Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 543 (1956) (defining “national 
security” as “those activities which are directly concerned with the Nation’s safety, as distinguished 
from the general welfare.”). 
458 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a); Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 (defining “probable cause”). 
459 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804. 
460 Id. §§ 1861(a), (c); 1881a(a), (i) 
461 Id. § 1881a(a). 
462 PPD-28 § 1(b). 
463 Id. § 1(c). 
464 James Clapper, DNI, National Intelligence Priorities Framework (January 2, 2015), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20204%20National%20Intelligence%20Priorities%20Fr
amework.pdf; see also Litt, Privacy, Technology & National Security, supra note 362. 
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2.2.3 Limited Scope 
The amount of data collected or subject to retention requirements must 
not go beyond what is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the 
surveillance and cannot be generalized or indiscriminate. Discriminants 
must be established with due care and consistent with the specified 
purposes for surveillance.  The period of retention must be reasonable 
and finite. 
The US legal order limits the scope of US surveillance even when it meets the legal 
and factual requirements that establish the necessary threshold.  The Constitution, 
statutes, and binding executive pronouncements specifically constrain the ability of 
law enforcement and the Intelligence Community to collect, retain, access, and use 
personal information.  This section addresses these limits on law enforcement and 
then those on the Intelligence Community. 
Collection 
The collection of personal information, whether through real-time interception of 
communications or access to stored contents of emails, is regarded by the US legal 
order as an interference with privacy.  “Privacy and civil liberties [are] integral 
considerations in the planning of U.S. signals intelligence activities.”465  The United 
States has therefore taken steps to minimize the discretion of law enforcement and 
the Intelligence Community to collect the personal information of persons who are 
targets of surveillance, much less that of all other persons.  This includes persons 
outside the United States.466 
 Law Enforcement 
The Fourth Amendment’s warrant and reasonableness requirements govern law-
enforcement’s ability to collect information.  The Wiretap Act and ECPA layer on 
additional safeguards commensurate with the level of privacy invasion. 
The probable-cause standard limits the targets of surveillance to those persons or 
facilities (i.e., place, number, or device used) as to whom there is a factual basis to 
believe a connection to serious crimes exists.467  This factual basis must be spelled 
out with particularity,468 including the “particular offense that has been, is being, or is 
about to be committed,” a “particular description of the nature and location of the 
facilities from which the communication is to be intercepted,” and “a particular 
description of the type of communications to be intercepted.”469  This specificity 
                                                 
465PPD-28 § 1(b). 
466 “[N]o [other] country in the world that ha[s] significant surveillance capabilities ha[s] extended 
privacy protections, as a binding concept, to noncitizens abroad[.]”  Savage, Power Wars, supra note 
370, at 605. 
467 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). 
468 Id. §§ 2516(1)(b)–(e); 2518(1)(b) (requiring “full and complete statement of facts and 
circumstances”). 
469 Id. § 2518(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
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requirement ensures that the interception or collection of communications is 
targeted.   
Moreover, in seeking a Title III warrant to intercept real-time communications, law 
enforcement must also show that other, less-intrusive “investigative procedures have 
been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried 
or to be too dangerous.”470  This too protects against over-collection of information. 
Once the warrant issues, the protections continue.  Interception authorisation, for 
example, remains in effect only for 30 days absent reapplication to a magistrate,471 
and law enforcement may only record and collect information relevant or likely 
relevant to the ongoing investigation or other criminal activity.472  Law enforcement, 
pursuant to this latter provision, must undertake reasonable efforts to narrowly tailor 
their interceptions to the specific investigation at hand.473  In practical terms, this 
requirement means that law enforcement must devise and employ procedures so as 
not to record non-pertinent conversations regarding, for instance, family matters; if 
such conversations are inadvertently collected, they may have to be deleted.474  The 
minimization requirements in each case will likely be different, but one constant is 
that privileged communications between an attorney and client maintains their 
privileged character and, with very narrow exceptions, should not be recorded.475 
Law enforcement’s burden for obtaining stored contents of communications likewise 
imposes specificity and proportionality requirements.  The Fourth Amendment 
requires the government to obtain a warrant ‒ with all of its requirements ‒ from a 
neutral magistrate before collecting the stored contents of communications.476  Thus, 
a search warrant application, similar to one for a wiretap, must specifically identify 
the communications to be seized, so as to limit the intrusion into a person’s private 
correspondence, and show that probable cause exists to believe the contents seized 
will be related to a crime.477 
The government must issue legal process, demonstrating a legitimate law-
enforcement interest in the information, to collect non-content personal data478 that 
                                                 
470 Id. § 2518(1)(c). 
471 Id. § 2518(5). 
472 Id. § 2518(5). 
473 See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). 
474 See, e.g., United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 646 (7th Cir. 2002) (detailing minimization 
order); see also Clifford S. Fishman, The “Minimization” Requirement in Electronic Surveillance: Title 
III, the Fourth Amendment, and the Dread Scott Decision, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 315, 327–29 (1979) 
(describing minimization strategies). 
475 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4). 
476 Id. § 2703(a); Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (6th Cir. 2010). 
477 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. 
478 See supra note 355 and accompanying text (describing distinction between content and non-
content information). 
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has been shared with third parties.479  The government must specifically show that 
“there are reasonable grounds” to believe that the information is “relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation”480 to obtain a § 2703(d) order.481  Such 
an order allows the government to collect the non-content information without 
providing notice to the target.482 
Grand-jury and administrative subpoenas will also suffice to obtain non-content 
personal information and may issue, respectively, so long as a grand jury has been 
empanelled or an agency investigation is ongoing.  The recipient of the subpoena ‒ 
most likely, a service provider ‒ may challenge the subpoena, however, before a 
neutral magistrate as “unreasonable or oppressive.”483  If the government cannot 
make a sufficient showing, it cannot obtain the requested information.  Entities that 
are not service providers may release information upon a written request, but they 
are also free to demand that law enforcement issue legal process (i.e., a subpoena) 
as well.484 
 Intelligence Community  
FISA Title I, Section 702, Section 215, and various Presidential orders similarly limit 
the Intelligence Community’s ability to collect foreign-intelligence information.   
Under Title I of FISA, the government must show485 probable cause to believe that 
the real-time communications it proposes to intercept contain foreign-intelligence 
information,486 within the specific definitions and limitations discussed above. Only 
then will the FISC issue a FISA warrant. 
Section 702 likewise limits the acquisition of the contents of communications.  Under 
this section, the government:  
                                                 
479 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
480 Id. § 2703(d). 
481 See supra note 442 and accompanying text (describing Section 2703(d) orders). 
482 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
483 Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(2); see also United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991) 
(“Grand juries are not licensed to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions, nor may they select targets 
of investigation out of malice or an intent to harass. In this case, the focus of our inquiry is the limit 
imposed on a grand jury by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c), which governs the issuance of 
subpoenas duces tecum in federal criminal proceedings. The Rule provides that ‘[t]he court on motion 
made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or 
oppressive.”’). 
484 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
485 These applications go through multiple, assending levels of review within the FBI and the 
Department of Justice.  Litt, Privacy, Technology & National Security, supra note 362. 
486 50 U.S.C. § 1805(b). 
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(1) may not intentionally target any person known at the time of 
acquisition to be located in the United States; 
(2) may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is 
to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the 
United States; 
(3) may not intentionally target a United States person reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States; 
(4) may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the 
sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the 
acquisition to be located in the United States; and 
(5) shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.487 
The Intelligence Community, to this point, has promulgated targeting procedures that 
implement Section 702.488  These procedures remain classified, but they have been 
reviewed and approved by the FISC489 ‒ and their existence demonstrates that 
collection under Section 702 is not indiscriminate.490  They also have been presented 
to the PCLOB for pre-implementation review and comment,491 and previous versions 
have been declassified and released to the public.492  
                                                 
487 Id. § 1881a(b). 
488 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d); NSA, Procedures Used by the National Security Agency for 
Targeting Non-United States Persons Reasonably Believed to Be Located Outside the United States 
to Acquire Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0928/NSA%20Section%20702%20Targeting%20Procedures.pdf; 
Affidavit of Richard H. Ledgett, Jr., Acting Dir., NSA (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0928/Affidavit%20of%20Acting%20Director%20NSA.pdf; Affidavit 
of James B. Comey, Dir., FBI (July 28, 2014), 
http://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dni.gov%2Ffiles%2Fdocuments%2F0928%2FAffi
davit+of+Director+FBI.pdf&t=ZjkyODczZGFmMTlkMDY1YTE5ZjU1YTdhNThmMGJjZTQ2NTllNzVjZS
w5YWRIOTg3Qw%3D%3D. 
489 Memorandum Opinion, [Caption Redacted], No. [Redacted], (FISA Ct. Aug. 26, 2014), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0928/FISC%20Memorandum%20Opinion%20and%20Order%202
6%20August%202014.pdf. 
490 Litt, Privacy, Technology & Intelligence Collection, supra note 362 (“The targeting procedures are 
designed to ensure that we target someone only if we have a valid foreign intelligence purpose.”). 
491 Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013, supra note 398, at 40. 
492 See, e.g., NSA, Procedures Used by the National Security Agency for Targeting Non-United States 
Persons Reasonably Believed to Be Located Outside the United States to Acquire Foreign 
Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 
as Amended (July 22, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/20/exhibit-a-
procedures-nsa-document. 
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These FISC-approved targeting procedures mandate the use of selectors or 
discriminants,493 and the application of such procedures is carefully supervised.494  A 
trained analyst, for instance, initially proposes a particular selector – an email 
address or telephone number, not a keyword or name – based on the targeting 
procedures’ criteria.495  Documentation must link the selector to a specified foreign-
intelligence purpose.496  Two different senior NSA analysts must review the 
proposed selector and the accompanying documentation to ensure it complies with 
the FISC-approved targeting procedures and then approve it before it is tasked and 
sent to a service provider.497   
Tasked selectors are regularly reviewed by the NSA to ensure continued compliance 
with the targeting procedures.  Analysts audit the collected materials every 30 days 
to determine whether the tasked selector is still associated with a valid “foreign 
intelligence target,”498 and they must annually re-verify that the selector relates to a 
foreign intelligence purpose. The NSA additionally logs and demands justification for 
each query499 run on collected data to detect abuse.500  
                                                 
493 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d), (g)(2). 
494 See infra Part 2.3.4. 
495 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 45–46; Rebecca J. Richards, Dir. of NSA Civil 
Liberties & Privacy Office, NSA’s Civil Liberties and Privacy Protections for Targeted SIGINT Activities 
Under Executive Order 12333, Part II(3)–(4) (Oct. 7, 2014).  The NSA, to further safeguard this tool, 
requires supervisor approval for each analyst working on a particular mission and that each analyst 
complete required training. Richards, NSA’s Civil Liberties and Privacy Protections for Targeted 
SIGINT Activities Under Executive Order 12333, supra note 495, at Part III. 
496 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 45; Richards, NSA’s Civil Liberties and Privacy 
Protections for Targeted SIGINT Activities Under Executive Order 12333, supra note 495, at Part II(4). 
497 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 46; Richards, NSA’s Civil Liberties and Privacy 
Protections for Targeted SIGINT Activities Under Executive Order 12333, supra note495, at Part III(8) 
(The agency “perform[s] pre-targeting research and two-person review and approval before entering 
any [selector or discriminant] into NSA’s collection systems, and conduct[s] checks throughout the 
targeting process to review and validate that the acquired collection is responsive to the documented 
foreign intelligence need.”). 
498 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 48. 
499 In Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, [2014] IEHC 310, para. 12, the Irish High Court cited 
a Guardian newspaper article, disclosing the existence of “X Keyscore.”  According to the Guardian 
report, this programme permits NSA “analysts to search with no prior authorization through vast 
databases containing emails, online chats and the browsing history of millions of individuals.”  See 
Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything  a User Does on the Internet, 
THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-
online-data. The NSA has denied the charges that XKeyscore is operated by unsupervised analysts 
and stated that analyst queries are subject to audit and compliance mechanisms.  NSA Press 
Statement (July 30, 2013), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/search/xkeyscore. The documents 
released concerning the programme show that it operates as a search tool used on already-collected 
data – not as a means of collection.  Since the programme is not aimed at data stored in the US, data 
of EU citizens transferred to the US is unaffected.  The NSA may collect data transmitted to and 
stored in the United States only through the use of selectors and discriminants as described. 
Illustrative Member States also deploy XKeyscore on data collected in Europe.  See, e.g., Document 
Pertaining to the Agreement Between the NSA and Germany’s Domestic Intelligence Agency BfV, 
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This multi-step system limits the government’s collection of communications from 
non-US persons significantly.501  In 2014, for example, the Section 702 programme 
affected only 92,707 targets out of all the individuals whose data was available in the 
United States.502  This number, while not trivial, falls far short of the initial reports on 
the PRISM programme in the Washington Post that “[t]he National Security Agency 
and the FBI are tapping directly into the central servers of … leading internet 
companies, extracting audio, video, photographs, e-mails, documents, and 
connection logs that enable analysts to track a person’s movements and contacts 
over time.”503 
Furthermore, Section 702 authorizations are limited to one year and, to continue 
beyond that year, the Attorney General and the DNI must make another joint 
certification to the FISC and obtain a second approval.504  And minimization 
procedures, discussed further below, ensure that legally-privileged attorney-client 
communications – to the extent feasible – are not collected.505  “As soon as it 
becomes apparent that a communication is between a person who is known to be 
                                                                                                                                                        
ZEIT ONLINE (August 26, 2015) (reporting Germany’s use of XKeyscore), 
http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2015-08/xks-xkeystore-document. 
500 Richards, NSA’s Civil Liberties and Privacy Protections for Targeted SIGINT Activities Under 
Executive Order 12333, supra note 495, at Part III. 
501 Robertston, Opinion, supra note 398, at para. 31 (noting that use of selectors under Section 702 “is 
not ‘bulk’ or ‘generalised’ collection, and is more akin to the ‘strategic monitoring’ which was upheld by 
the European Union in Weber and Saravia.”). 
502 See ODNI, 2014 Transparency Report, 
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/transparency/odni_transparencyreport_cy2014. 
The NSA has stated publicly that NSA ‘“touches’ about 1.6%, and analysts only look at 0.00004%, of 
the world’s internet traffic.’” Joint Statement from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and 
the National Security Agency (Aug. 21, 2013), 
https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/speeches_testimonies/ 
2013_08_21_Joint_Statement_ODNI_NSA.pdf 
503 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S. Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies 
in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, available at 
http://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/must-read/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-
internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program.  
On June 7, 2013, the Washington Post updated this article to provide additional context, including the 
revelation that US and British intelligence agencies were conducting the programme and that these 
intelligence agencies were required to provide the service providers with legal process (a “directive”) 
and discriminants. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from 
Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-
companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
d970ccb04497_story.html; see also Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 
2013, supra note 398, at 14–15 & n.41. 
504 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a). 
505 See Letter from Keith B. Alexander, Dir. of NSA, to James R. Silkenat, President, American Bar 
Ass’n (Mar. 10, 2014). 
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under a criminal indictment in the United States and an attorney who represents that 
individual,” for example, “monitoring of that communication will cease.”506  Any such 
communications already collected are then segregated by the Department of 
Justice.507 
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, as amended by the USA FREEDOM Act, also 
contains an important limit on Intelligence Community acquisition of data.  As noted 
above, the government must submit “specific selection term[s]” (or “selectors” or 
“discriminants”) to the telecommunications providers to prevent bulk and 
indiscriminate collection of metadata.508 Metadata collected pursuant to these 
selectors is then reviewed, and any nonresponsive records are immediately 
destroyed.509 
Together, these requirements restrain both law enforcement and the Intelligence 
Community collection of personal information.  They require that the government 
specify in various degrees what particular communications or data it wishes to 
access, and they set a limit on how much the government may acquire. 
Retention 
The United States has instituted significant limitations on the government’s ability to 
retain data automatically for indefinite periods of time.   
 Law Enforcement 
The Wiretap Act requires that the contents “be recorded … in such a way as will 
protect the recording from editing or other alterations” and “made available to the 
judge issuing [the Title III warrant] and sealed under his [or her] directions.”510  The 
neutral magistrate may then order them destroyed; otherwise they are “kept for ten 
years.”511  
No particular statute limits the federal government’s storage of information collected 
under ECPA.  However, each federal law-enforcement agency, including the FBI, 
has promulgated a record-retention plan approved by the National Archives and 
Records Administration.512  The government must retain the data under this plan and 
                                                 
506 Id. at 3 (quoting NSA, Section 702 Minimization Procedures § 4). 
507 Id. 
508 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2). 
509 NSA, Minimization Procedures Used By the National Security Agency in Connection with the 
Production of Call Detail Records Pursuant to Section 501 of the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence 
Act, at 2 (Nov. 2015), https://www.nsa.gov/civil_liberties/_files/UFA_SMPs_Nov_2015.pdf. 
510 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a). 
511 Id. § 2518(8)(a). 
512 See US Dep’t of Justice, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations 35 
(2008), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/guidelines.pdf; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Privacy Act, 
which limits dissemination of records); 36 C.F.R. §§ 1220.1–1227.14 (NARA regulations). 
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additional guidelines created by the Attorney General only so long as investigation 
remains open.513  
The US surveillance authorities also do not impose any default retention requirement 
on private service providers with two exceptions.  One, law enforcement may in 
individual cases request that service providers preserve specific stored contents of 
communications for 90 days pursuant to ECPA,514 but such requests are limited to 
the identified communications.  Two, the Federal Communications Commission ‒	the 
independent federal agency charged with regulating telephone and internet service 
providers ‒ requires that regulated service providers maintain records for 18 months 
for billing purposes.515  That requirement, however, is wholly independent of the 
surveillance regime.  
Finally, PPD-28 – along with other “Executive Orders, proclamations, Presidential 
directives, IC directives, and associated policies” – require that the information 
collected and retained be stored securely and limited to “authorized personnel.”516 
Intelligence Community 
Various FISA provisions and Attorney General guidelines prohibit indiscriminate and 
indefinite storage of specific communications collected pursuant to a FISA Order.  
Foremost among them are the minimization procedures promulgated by the Attorney 
General and approved by the FISC.517  These procedures require that the 
Intelligence Community determine whether unencrypted data should be permanently 
preserved as foreign intelligence or be destroyed within five years.  To store the 
information beyond five years, the analysts must obtain express authorisation.518   
Minimization procedures also apply to the communications and data collected under 
Section 702.  The same five-year timeline applies to data collected under PRISM,519 
and a two-year maximum applies to unanalysed data obtained pursuant to 
Upstream.520  Moreover, President Obama has stated that “long-term storage of 
personal information [is] unnecessary to protect [the United States’s] national 
security [and] is inefficient, unnecessary, and raises legitimate privacy concerns.”521  
513 US Dep’t of Justice, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, supra note 
512 at 36. 
514 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f). 
515 47 C.F.R. § 42.6. 
516 PPD-28, § 4(a)(ii). 
517 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1805(a)(3). 
518 See USSID SP0018 § 6. 
519 PPD-28, § 4(a). 
520 NSA, Dir. of Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, NSA’s Implementation of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act Section 702, at 8 (2014), 
https://www.nsa.gov/civil_liberties/_files/nsa_report_on_section_702_program.pdf. 
521 PPD-28 § 4(a)(i). 
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Furthermore, outside of FISA, PPD-28 directs that “[p]ersonal information [of foreign 
citizens] shall be retained only if the retention of comparable information concerning 
U.S. persons would be permitted under section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333.”522  
Pursuant to this directive, the minimization procedures now direct that 
communications clearly unrelated to foreign intelligence be destroyed as soon 
feasible523 and that “[n]onpublic communications that are acquired by the [US 
Intelligence Community] that contain personal information of non-U.S. persons may 
be retained in their original or transcribed form only … for up to 5 years unless the 
Director of National Intelligence … has expressly determined in writing that 
continued retention is in the national security interests of the United States.”524 
The Section 215 programme under the USA FREEDOM Act strikes a similar 
balance.  The Act explicitly forbids the bulk collection of metadata stored in the 
United States,525 and the service providers, who store the metadata, are not required 
to retain such information beyond the necessary 18-month period imposed by the 
FCC.526  Metadata that is properly collected, in turn, must be destroyed within five 
years after the initial collection.527  These limits balance the need for privacy and the 
recognition that “the significance to our national security of intelligence is not always 
apparent upon an initial review of information.”528  
Finally, as with information collected by law enforcement, the personal data stored 
by the government is kept secure from unauthorised access.529 
Access And Dissemination 
The US legal order further limits the scope of law enforcement’s and the Intelligence 
Community’s intrusions into the privacy of individuals by regulating who has access 
to collected and retained information and under what conditions that information may 
be released. 
                                                 
522 Id. § 4(a)(i). 
523 Dep’t of Justice, Section 702 Minimization Procedures, supra note 509, at § 3(c)(1)–(2); see also 
NSA, Dir. of Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, NSA’s Implementation of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act Section 702, at 8 (2014), 
https://www.nsa.gov/civil_liberties/_files/nsa_report_on_section_702_program.pdf. 
524 NSA PPD-28 Section 4 Procedures § 6.1(a) (Jan. 12, 2015). Department of Defense guidelines 
likewise call for the destruction of inadvertently intercepted communications “as soon as feasible.”  
Dep’t of Def., Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United 
States Persons, No. DoD 5240 1-R, at C5.3.3.2.2 (1982). 
525 Pub. L. No. 114–23, § 103 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2), (c)). 
526 See Savage, Power Wars, supra note 370, at 608.  
527 NSA, 2015 Minimization Procedures, supra note 509, at 7. 
528 PPD-28 § 4(a). 
529See, e.g., Litt, Privacy, Technology & National Security, supra note 362 (“[W]e have secure 
databases to hold this data, to which only trained personnel have access.”). 
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 Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement use of communications intercepted or collected under the Wiretap 
Act or ECPA must be consistent with the strictures imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 2517.  
These rules, in various ways, limit the dissemination of information to legitimate law-
enforcement and counterterrorism purposes.  
Furthermore, the recordings and other “evidence derived therefrom” may not be 
introduced in criminal proceedings against a defendant unless the government 
“furnish[es] a copy of the court order, and accompanying application, under which 
the interception was authorized or approved.”530  This disclosure permits a defendant 
to “move to suppress the contents” of the intercepted communications or evidence 
found due to the interception.531  This right includes seeking to suppress the use of 
privileged communications, regardless of whether they are intercepted or otherwise 
collected.532  
 Intelligence Community 
The US legal order imposes even stricter restrictions on the use and dissemination 
of information collected under the various sections of FISA.  Section 1806 of FISA 
requires the government to “notify [an] aggrieved person and the court] that it intends 
to offer information collected via FISA “into evidence or otherwise use or disclose [it] 
in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, 
agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, against the 
aggrieved person.” 533 Furthermore, Title I of FISA precludes “electronic surveillance” 
obtained via a FISA order from being “used or disclosed by Federal officers or 
employees except for lawful purposes,”534 and information acquired as part of the 
Section 702 programme is governed by the same protections.535  
In turn, regulations issued by the NSA define “lawful purposes” to include only those 
instances in which “personal information (i) is publicly available; (ii) is related to an 
authorized foreign intelligence requirement; (iii) is related to a crime that has been, is 
being, or is about to be committed; or (iv) indicates a possible threat to the safety of 
any person or organization.”536  Intercepted communications may be used for law-
enforcement purposes only with the authorisation of the Attorney General,537 and the 
Department of Justice regulations specifically preclude the dissemination of personal 
                                                 
530 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9). 
531 Id. § 2518(10)(a). 
532 See id. §§ 2517(4). 
533 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c); see also id. § 1881e(a). 
534 Id. § 1806(e). 
535 Id. § 1881e 
536 NSA, PPD-28 Section 4 Procedures § 7.2 (Jan. 12, 2015). 
537 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b). 
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information “about the routine activities of a non-U.S. person … without some 
indication that the personal information is related to an authorized foreign intelligence 
requirement.”538 
Privileged communications, in particular, receive protections.  They may not, for 
instance, be used in criminal prosecutions.539 
Section 215 likewise precludes government officials from using and disclosing the 
obtained information, except as authorized by law.540  
2.2.4 Oversight 
There should be some combination of executive, legislative, judicial 
and expert oversight for approval and review of surveillance measures. 
The United States has instituted structural and statute-specific oversight 
mechanisms that operate on multiple levels.  First, there is the judiciary.  The 
Constitution and federal statutes mandate an essential role for judges ‒ members of 
an independent branch of government, who hold their appointments for life, control 
when warrants issue, and supervise the execution of warrants.  Second, there is the 
executive branch itself, which has appointed and empowered inspectors general and 
civil liberties officers to oversee and report on surveillance activities, established 
administrative controls, and releases public reports and other public information 
about surveillance.  Third, there is Congress and its committees that control 
appropriations for government activities, hold hearings, and provide public reports.  
Finally, there are independent outside groups that have the power to request and 
release information and reports on the United States’s surveillance activities.  This 
report addresses each level of oversight in turn. 
 Judiciary 
The US legal order places great emphasis on the independence of the judiciary, a 
branch co-equal with the executive and the legislature.  As one member of the 
founding generation put it, “[t]he complete independence of the courts of justice is 
peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”541  The American Constitution protects 
the independence of federal judges by ensuring the concurrence of both of the other 
branches of the government through nomination by the President and confirmation 
by the Senate, and by conferring lifetime tenure without reduction in pay.542 
In turn, the judiciary plays a key role in restraining and overseeing the surveillance 
activities of law enforcement and the Intelligence Community.  Nearly all of the 
                                                 
538 NSA, PPD-28 Section 4 Procedures, supra note 509 § 7.2. 
539 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a). 
540 See id. § 1861(h) (governing use of information). 
541 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
542 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; art. III, § 1. 
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government’s surveillance tools require that the courts approve their deployment ex 
ante.   
 Wiretap Act 
The Wiretap Act, as discussed above, requires the government to obtain a Title III 
warrant from a neutral magistrate before intercepting real-time communications.  For 
such a warrant to issue, the judge must find on the basis of the required 
particularized showing543 that probable cause exists to believe the intercepted 
communications will reveal evidence related to one or more enumerated felonies, 
that other means of acquiring the communications have been exhausted, and that 
the surveillance will be conducted in as limited a manner as possible.544  
If the court approves the wiretap request, it continues to play a supervisory role.  The 
government must reapply every 30 days ‒ at a minimum ‒ to maintain an authorized 
wiretap,545 and the court may require status reports to justify continued authorisation 
before thirty days has run.546  
To ensure that the courts are vigilant, the Wiretap Act also requires every judge who 
has issued a Title III warrant (or an extension) to report to the Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts, once the warrant has expired, the period for which 
surveillance was authorized, and the crime being investigated.547  This information 
becomes the basis for a report by Administrative Office to Congress on the use of 
wiretaps each year.548 
 ECPA 
The judiciary plays a similar role under ECPA.  For the government to obtain a 
search warrant to collect stored contents of communications,549 a judge must find 
that probable cause exists to believe the contents seized will be related to a crime.550  
The government may go ahead with the collection only once the court is satisfied 
that such a standard is met. 
For a Section 2703(d) order to issue, permitting the government to acquire non-
content information without providing notice to the target,551 a neutral magistrate 
                                                 
543 See infra part 2.2.2. 
544 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516–18.  
545 Id. § 2518(5). 
546 Id. § 2518(6). 
547 Id. § 2519(1). 
548 Id. § 2519(3). 
549 Id. § 2703(a); Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.  
550 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. 
551 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
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must similarly find that “there are reasonable grounds” to believe that identified 
information is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”  And even 
when judicial approval is not necessary ex ante, i.e., when the government uses a 
subpoena to acquire non-content information, the judiciary may decide whether to 
quash the government’s request.552  
 FISA Title I 
The FISC plays the dominant role in approving the Intelligence Community’s conduct 
of electronic surveillance for foreign-intelligence purposes.  The government may 
conduct such surveillance only by obtaining a FISA warrant,553 which issues only if 
the FISC determines that probable cause exists to believe that the information the 
Intelligence Community proposes to intercept is foreign intelligence information.554  
FISA’s probable-cause standard is identical to that used by courts under the Wiretap 
Act and ECPA.  In recent years, the FISC has denied555 and modified a number of 
FISA applications,556 and the government has withdrawn others due to court 
scrutiny.557  In multiple letters to Congress, the FISC has noted that “[i]n some 
cases,” where the FISC judge “is inclined to deny [the government’s application], the 
government may decide not to submit a final application, or to withdraw one that has 
been submitted, after learning that the judge does not intend to approve it.”558  These 
actions do not show up significantly in the statistics, even though “[d]uring the three 
month period from July 1, 2013 through September 30, 2013, [the court] observed 
that 24.4% of matters submitted ultimately involved substantive changes to the 
information provided by the government or to the authorities granted as a result of 
Court inquiry or action.”559  
Furthermore, the USA FREEDOM Act has authorized the FISC to appoint amici 
curiae  charged with advancing “legal arguments that advance the protection of 
individual privacy and civil liberties.”560  The FISC, pursuant to this directive, 
                                                 
552 Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(2). 
553 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a). 
554 Id. § 1805(a)–(b). 
555 See, e.g., Report from Ronald Weich, Ass’t Att’y Gen., to Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., at 1 (Apr. 30, 
2010) (noting that the FISC denied one FISA application), 
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2009rept.pdf. 
556 See, e.g., Report from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., to Sen. Harry Reid, at 1 
(Apr. 30, 2014) (noting that the FISC modified 34 of 1,588 FISA applications for electronic 
surveillance), http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2013rept.pdf. 
557 Weich Report, supra note 555, at 1 (noting that the government withdrew 8 FISA applications). 
558 Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, FISC, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, at 3 (July 
29, 2013), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Correspondence%20Grassley-1.pdf; see 
also Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, FISC, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, at 1 
(October 11, 2013) (providing additional statistics). 
559 October Letter from Hon. Reggie B. Walton to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, supra note 558, at 1. 
560 Pub. L. No. 114–23, § 401, 129 Stat. 279 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i)(4)). 
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announced the appointment of five highly-qualified advocates on November 25, 
2015.561  The USA FREEDOM Act also requires the FISC to release publicly any 
FISC “decision, order, or opinion, including any denial or modification of an 
application under this Act, that includes significant construction or interpretation of 
any provision of law or results in a change of application of any provision of this Act 
or a novel application of any provision of this Act” within 45 days.562  These 
provisions were designed to add balance to the FISC’s largely ex parte proceedings. 
 Section 702 
The FISC is heavily involved in the Intelligence Community’s actions under Section 
702.  It reviews and approves the government’s certification,563 targeting 
procedures,564 and minimization procedures.565  This power is not merely theoretical: 
in 2011, the FISC held the government’s Section 702 programme unconstitutional as 
applied, mandating changes (that were quickly implemented) to bring the programme 
into compliance with the Constitution and Section 702 itself.566 
Section 702 also empowers the FISC to hear and investigate challenges from 
electronic-service providers to the Attorney General/Director of National Intelligence 
directives requiring the contents of communications.567  If a directive fails to meet the 
statutory requirements or is otherwise unlawful, the FISC may set the directive 
aside.568  If the FISC affirms the directive, Section 702 permits the service provider to 
appeal to the FISA Court of Review.569 
FISC rules of procedure further require the government to report any instances of 
noncompliance with the FISC authorizations under Sections 702 and 215.570  The 
                                                 
561 See Poplin, Amicus Curiae for FISC Announced, supra note 371.. 
562 Pub. L. No. 114–23, § 604, 129 Stat. 297 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1871(c)(1)). 
563 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i). 
564 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d). 
565 Id. § 1881a(e). 
566 Memorandum Opinion, [Caption Redacted], No. [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 
2011), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0716/October-2011-Bates-Opinion-and%20Order-
20140716.pdf; see also Savage, Power Wars, supra note 370, at 564, 572 (detailing FISC criticism of 
government procedures). 
567 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4); see also PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 76 (noting FISC 
powers to investigate non-compliance). 
568 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(4); see also In re Proceedings Required by § 702(i) of the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008, No. Misc. 08-01, at *8–9 (FISA Ct. Rev. Aug. 28, 2008) (“Section 702(h) 
explicitly provides for the participation of parties other than the Government, in that electronic 
communication service providers can bring a challenge in the FISC to directives issued to them under 
the FAA.”). 
569 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(6). 
570 FISC Rule of Procedure 13, 
http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/FISC%20Rules%20of%20Procedure.pdf. 
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government, when issues have arisen, have made the required supplemental filings 
and confessions.571  In fact, the temporary shuttering of Upstream by a federal 
district court in 2011 came about as a result of the government’s self-reporting.572 
 Section 215 
The FISC or another neutral magistrate must also approve a Section 215 order that 
requires service providers to release selected metadata.573  The judiciary can 
accordingly monitor the executive’s actions under this previously-controversial 
programme.574  In the event that a service provider challenges the order, the FISC 
has the sole authority to hear that case.575  
Executive Branch  
The executive branch itself undertakes significant actions in the interest of 
compliance and transparency.  Those actions take the form of procedures and 
controls to check surveillance and ensure compliance with the Constitution and 
federal statutes, independent oversight officers within the agencies, statutorily-
mandated reports, and other voluntary disclosures.576 
 Internal Compliance Procedures And Controls 
There are many procedures and controls mandated by statute or implemented 
voluntarily by the government.  For example, the Wiretap Act, FISA Title I, and 
Section 702 all require high-level Department of Justice approval to apply for the 
relevant legal order.577  The foreign-intelligence applications, in particular, must aver 
                                                 
571 See, e.g., Letter from Kevin J. O’Connor, Chief, Oversight Div., Nat’l Sec. Div., US Dep’t of Justice, 
to Hon. Thomas F. Hogan, FISC, re: Update Regarding Compliance Incidents Reported in the 
December 2013, March 2014, and June 2014 Section 702 Quarterly Reports (July 30, 2014), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0928/Letter%20to%20Judge%20Hogan%2030%20July%202014.
pdf; Letter from Kevin J. O’Connor, Chief, Oversight Div., Nat’l Sec. Div., US Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. 
Reggie B. Walton, FISC, re:  Notice of NSA’s Assessment of Purge Practices and Discovery of 
Incomplete Purges (March 18, 2014), 
http://t.umblr.com/redirect?z=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dni.gov%2Ffiles%2Fdocuments%2F0928%2FLet
ter+to+Judge+Walton+18+March+2014.pdf&t=OTkwMWE4MTU4YjQ5NDBiODVhZTU3YmI1NWYwM
WU0MjUzYTNkODlmNyw5YWRIOTg3Qw%3D%3D; Savage, Power Wars, supra note 370, at 564, 
572. 
572 Savage, Power Wars, supra note 370, at 572. 
573 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c). 
574 See, e.g., Kadzik Report, supra note 556, at 2 (noting that the FISC modified 141 of 178 
applications for business records under 50 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)), 
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2013rept.pdf. 
575 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f). 
576 See generally Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 657 (2016). 
577 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (Wiretap Act); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a), (d) (FISA); 1881a(a) (Section 
702). 
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that the government seeks “foreign intelligence”578 and, for FISA Title I, that this 
intelligence cannot otherwise be obtained without the proposed surveillance.579  
These personal certifications ensure that the heads of the agencies are responsible 
for the conduct of American surveillance. 
Next, the Department of Justice580 and ODNI jointly assess compliance.  Twice per 
year, the agencies release an unclassified report that details how, how often, and 
why noncompliance occurs.581  In August 2013, that report revealed that the 
incidents of non-compliance were minimial and not systemic.582 
Furthermore, the agencies have implemented various controls to ensure that the 
surveillance conducted remains in compliance with the Constitution and federal 
statutes after authorisation is obtained from the FISC.  The NSA, for instance, has 
instituted significant controls surrounding the analysts’ choice of selectors and audits 
on individual targeting decisions and minimization efforts.583  These monitoring 
procedures have detected minor compliance issues, such as a failure to de-task all 
selectors and discriminants when a non-US person enters the United States,584 but 
they have also detected a few systemic issues, such as a gap in the agency’s 
procedures for purging irrelevant data585 and inappropriate personal queries.586  
When issues have been detected, appropriate modifications have been made 
promptly.587 
                                                 
578 FISA defines “foreign intelligence information” as “information that relates to … the ability of the 
United States to protect against actual or potential attack … of a foreign power …; sabotage, 
international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction …; or 
clandestine intelligence activities” or “information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory 
that relates to … the national defense or security of the United States; or the conduct of the foreign 
affairs of the United States.”  50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). 
579 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7).  
580 The Department of Justice has a section of the National Security Division devoted to oversight of 
intelligence surveillance.  US DOJ, Sections & Offices (September 9, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/nsd/sections-offices#oversight. 
581 US Dep’t of Justice & ODNI, Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and 
Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by 
the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, at 23–36 (August 2013), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Semiannual%20Assessment%20of%20Compliance%20with%20p
rocedures%20and%20guidelines%20issued%20pursuant%20to%20Sect%20702%20of%20FISA.pdf 
582 Id. at 24. 
583 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 67–68; see also supra notes 495–503 and 
accompanying text. 
584 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 78. 
585 Id. at 79.  
586 See Peterson, LOVEINT, supra note 403. 
587 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380, at 79. 
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 Inspectors General 
Congress has mandated that each agency within the executive branch has at least 
one inspector general.  Inspectors general are independent, high-ranking appointees 
confirmed by the Senate for an indefinite term whose mission is to promote efficiency 
and ferret out fraud and abuse.588  The Department of Justice Inspector General, for 
instance, is tasked with “detect[ing] and deter[ring] abuse, and misconduct in 
[Department of Justice] programs and personnel,”589 and reporting to Congress 
semi-annually whether “Department programs and operations … are lawful, well-run, 
or otherwise in the public interest.”590  
Inspectors General routinely issue public reports when the government fails to meet 
those goals.591  For example, a report by the Department of Justice Inspector 
General in 2007 identified excessive use by the FBI of “national security letters,”592 
and reports from the National Security Agency Inspector General have become 
available, detailing the number of phone and email accounts targeted by the NSA 
under a precursor to Section 702.593  Inspectors General for the Department of 
Justice and Intelligence Community have access to classified information, so they 
are able to review sensitive law enforcement and intelligence surveillance programs, 
and report on these to Congress. 
 Civil Liberties Officers 
Each agency also has a privacy and civil liberties officer, a senior official whose role 
in law enforcement and intelligence agencies includes to review, oversee, and audit 
day-to-day surveillance activities.594  For example, the Department of Justice Chief 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer “review[s], overs[ees], and coordinat[es] the 
                                                 
588 See 5 U.S.C. App. § 8H (requiring inspectors general for the Intelligence Community). 
589 US Dep’t of Justice, Inspector General Mission Statement, (Jan. 2016), https://oig.justice.gov/; see 
also 5 U.S.C. app. 2. 
590 The Department of Justice Inspector General’s Access to Information Protected by the Federal 
Wiretap Act, Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Section 626 of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, at 5 (Op. O.L.C. July 20, 2015) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 0.29a(b)(2), (4)), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ files/olc/ opinions/attachments/2015/07/23/2015-07-20-doj-oig-
access.pdf. 
591 See, e.g., I. Charles McCullough, III, ODNI Inspector Gen., Semiannual Report to the Director of 
National Intelligence: April 1–September 30, 2015 (Jan. 15, 2016); Letter from Dr. George Ellard, 
Inspector Gen., Nat’l Sec. Agency, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley (Sept. 11, 2013) (reporting “instances 
of intentional misuses of the signals intelligence authorities”). 
592 US Dep’t of Justice, Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of 
National Security Letters (Mar. 2007), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0703b/final.pdf. 
593 See Savage, Power Wars, supra note 370, at 211; see also NSA, Inspector General, ST-09-0002 
Working Draft (Mar. 24, 2009), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/20130816/NSA%20IG%20Report.pdf. 
594 See, e.g., 50 USC. § 403-3d(b)(1) (establishing position of Director of National Intelligence Civil 
Liberties Protection Officer); 42 USC. § 2000ee-1(a) (requiring privacy and civil liberties officers for 
the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency). 
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Department’s privacy operations” and “provides legal advice and guidance to 
Departmental components” to ensure that the government operates within its legal 
authority.595  The ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer “ensur[es] that the protection 
of privacy and civil liberties is appropriately incorporated in Intelligence Community 
policies and procedures, oversee[s] compliance by the ODNI with privacy and civil 
liberties laws, review[s] complaints of possible abuses of privacy and civil liberties in 
programs and operations administered by the ODNI, and ensur[es] that the use of 
technology sustains, and does not erode, privacy.596  As with the inspectors general, 
these officers release public reports evaluating the government’s progress in melding 
a need for effective surveillance and for protecting privacy.597 
 Review Boards 
The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight 
Board, an element within the Executive Office of the President, have a standing 
obligation to “overse[e] the Intelligence Community’s compliance with the 
Constitution and all applicable laws.”598 
Recently, President Obama also established the President’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technology after the Snowden disclosures.599  
This group reviewed United States surveillance policies and activities, and it then 
issued a public report with recommendations.600  Many of those recommendations 
were subsequently included in PPD-28 or the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015.601 
                                                 
595 US Dep’t of Justice, Office of Privacy & Civil Liberties, http://www.justice.gov/opcl; see also 28 
U.S.C. § 509 (note) (establishing Privacy and Civil Liberties Office). 
596 ODNI, Civil Liberties Protection Officer, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/leadership/civil-
liberties-protection-officer.   
597 See, e.g., NSA Civil Liberties & Privacy Office, USA FREEDOM Transparency Report, supra note 
384; NSA Civil Liberties & Privacy Office, Transparency Report: NSA’s Implementation of FISA 
Section 702 (Apr. 16, 2014), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0421/702%20Unclassified%20Document.pdf. 
598 President’s Intelligence Advisory Board & Intelligence Oversight Board, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/piab/. 
599 President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology, Liberty and Security 
in a Changing World, supra note 428.  
600 It bears noting that, even though the review group recommended several changes to current 
United States policy, “nothing in [this report] indicated that [the United States] intelligence community 
ha[d] sought to violate the law or [wa]s cavalier about the civil liberties of their fellow citizens.”  Pres. 
Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Review of Signals Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014). 
601 Peter Swire, The USA FREEDOM Act, the President’s Review Group and the Biggest Intelligence 
Reform in 40 Years (Jan. 8, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-usa-freedom-act-the-presidents-
review-group-and-the-biggest-intelligence-reform-in-40-years (explaining adoption of Group’s 
recommendations). 
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 Public Reports And Disclosures 
As noted before, FOIA exists to permit the press and private parties to obtain any 
unclassified documents from the government.602  
The Director of National Intelligence, however, also publishes all declassified 
procedures, guidelines, speeches, and FISA opinions on the internet,603 and the 
Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice makes many of its opinions 
available for public consumption.604 
The various agencies, moreover, have public reporting requirements.  The 
Department of Justice must file a report with the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts, which provides a general description of the intercepted 
communications, the number of arrests made pursuant to the information, and the 
number of convictions secured.605  These reports are then released to the public for 
review.606  Likewise, the Intelligence Community must submit yearly reports to the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and to Congress.607  These reports 
must detail the number of applications approved by the Attorney General and the 
number of FISA orders granted or extended by the FISC.608  
More specifically, law-enforcement agencies must notify the target of a wiretap 
application in short order after the Title III warrant expires or is denied.609 Likewise, 
and, as noted earlier, law enforcement and the Intelligence Community must 
                                                 
602 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 14-4432-cv (2d Cir. Oct. 22, 2015) 
(affirming district court order requiring disclosure of OLC opinions related to drone program), available 
at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/27a87bdf-b5fd-4cb7-98f6-5bfe606ef80a/1/doc/14-
4432_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/27a87bdf-b5fd-4cb7-98f6-
5bfe606ef80a/1/hilite/. 
603 See, e.g., ODNI, IC On the Record, http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/topics/section-702; In re 
Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible 
Things, No. BR 14-01 (FISC Mar. 20, 2014), available at 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/opinion-and-order-in-case/955/. 
604 See US Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, http://www.justice.gov/olc/opinions; see also 
David J. Barron, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, Mem. re: Best 
Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 5 (July 16, 2010) (noting that “the Office 
operates from the presumption that it should make its significant opinions fully and promptly available 
to the public”), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2014/07/11/olc-best-
practices-2010.pdf. 
605 18 U.S.C. § 2519(2). 
606 See, e.g., US Dep’t of Justice, Wiretap Report 2014, supra note 351. 
607 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 114–23, § 108; 50 U.S.C. §§ 1807; 1881a(l)(1); see also Off. of Dir. of Nat’l 
Intelligence, Signals Intelligence Reform: 2015 Anniversary Report, 
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ppd-28/2015. 
608 50 U.S.C. § 1807(a). 
609 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d); see also id. §2703(d) (permitting delayed notification of access to stored 
communications). 
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disclose if surveillance was used to obtain evidence the government intends to 
introduce in a criminal proceeding.610 
The end result is that these bodies provide oversight of the government’s Wiretap 
Act activities, and the public remains informed of law enforcement’s activities.  If 
abuses are discovered, reforms can thus be instituted quickly and with dispatch. 
Congress 
Congress itself plays a significant role monitoring law enforcement’s and the 
Intelligence Community’s surveillance activities.  As a non-parliamentary system, the 
US Congress is wholly independent of the executive branch and judiciary. 
Significantly, however, the legislature holds the power of the purse, meaning it can 
refuse to appropriate money to federal law enforcement or the Intelligence 
Community in response to unapproved surveillance.611  The Judiciary and 
Intelligence Committees in both the House and Senate have jurisdiction over the 
Department of Justice and the Intelligence Community, and they frequently conduct 
hearings regarding surveillance.612  They have secure facilities in which to receive 
classified briefings and large staffs with the necessary clearances to properly 
conduct intense and granular oversight proceedings.  From these hearings, abuses 
can be identified and corrected, as they were with the original passage of the 
Wiretap Act and FISA and, more recently, the USA FREEDOM Act. 
Independent Watchdogs 
Independent oversight bodies provide a mechanism to ensure that law enforcement 
and intelligence surveillance comply with public law that, like the judiciary, is 
independent both of the prosecutorial or intelligence functions and of political 
decision-making.613  The activity of such bodies can be supplemented by civil 
society. 
                                                 
610 Id. § 2515; 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c)–(d). 
611 US Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
612 See, e.g., Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balance Between Public Safety and 
Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (July 8, 2015); Report of the 
Select Comm. on Intell., Covering the Period Jan. 3, 2013 to Jan. 5, 2015 (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee-intelligence-covering-period-
january-3-2013-january-5-2015; Comm. Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and 
Interrogation Program (Dec. 9, 2014); Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Jan. 29, 2014); Strengthening Privacy Rights and National 
Security:  Oversight of FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Surveillance Programs:  Hearing 
of the S. Judiciary Comm., 113th Cong. (July 31, 2013); Video Laptop Surveillance: Does Title III 
Need to Be Updated: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (Mar. 29, 2010). 
613 Cf. ECtHR 4 December 2015, Application No. 4743/06, Zakharov v. Russia, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2015:1204JUD004714306, §§ 275 and 279 (approving of oversight bodies composed 
of legislators and members of the judiciary, but noting that political appointees and prosecutors 
charged with overseeing surveillance activities were not sufficiently independent). 
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 Privacy And Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
The foremost independent oversight body (within the Executive Branch) is the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), a board of five experts with 
members from both parties nominated by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate.  Mandated by statute following the attacks of 9/11,614 the PCLOB has two 
main responsibilities:  
(1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the 
Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with 
the need to protect privacy and civil liberties; and (2) ensure that liberty 
concerns are appropriately considered in the development and 
implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect 
the Nation against terrorism.615  
The PCLOB, pursuant to this directive, has access to classified information and may 
elicit testimony and documents from the government.616  The PCLOB is ultimately 
permitted to issue public reports, describing any abuses and offering 
recommendations for improvements.617 
Two of these reports have particular significance for assessing the level of protection 
for personal data of EU citizens that is transmitted to the US.  The first is the 
PCLOB’s report on the government’s metadata programme under Section 215.618  
The PCLOB found that the government’s programme of bulk-collection domestic 
telephone metadata violated Section 215 itself as well as ECPA, and that it raised 
significant questions under both the First and Fourth Amendments to the US 
Constitution.619 The report, moreover, found that “the Section 215 program has 
shown minimal value in safeguarding the nation from terrorism”620 ‒ in effect, that the 
programme was disproportionate.  The report consequently recommended that “the 
government end the program”621 and that Congress enact additional safeguards.622  
                                                 
614 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee; see also supra note 1. 
615 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(c). 
616 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(d), (g). 
617 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(e); PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380; PCLOB, Report on 
the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the 
Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (Jan. 23, 2014) (Section 215 Report), 
https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf. 
618 PCLOB, Section 215 Report supra note 617. 
619 Id. at 10–11. 
620 Id. at 11. 
621 Id. at 16. 
622 Id. at 17.  
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Those safeguards largely became the basis for the USA Freedom Act, which has 
become law.623 
The second significant report is the PCLOB’s report on the Section 702 programme, 
or “PRISM” programme.624  This report found that “the Section 702 program is not 
based on the indiscriminate collection of information in bulk.  Instead the program 
consists entirely of targeting specific [non-United States] persons about whom an 
individualized determination has been made.”625  The PCLOB also noted that “[t]he 
Section 702 program has proven valuable to the government’s efforts to combat 
terrorism,” including by helping the Intelligence Community “understand the structure 
and hierarchy of internationals terrorist networks,” “identify previously unknown 
individuals who are involved in international terrorism,” and “discovering … 
connection[s] between [foreign] extremist[s] and [previously] unknown person[s] [in 
the United States].”626  As a result, the PCLOB found, there have been at least “54 
‘success stories’” in which the Section 702 programme has played a role, and 
approximately 30 cases in which “Section 702 information was the initial catalyst that 
identified previously unknown terrorist operatives and/or plots.”627 
These reports ‒ one critical of the proportionality of surveillance programs, one 
supportive ‒ provide the public with the necessary insight into government 
surveillance programs.  The thoroughness and candour of the PCLOB’s reports 
demonstrate the independence of the board and effectiveness of its oversight. 
 Service Providers 
The government permits telecommunications and internet-service providers to 
disclose “transparency reports,” aggregate reports regarding government requests 
for information under Section 702.628  These reports, for instance, show in six-month 
periods the number of data requests made by the government and the number of 
users affected.629  Certain restrictions, however, apply: a company must wait two 
years to report “data relating to the first order that is served on [it] for a platform, 
                                                 
623 Pub. L. No. 114–23, § 103 (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2), (c)). 
624 PCLOB, Section 702 Report, supra note 380. 
625 Id. at 111. Cf. Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and 
surveillance and remedies in the EU: http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/surveillance-
intelligence-services November 2015. 
626 Id. at 107–08.  
627 Id. at 109–10. 
628 See, e.g., Letter from James M. Cole, Dep. Att’y Gen., to Colin Stretch et al. (Jan. 27, 2014), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/366201412716018407143.pdf; Peter Swire, US 
Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013, 28 (Dec. 17, 2015), https://fpf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/White-Paper-Swire-US-EU-Surveillance.pdf. 
629 See, e.g., Google, Transparency Report, 
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/; Facebook, Government Requests 
Report, https://govtrequests.facebook.com/country/United%20States/2015-H1/. 
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product, or service (whether developed or acquired) for which the company has not 
previously received such an order.”630 
 Other Watchdog Groups 
In addition, a robust civil society brings ad hoc oversight using various transparency 
statutes that permit individual citizens to petition the government for documents and 
other information.  The Freedom of Information Act,631 for example, creates a 
presumption that government information must be disclosed at the request of a 
private citizen or organisation.  This statute provides a significant mechanism for 
obtaining information in the government’s possession, such as government 
surveillance manuals, and is available to European citizens.632  
Various outside groups have vigorously pursued FOIA requests and other 
transparency measures, which increase the public knowledge of the government’s 
surveillance and disclosure policies and actions.  
Civil litigation also presents opportunities to acquire previously unreleased 
information.  Civil litigants have disclosure and discovery obligations633 from which 
the government is not excused.634  The public, as a result, can obtained access to 
pertinent documents regarding government surveillance. 
The end result is that these bodies provide thorough oversight of the government’s 
surveillance activities, and the public remains informed.  If abuses are discovered, 
reforms can thus be instituted quickly and with dispatch.  
                                                 
630 Letter from James M. Cole supra note 628,  at 3. 
631 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
632 See, e.g., H. Marshall Jarrett, US Dep’t of Justice, Searching & Seizing Computers & Obtaining 
Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations (2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ ssmanual2009.pdf. 
633 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. 
634 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch v. Drug Enforcement Agency, No. CV 15-2573 PSG (JPRx) (Aug. 
14, 2015), https://www.eff.org/document/order-holding-abeyance-ruling-motion-dismiss-and-granting-
part-plaintiffs-request-discovery (granting discovery regarding DEA surveillance program); Campbell 
v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 1962) (“In a mine-run civil case the discovery provisions of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to claims against the government.”); cf. United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (establishing that high-government officials are not immune to legal 
process). 
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2.2.5 Legal Remedies And Redress 
The public should be informed about surveillance laws and have some 
opportunity for access and rectification, and for judicial redress.  If 
necessary for legitimate aims of surveillance, surveillance can be 
secret, in which event oversight or more general legal redress are 
necessary.  
Remedies and means of redress exist at law for individuals subject to illegal 
surveillance.  They come largely in two forms: the right to exclude the collected 
information from the government’s evidence in a criminal trial, and civil causes of 
action that allow for damages or injunctive relief.  Both are generally open to US and 
EU citizens. 
Exclusionary Rule 
The Fourth Amendment usually precludes the government from introducing evidence 
obtained through unauthorised electronic surveillance or evidence derived from such 
illegal means.635  This means that if the government fails to follow these strictures, 
any information or evidence obtained cannot be used to prosecute the individual.  
Under this doctrine, it matters not that “the surveillance was limited, both in scope 
and in duration, to [a] specific purpose” if the government’s reasons for warrantless 
surveillance were not reasonable,636 because the Constitution recognizes that “[t]he 
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men [and women] of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”637  This mechanism protects the 
individual, but it also serves as a powerful deterrent to law enforcement by removing 
the main purpose for law enforcement collecting information ‒ obtaining evidence on 
which to produce criminal convictions.   
The Wiretap Act, ECPA, and FISA have codified this rule.638  These statutes, in 
addition, require that targets of surveillance be informed that the government has 
collected their information and plans to use it against them in any adverse 
proceeding.639  For instance, FISA demands that, if information is used for adverse 
purposes, the government must “notify the aggrieved person and the court … that 
the Government intends to so disclose or so use such information.”640  The 
                                                 
635 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). 
636 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 354. 
637 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Supreme 
Court in Mapp largely adopted Justice Brandeis’s dissent as the majority’s position.  367 U.S. at 659 
(“‘Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole 
people by its example. * * * If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it 
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.’” (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 
485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  
638 18 U.S.C. § 2515; 50 U.S.C. § 1806(e). 
639 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8). 
640 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c). 
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aggrieved person then must be provided an opportunity to “move to suppress the 
evidence obtained or derived from [the government’s] electronic surveillance.”641  As 
with the application of the exclusionary rule with respect to wiretaps,642 section 
1806(e) thus ensures that the government does not benefit from illegal surveillance 
and deters the deployment of further surveillance without appropriate approval. 
Civil Causes Of Action 
The surveillance statutes also provide civil causes of action that allow harmed 
individuals to sue for damages or, in certain instances, equitable relief.  These apply 
against the individual officers, as well as the United States government. 
The Wiretap Act creates a private cause of action against individual officers for “any 
person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or 
intentionally used” in violation of the Act643 and allows a court to order “appropriate 
relief,” including “such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be 
appropriate; damages … and punitive damages in appropriate cases; and a 
reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.”644  This 
right applies to foreign citizens as well as United States persons.645 
ECPA similarly allows the target of surveillance conducted in willful violation of the 
statute to sued under for civil damages.646  Relief against individuals can include 
money damages (no less than $1,000 per action), equitable or declaratory relief, and 
a reasonable attorney’s fee plus other reasonable litigation costs.647  Willful or 
intentional violations can also result in punitive damages, and employees of the 
United States may be subject to disciplinary action.648  
Where US agents and officers willfully fail to comply with Title III provisions, ECPA 
authorizes suits against the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 2712.  This section 
authorizes courts to award actual damages or $10,000, whichever is greater, and 
                                                 
641 Id. § 1806(e). 
642 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9)–(10). 
643 Id. § 2520(a). 
644 Id. § 2520(a), (b).  
645 Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 671 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2011); see also PCLOB, Section 
702 Report, supra note 380, at 99 n.444 (citing Suzlon for proposition that “any person” includes “non-
U.S. persons”). 
646 See, e.g., Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Conn. 2004) (granting summary 
judgment on liability under ECPA against police officers who served on AOL a purported search 
warrant that had not been signed by a judge). Government employees are subject to this provision, 
but United States itself is subject to liability under a separate provision. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a). 
647 18 U.S.C.§§ 2707(b), 2710(c)(2)(D), 2712(c). 
648 See id. § 2707(c), (d). Good faith reliance on a court order or warrant, grand jury subpoena, 
legislative authorisation, or statutory authorisation provides a complete defence to any civil or criminal 
action brought under ECPA. See id. § 2707(e). Qualified immunity may also be available. 
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reasonable litigation costs.  Section 2712 also defines procedures for suits against 
the United States and a process for staying proceedings when civil litigation would 
interfere with a related investigation or criminal prosecution.649  
Violations of ECPA may also give rise to a cause of action against the United States, 
and may result in disciplinary action against offending officials or employees.650  As a 
result, suits against the United States may be brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2712 for 
willful violations of ECPA.651  This section authorizes courts to award actual 
damages or $10,000, whichever is greater, and reasonable litigation costs.  Section 
2712 also defines procedures for suits against the United States and a process for 
staying proceedings when civil litigation would adversely affect a related 
investigation or criminal prosecution.652  
Under FISA, “[a]ny aggrieved person” ‒ including a European citizen (not an agent of 
a foreign power) ‒ likewise has “a cause of action against any person” who 
conducted surveillance without statutory or Presidential authorisation or who 
misused or disclosed such information.653  If successful, that person may obtain 
actual, statutory, or punitive damages and reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation 
costs.654 
2.3 The Authority And Limitations For Surveillance Under US Law Fall 
Well Within The Range Of Discretion Accorded To EU Member States 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This section compares current US laws and practices regarding government 
surveillance, as delineated in the preceding section, against the EU Benchmark. As 
noted above, Member States have considerable latitude in choosing the type of 
surveillance they consider appropriate.655 Even though this latitude may be reduced 
when a strong consensus exists among Member States concerning the legality of 
specific practices, the breadth of government discretion under the EU Benchmark 
remains significant, as described in Parts 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2 below.  
This comparison uses the same four general criteria deployed above to survey the 
surveillance laws of the Illustrative Members States and of the US (specific legal 
                                                 
649 See id. § 2712(b), (e). 
650 Id. § 2712. 
651 This section also applies to the Title III Wiretap Act, and specified sections of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c. 
652 See 18 U.S.C. § 2712 (b), (e). 
653 50 U.S.C. § 1810.  
654 50 U.S.C. § 1810. 
655 See supra Part 1.3.3.  This is confirmed most recently in ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 4 December 
2015, Application No. 47143/06, Roman Zakharov v. Russia, § 232; and in ECtHR 12 January 2016, 
Application No. 37138/14, Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, § 57.  Of course, each type of surveillance 
will require safeguards appropriate to prevent abuse of that type of surveillance.   
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authority, limited scope, appropriate oversight, and legal remedies and redress), 
which reflect the ECtHR guidance on ensuring proportionality discussed at length in 
Part 1.3.3 above.  These criteria help establish the EU Benchmark against which to 
compare the US legal order for surveillance.   
Any thorough comparison must establish facts fully and fairly.  No adequacy decision 
can be based on allegations or rumours in press reports, such as Washington Post 
articles reporting on the Snowden revelations that were later retracted and corrected 
by the Post itself.656  Nor can such a decision be based on allegations that have 
otherwise been proven to be inaccurate or unsubstantiated.  For example, the 
PRISM programme was characterized as “mass and undifferentiated access” in the 
referral judgment of the High Court of Ireland,657 and was assumed to be so by the 
Advocate-General.658  Such allegations not only are inaccurate under binding US 
law, but also have been recognised as such by the FRA Report.  That report, in fact, 
explains that the PRISM programme applies individualised search terms according 
to court-approved targeting procedures and, thus, is  “targeted”surveillance ‒ not 
“mass and undifferentiated.”659 
All previous European reports suffer from similar misconceptions or fail to account 
for recent changes in the US legal order.  Since the start of the Schrems case in 
Ireland on 25 June 2013, there have been two independent reviews of surveillance 
activities, at least seven legislative actions, and 13 executive branch actions in the 
US,660 many of which were not addressed in the European Parliament Resolution of 
12 March 2014, or the LIBE Committee Report of 13 October 2015. Notable changes 
include the USA FREEDOM Act, which ended the telephone metadata bulk-
collection programme previously conducted pursuant to Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act661; and the NSA’s Transparency Report: USA Freedom Act Business 
Record FISA Implementation published on 16 January 2016, which clarifies that the 
                                                 
656 See Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013, supra note 398, at 11; 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, FRA Report, supra note 127, at 17. The original 
erroneous article nevertheless was quoted in the referring judgment of the High Court of Ireland of 18 
June 2014 in the Schrems case.  See Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 
2013, supra note 398, at 14–15 & n.41; Robertson, Opinion, supra note 398, at para. 8 (noting that 
the CJEU “struck down [Safe Harbour] on the basis of an unexamined allegation by Edward Snowden 
that NSA had established PRISM in 2009 to obtain unrestricted access ‘on a casual and generalised 
basis’ to mass data stored on US servers” and that “[t]his is not factually correct, although it reflects 
many media misinterpretations of PRISM”). 
657 Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, [2014] IEHC 310, § 52. 
658 Opinion of A-G Bot of 23 September 2015, Case C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:627, § 26.  The CJEU 
also referred the “mass and undifferentiated accessing of personal data,” Schrems, § 33, but in the 
context of describing the Irish High Court judgment. 
659 FRA Report, supra note 127, at 17. 
660 See Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013, supra note 398, at 23–
43. 
661 Pub. L. No. 114–23, § 103, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1861).  See also supra 
Part 2.2.1. 
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data previously gathered under that programme will “never be accessed.”662  
Therefore, neither the Commission nor any supervising authority can refer 
uncritically to any of the reports published to date, as all are based in part on 
outdated and often incorrectly stated or merely presumed facts, and omit essential 
parts of the legal order in the US.   
The overview of US surveillance in this report reflects the US legal order as it exists 
today and, thus, may serve as a cornerstone of the current, correct, complete, and 
substantiated backdrop from which an essentially equivalent comparison must be 
conducted. It is neither correct nor reasonable to base any decision concerning the 
level of data protection going forward on anything less. 
The surveillance regimes in the Illustrative Member States and the US all structure 
laws and safeguards for surveillance by law enforcement agencies differently from 
that by intelligence services.  This comparison therefore follows this differentiation, 
looking separately at the degree of consensus among the Illustrative Member States 
for each category, and then comparing US safeguards against the range of 
consensus and the variations among the Illustrative Member States.  In the 
intelligence category, the analysis focuses in particular on untargeted surveillance, 
because it is this type of surveillance that has been the greatest cause of criticism of 
the US and the source of unsubstantiated allegations regarding the PRISM 
programme that were a concern in the Schrems case. 
On the basis of these facts, as detailed further below, this report concludes that the 
level of data protection under the US legal order for surveillance as it exists today is 
essentially equivalent to the EU Benchmark, both with regard to law enforcement 
surveillance and to intelligence surveillance.  
2.3.2 Measuring The US Legal Order Surveillance Against The EU 
Benchmark  
2.3.2.1 Targeted Law Enforcement Surveillance: Broad Consensus 
Allowing Strong Surveillance Among Illustrative Member 
States, Condoned By ECtHR  
The overview of EU surveillance laws shows broad consensus among the Illustrative 
Member States regarding law enforcement surveillance against targeted individuals. 
All Illustrative Member States employ secret law enforcement surveillance against 
individuals suspected of crimes of a certain degree of seriousness. The 
enumerations of such crimes vary widely among the Illustrative Member States and 
often are limited to general descriptions.  For example, in France, certain forms of 
surveillance can be ordered for crimes and misdemeanours punishable by at least 
two years in prison.663  In the UK, other than to justify the interception of 
communications or intrusive surveillance, there is no requirement for the crime even 
                                                 
662 NSA Civil Liberties & Privacy Office, Transparency Report:  The USA FREEDOM Act Business 
Records FISA Implementation, supra note 384, at 7. 
663 Criminal Procedure Code, Article 100. 
 119 
datamatters.sidley.com   
to be “serious.”664  Thus, there is no specific consensus among Member States as to 
the types of crimes that can justify secret surveillance. 
All but one of the Illustrative Member States require that a warrant for surveillance be 
issued by a judge, and all allow exceptions for emergencies or other special 
circumstances.  The UK, the single outlier, permits a warrant to be issued by the 
Secretary of State.  
In the Illustrative Member States, data subjects will not be informed of the 
surveillance when it is undertaken.  The data subjects, however, will be informed 
before they are prosecuted, and they may defend themselves in standard criminal 
law proceedings.  For example, in Germany, investigating authorities must inform 
certain individuals targeted by a surveillance measure as soon as such notification 
does not endanger the purpose of the investigation; the life, physical integrity, and 
personal liberty of another person; or significant assets.665  This consensus among 
the Illustrative Member States is supported by case law from the ECtHR condoning 
secret surveillance for law enforcement purposes, provided the crimes are 
sufficiently serious to warrant its use and appropriate safeguards against abuse are 
in place.666   
2.3.2.2 Intelligence Surveillance: Illustrative Member States Engage 
In Targeted And Non-Targeted Surveillance; Both Are 
Condoned by the ECtHR 
Surveillance Of Targeted Individuals   
All of the Illustrative Member States permit secret surveillance of targeted individuals 
for the purposes of protecting national security or state security and a number of the 
other purposes enumerated in Article 8 ECHR: “in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.”  Purposes specified by Illustrative Member States are broad 
enough to include, for example: “the scientific and economic potential of the State” 
(Belgium); “major economic, industrial, and scientific interests” (France); “the State’s 
economic interests” (Poland); and “the economic well-being of the country” (UK).   
In Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal found the term “the State’s economic interests” 
to be insufficiently specific.667  However, this solitary judgment does not establish 
any “broad consensus” that generally descriptive terms are insufficient to denote the 
purpose for which secret surveillance may be ordered.  To the contrary, in Szabó & 
                                                 
664 RIPA, §§ 22(2), 28 & 49. 
665  Code of Criminal Procedure, §§ 101(4) & (5).  
666 Weber & Saravia, § 4. 
667 Decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, 30 July 2014, Case K23/11. 
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Vissy v. Hungary, the ECtHR noted that the term “terrorist threat” is sufficiently 
precise and permits sufficient “foreseeability” for citizens.668   
With regard to the process of authorising surveillance against targeted individuals, in 
the majority of the Illustrative Member States, the warrants or authorisations are not 
granted by a court, but by a variety of non-judicial bodies, often a minister or other 
officer in the executive branch of government.  For example, in France the 
implementation of surveillance measures by the intelligence services are subject to 
the prior authorisation of the Prime Minister and, in the UK, by the Secretary of State. 
Thus, there is no consensus  among Illustrative Member States that such 
authorisations should be issued by a court. There is also no consensus among 
Illustrative Member States regarding the degree of suspicion required to authorise 
surveillance. Only two of the Illustrative Member States – Belgium and the 
Netherlands ‒ specifically require a demonstration that there is no alternative, less 
intrusive method to obtain the information. 
Surveillance Not Targeted At Specific Individuals  
Five of the Illustrative Member States (France, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, 
and the UK) carry out signals intelligence that is not targeted at specific individuals 
suspected of committing or preparing crimes or threatening national security.  They 
generally do so by means of applying search terms (also referred to as 
“discriminants”) for the purpose of filtering information from large data flows.  In 
these Member States (other than Poland), the intelligence agencies have the 
technical ability to access data flows such as telephone or internet backbone cables 
directly, but they are permitted to use this access solely for the purpose of applying 
the search terms.  In most cases, this is done using metadata without, in the first 
stage, accessing the content of the communications.  However, in Germany the 
statutory restrictions in respect of the use of keywords for strategic 
telecommunications surveillance do not apply to telecommunications outside 
Germany ‒ including in other EU Member States ‒ provided such communications 
do not involve German nationals. 
For the remaining Illustrative Member States, their laws do not explicitly authorise 
untargeted surveillance. Whether they nonetheless engage in similar signals 
intelligence, as the FRA Report has suggested some States do669 ‒ is currently 
unknown.  In any event, it is not possible to state that there is a specific consensus 
among EU Member States regarding such signals intelligence.  
Indeed, the number of countries engaged in signals surveillance is high enough that 
it is not possible to characterise any Member State engaging in untargeted signals 
                                                 
668 Szabó & Vissy, § 64. 
669 Supra note 127, at 17; see also id. (“In 2015, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights stated that “in many Council of Europe member states, bulk, untargeted surveillance by 
security services is either not regulated by any publicly available law or regulated in such a nebulous 
way that the law provides few restraints and little clarity on these measures.”) 
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intelligence of large data flows using search terms as an “outlier.”670  The ECtHR has 
repeatedly held that non-targeted signals intelligence does not infringe Article 8 
ECHR, if accompanied by sufficient safeguards.671   
As noted in the FRA Report and in Section 2.1, the Illustrative Member States have 
widely diverging systems of authorisation, oversight, and legal redress regarding 
secret intelligence surveillance.  In Germany, for example, the PkGr is responsible 
for approving important aspects of the strategic telecommunications surveillance 
undertaken by the intelligence services. In the Netherlands, however, 
implementation of untargeted surveillance is permitted via the use of keywords 
without prior authorisation of the relevant minister. The diversity among Member 
States on all these points is broad, and the review of Illustrative Member State laws 
reveals little consensus on the precise measures that must be taken beyond the 
“minimum safeguards” noted in the ECtHR case law.  
By contrast, there is broad consensus among the Illustrative Member States on one 
issue:  direct legal redress by data subjects is available only to the extent information 
about the surveillance is communicated to the data subject, and this is often 
impossible without endangering the purpose for which the surveillance is justified. In 
some cases there are indirect processes like those in France, whereby at the 
request of the CNCTR the Council of State verifies whether surveillance measures 
have been implemented lawfully.   
2.3.2.3 Law Enforcement Surveillance: The US Meets The 
“Essentially Equivalent” Test 
With regard to secret surveillance for law-enforcement purposes, little or no criticism 
has been raised against the US criminal justice system.  As shown in Section 2.2 
above, there is a multitude of guarantees against abuse built into the US system, 
and comparison with the Illustrative Member States shows no doubt that the US 
system provides a level of protection that meets the EU Benchmark.   
Specific Legal Authority   
The US laws permitting secret surveillance for law enforcement purposes – the 
Wiretap Act and ECPA – contain clear obligations requiring law enforcement to 
demonstrate to a neutral magistrate that “probable cause” exists to believe the 
content of particular communications are relevant to a crime.672  Furthermore, to 
intercept such communications in real-time, the crime being investigated must be 
among an enumerated list of serious felonies, such as espionage, kidnapping, 
murder, bribery, human trafficking and forced labour.673  To access non-content 
                                                 
670 For a decision finding an outlier, see S. & Marper v. UK, § 110, where the ECtHR noted that 
“England, Wales and Northern Ireland appear to be the only jurisdictions within the Council of Europe 
to allow the indefinite retention of fingerprint and DNA material”.   
671 The main case is Weber & Saravia, § 137. 
672 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(c), 2703(a). 
673 See id. §§ 2516, 2518. 
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information, or metadata, without notice to the data subject, law enforcement must 
show “reasonable suspicion” exists to believe the data is related to a crime.674  There 
can be little doubt as to the clarity and quality of these two laws, and hundreds of 
court cases have shaped and further clarified their wording.  Nor can there be doubt 
about the “foreseeability” of these laws: the list of crimes for which interception can 
be deployed is clearly spelled out, and the standards by which lesser forms of 
intrusion are precisely defined and publicly available.   
The types of crimes for which secret law enforcement surveillance may be requested 
are at least as precise in the US as in the Illustrative Member States, and standards 
and methods for authorising all surveillance are at least as clearly established.   
Limited Scope   
US law establishes multiple safeguards to limit the scope of the data collected, used, 
and retained by US law enforcement authorities.  For example, the factual basis for a 
warrant request must spell out “with particularity” the offence and the 
communications targeted, and this basis must establish the requisite “probable 
cause.”675 This requirement appears at least as strict as the corresponding tests set 
out in the Illustrative Member States, e.g., “serious indication” (Belgium); “justifiable” 
(France); “initial suspicion” (Germany); “reasonable grounds for believing” (Ireland); 
“serious suspicion” (Netherlands); and “serious suspicion” combined with a 
justification requirement (Italy). Notably, there is no explicit threshold for suspicion in 
Poland and the UK. 
In the US, a request for a wiretap warrant must also explain that other, less intrusive 
investigative procedures have failed or are unlikely to succeed.676  A specific 
requirement to that effect has been included in the laws only of Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and in France, Germany, Poland, and the UK, a more general 
proportionality test may be applied.  On this point, the US legal order appears to 
contain requirements at least as stringent as those in the Illustrative Member States.   
Communications intercepted by US law enforcement are presented to a court and 
kept under seal for a period of ten years.677  All of the Illustrative Member States 
generally provide similar retention limits and data-security standards. For example, in 
the UK, intercepted material and any related communications data must be 
destroyed as soon as there are no longer grounds for retaining it for an authorised 
purpose.678  
US laws provide that surveillance information cannot be used against an individual in 
criminal proceedings without disclosure, and the defendant can move to suppress 
                                                 
674 See id. § 2703(d). 
675 See id. § 2703(a); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41. 
676 Id. § 2518(1)(c). 
677 Id. § 2518(8)(a). 
678 RIPA, § 15(3). 
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the contents of any data obtained through improper surveillance.679  On these points, 
the Illustrative Member States do not have laws that are stricter than those in the US.  
Oversight  
There is strong ex ante oversight by an independent judiciary in the US.  Judges 
must find “probable cause” before any warrant is issued,680 and the criminal justice 
system provides ample opportunity to challenge any evidence based on secret 
surveillance that is introduced against a defendant.681  For the Wiretap Act, high-
level Department of Justice approval is needed,682 and the Act further requires that 
judicial supervision continue for every federal or state wiretap warrant and that each 
warrant be reported to the Administrative Office of the US Courts, which submits its 
findings to Congress in a public report.683  Congressional committees regularly 
conduct hearings regarding surveillance.684  The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
permits the press and private parties to obtain any unclassified documents from the 
government, and is frequently used by watchdog groups.685 
In the majority of Illustrative Member States, ex ante oversight is judicial. However, in 
Poland, prior authorisation for surveillance is granted by the Attorney General, and in 
the UK, a warrant for the interception of communications is granted by the Secretary 
of State. Both are members of the executive branch.  The level of post-
implementation review is different in each of the Illustrative Member States. Overall, 
the level of oversight in Illustrative Member States for law enforcement surveillance 
does not exceed the level of protection in the US.   
Legal Remedies And Redress   
The main protection against unlawful or abusive surveillance built into the US 
criminal justice system is the “exclusionary rule” that prevents individuals from being 
prosecuted on the basis of evidence that has not been legally obtained.686  This rule 
applies fully to evidence obtained through surveillance.687 Similar rules apply in the 
Illustrative Member States.  
                                                 
679 18 U.S.C. § 2515. 
680 Id. § 2518(3). 
681 Id. § 2515; see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 354. 
682 18 U.S.C. §2518(7). 
683 Id. § 2519. 
684 See supra note 353 (collecting representative hearings). 
685 See 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
686 See, e.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 354. 
687 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 354 (excluding evidence obtained via unlawful 
wiretap). 
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The US justice system also permits civil causes of action that allow harmed 
individuals to sue for damages and equitable relief, including statutory damages (a 
remedy that permits a plaintiff to obtain an amount higher than the actual damages 
suffered).688  In the EU, civil actions generally occur to a lesser extent than in the US, 
and the concept of “statutory damages” is not known.   
Conclusion  
There can be no doubt that the protection of data subjects with regard to secret 
surveillance by law enforcement agencies in the US is at least “essentially 
equivalent” to the protection available in the EU legal order. As a result, it is difficult 
to understand why the ECtHR, faced with such a system of safeguards, would 
consider that the laws of the US law enforcement system go beyond what is 
“necessary in a democratic society”.   
2.3.2.4 Intelligence Surveillance: The US Legal Order Passes the 
“Essentially” Equivalent Test 
The US laws described in detail in Section 2.2 establish a broad set of safeguards 
that work together to prevent abuses and ensure that intelligence is conducted for 
the specific purposes provided in those laws.  These safeguards apply quite 
specifically to surveillance in the US that could affect data of EU citizens transmitted 
to the US, and therefore operate to prevent abuse. Taken as a whole, these laws 
and safeguards meet the EU Benchmark.   
Specific Legal Authority  
The key US statute that authorises targeted surveillance that may affect EU citizens 
is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). Section 702 of that 
statute also provides legal basis for the PRISM and Upstream programmes focused 
upon in Schrems.  Additionally, Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act – as modified 
by the USA FREEDOM Act in 2015 – authorises a targeted telephone metadata 
collection programme.   
 Purposes Of Surveillance Defined   
FISA, in all of its forms, permits electronic surveillance when a significant purpose is 
to collect “foreign intelligence information.”689  This term is defined as:  
“information that relates to .. the ability of the United States to protect against 
(A) actual or potential attack … of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power; (B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction; or (C) clandestine intelligence activities by 
an intelligence service or network”;  
                                                 
688 18 U.S.C. § 2712. 
689 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B). 
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“[as well as] information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that 
relates to … the national defense or the security of the United States; or  … 
the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.”690  
The term has been further limited to mean “information relating to the capabilities, 
intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons.”691  Moreover, 
the Director of National Intelligence has directed that “Intelligence Community 
elements should permanently retain or disseminate [a foreign person’s] information 
only if [it] relates to an authorized intelligence requirement [and] not solely because 
of the person’s non-U.S. person status.”692  
In terms of defining the purposes for which surveillance may be requested, these US 
terms are as precise as, if not more precise, than the general terms such as “terrorist 
threats” condoned by the ECtHR in its case law693 and the purposes listed in Article 
8 ECHR. In addition, US law prohibits surveillance for unlawful discrimination or 
suppression of dissent, or solely to benefit US corporations.694  The only Illustrative 
Member State that has an explicit statutory provision comparable to this prohibition is 
Belgium, which broadly provides that the use of surveillance cannot hinder individual 
rights and freedoms. 
The list of goals for which intelligence surveillance is permitted in the US is much 
narrower than the goals listed in Article 3(2)695 and Article 13696 of Directive 95/46 or 
                                                 
690 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). 
691 Exec. Order 12,333 § 3.4. 
692 ODNI, Safeguarding the Personal Information of All People:  A Status Report on the Development 
and Implementation of Procedures Under Presidential Policy Directive 28, at 5 (July 2014), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1017/PPD-28_Status_Report_Oct_2014.pdf. 
693 Szabó & Vissy v. Hungary,§ 64 (and additional cases cited):  
“[T]he need to avoid excessive rigidity and to keep pace with changing circumstances means 
that many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague 
….  It is satisfied that even in the field of secret surveillance, where foreseeability is of 
particular concern, the danger of terrorist acts and the needs of rescue operations are both 
notions sufficiently clear so as to meet the requirements of lawfulness.  For the Court, the 
requirement of “foreseeability” of the law does not go so far as to compel States to enact legal 
provisions listing in detail all situations that may prompt a decision to launch secret 
surveillance operations. The reference to terrorist threats or rescue operations can be seen in 
principle as giving citizens the requisite indication.”  
694 PPD-28 § 1(b)–(c).  
695 See Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46: “[P]rocessing operations concerning public security, defence, 
State security (including the economic well-being of the State when the processing operation relates 
to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law.”  
696 See Article 13 of Directive 95/46:  
“(a) national security; (b) defence; (c) public security; (d) the prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of criminal offences, or of breaches of ethics for regulated 
professions; (e) an important economic or financial interest of a Member State or of the 
European Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters; (f) a monitoring, 
inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official 
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in Article 8 ECHR.697  It may also be recalled in this respect that several of the 
Illustrative Member States have used the list in Article 8 ECHR to a greater extent 
than the US.  For example, Belgium, France, Poland, and the UK permit surveillance 
for the protection of national economic interests.   
Therefore, in terms of the purposes that establish the necessity of surveillance, the 
scope for secret intelligence surveillance under FISA is specified significantly more 
narrowly and precisely than in the Illustrative Member States.   
 Scope Of Discretion And Foreseeability   
FISA Title Isurveillance permits a neutral judge (namely, a member of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)) to issue an order only after determining that 
“probable cause” exists that the target is a foreign power (or its agent) and a 
significant purpose of the collection is to obtain foreign-intelligence information.698  In 
addition, the government must show “a substantial factual nexus between the 
proffered target … and a foreign power, organisation, or person.”699   
Section 702 permits the intelligence services to engage in the PRISM and Upstream 
programmes only upon a detailed certification to the FISC that sets out the targeting 
and minimization procedures to be utilised. Those targeting procedures establish the 
specific parameters for creating “selectors” or discriminants (email addresses and 
telephone numbers only), which are then used to collect the contents of information 
(either stored or in real-time, depending on which programme).700  Section 215 
follows a similar process and requires that the FISC find “reasonable grounds to 
believe” that the specific selectors used by the government relate to foreign 
intelligence information.701   
The procedures to be followed by intelligence agencies in FISA surveillance have 
been clarified further in documents such the NSA’s Transparency Report:  USA 
Freedom Act Business Records FISA Implementation of 16 January 2016.702  The 
                                                                                                                                                        
authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e); (g) the protection of the data subject or of the 
rights and freedoms of others.” 
697 See Article 8 ECHR, which lists the following public policy grounds on which interference can be 
justified: “in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.” 
698 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) 
699 Id. § 1804. 
700 See supra notes 390–398 and accompanying text. 
701 Id. § 1861(b)(2)(B). 
702 See, e.g., United States Signals Intelligence Directive USSID SP0018 (Jan. 25, 2011); NSA, 
Procedures Used by the National Security Agency for Targeting Non-United States Persons 
Reasonably Believed to Be Located Outside the United States to Acquire Foreign Intelligence 
Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended 
(July 28, 2014), 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0928/NSA%20Section%20702%20Targeting%20Procedures.pdf. 
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“foreseeability” of secret surveillance in the US is significant, both in terms of the 
conditions under which and the circumstances within which data subjects may be 
exposed to secret surveillance.  For example, data subjects can estimate with a high 
degree of foreseeability that involvement with foreign terrorist organisations may 
expose them to PRISM or Upstream surveillance.  Moreover, FISA directives issued 
under Section 702, including those in furtherance of PRISM and Upstream, remain in 
effect for one year – at which point the government must seek authorisation anew.703 
In the Illustrative Member States, laws provide wide discretion to ministers or 
intelligence officials to authorise surveillance.  The threshold level of suspicion for 
targeted surveillance required in each of the Illustrative Member States varies and in 
some instances is not provided for, as in Poland and the UK.  In this regard, it may 
be recalled that the FRA report noted widespread bulk, untargeted surveillance in EU 
Member States, in many cases without a clear legal basis or oversight.704  
In these circumstances, it appears difficult to argue that the level of protection in the 
US, in terms of specific legal authority and foreseeability, is lower than in the 
European Union.   
Limitations On Scope 
The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution, part of the US Bill of Rights, protects 
the right of the American people to be free from unreasonable searches of their 
persons or their papers, and has been interpreted to protect “expectations of 
privacy.”705  FISA extends similar protections, in many ways, to all persons and 
protects these expectations by requiring the intelligence services to obtain a warrant 
before intercepting communications in real-time.706  Section 702 provides that data 
collection must be conducted based on individualised suspicion and in a manner 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and Section 215 (as reformed by the USA 
FREEDOM Act) likewise requires judicial review and targeted collection.  As a result, 
foreign citizens and their data maintain substantial and significant privacy protection 
– even when they live abroad. 
In fact, under PRISM and Upstream, no data may be collected unless that data 
responds to “selectors” or “discriminants” that have been set pursuant to targeting 
procedures reviewed and approved by FISC,707 and presented to an independent 
oversight body – the PCLOB – for pre-implementation review and comment.   
With regard to the PRISM programme, which targets specific persons and groups 
using email addresses and telephone numbers as selectors, the number of targets 
                                                 
703 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a). 
704 FRA Report, supra note 127, at 17. 
705 See Katz, 379 U.S. at 354. 
706 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a). 
707 Robertson, Opinion, supra note 398, at para. 22 (noting that the PRISM programme “is not ‘bulk’ or 
‘generalised’ collection, and is more akin to the ‘strategic monitoring’ which was upheld by the 
European Court in Weber & Saravia”).   
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was limited to 92,707 targets out of the several billion people whose data was 
transmitted to the US in 2014.  Access by the NSA in the aggregate was limited to 
0.00004% of internet traffic.  These numbers of targets may be put in perspective 
against the estimated 20,000 foreign fighters currently estimated to be in Syria, who 
make up only a part of ISIS fighters across the region and elsewhere, and to the 
numbers of fighters in other groups such as Al-Qaeda.  
The Upstream programme, which is also authorised under Section 702 of FISA, is a 
more targeted version of the programme that collects contents of communications, 
using the same selectors, in real-time from entities controlling the internet 
backbone.708  Reports estimate that information collected via Upstream constitutes 
only ten percent of that collected pursuant to Section 702.709   
The US metadata-collection programmes are now similarly circumscribed.  The 
intelligence services may collect metadata from services providers under the USA 
FREEDOM Act only by submitting FISC-approved selectors.  The service providers 
then search their records, returning those metadata sufficiently related to the 
selectors.  Furthermore, the USA FREEDOM Act makes bulk collection of metadata 
explicitly illegal. 
The current state of the law in the US, therefore, is that untargeted surveillance and 
bulk collection of metadata by the government is unlawful.  This process appears no 
less protective than the processes used in the Illustrative Member States that have 
laws authorising non-targeted surveillance.  None of the Illustrative Member States 
provide for ex ante judicial review of individual search terms.  Even in Germany, the 
country that has been held up by the ECtHR as the example to follow, has only 
delegated approval of selectors to the G10 commission, which is not a judicial body.   
Multiple safeguards are in place in the US to limit the use of data captured in 
intelligence surveillance, notably under PRISM and Upstream.  The procedures 
promulgated by the Attorney General and approved by the FISC provide that 
communications clearly unrelated to foreign intelligence must be destroyed as soon 
as feasible.  Unexamined data obtained via Upstream may be retained for only two 
years.  All data obtained pursuant to Sections 702 and 215 must be destroyed after 
five years unless the Director of National Intelligence certifies that continued storage 
of specific records is in the national interest.  Data retained must not be used except 
as authorised by law.  All these data retention limits apply also to non-US citizens. 
In terms of data retention and access, the level of protection in the US is no less than 
in the Illustrative Member States.  None of the Illustrative Member States provide in 
their surveillance laws for specific statutory safeguards relating to the actual security 
of the data obtained via authorized surveillance measures beyond, in cases like the 
UK, a general requirement to store such data securely. Indeed, the UK’s Anderson 
Report stated that “safeguards must be more explicit and more stringent” and 
                                                 
708 And not, as some have argued, a programme providing for direct access to servers of US internet 
companies. 
709 Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms Since 2013, supra note 398, at 17. 
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recommended the implementation of “strict rules on data minimization […] similar to 
the controls imposed by the FISC in the United States.”710  
Only in France and Germany do the surveillance laws include prescriptive retention 
periods, which vary according to the type of data collected.  However, these limits on 
retention only apply in certain cases or in respect of certain types of surveillance. 
Destruction of data following the requisite retention period is required in the 
surveillance laws of all Illustrative Member States (other than in Ireland); however, 
there is no explicit requirement that the destruction be irreversible.  
In view of the above, it appears difficult to argue that the level of protection in the US, 
with regard to limiting the scope of surveillance, falls short of the level of protection 
required by the ECtHR.   
Oversight 
In the US, there is a combination of judicial, administrative, legislative, and 
independent expert oversight.  First, the FISC, which is made up entirely of Senate-
confirmed federal judges enjoying the unfettered independence assured by life 
tenure, must approve the government’s applications under FISA to intercept and 
collect specific contents of information, and will do so only if the information 
proposed to be intercepted is believed to be foreign intelligence information.  In fact, 
on numerous occasions the FISC has denied and modified FISA applications.  The 
FISC also must approve all orders requiring telecommunications providers to release 
metadata under Section 215 as modified by the USA FREEDOM Act.   
In contrast, the Illustrative Member States that permit government surveillance 
without targeting specific individuals do not require approval of a court; the approvals 
process involves committees of various types, often linked to the executive branch of 
government.  Only Italy and Poland require any ex ante judicial approval of targeted 
intelligence surveillance.  
Second, there are multiple compliance procedures and controls within the US 
agencies that request approvals for surveillance, and there are Inspectors General 
and Privacy and Civil Liberties Officers in all of the relevant agencies to provide 
internal oversight.   
Third, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board also oversee the 
Intelligence Community’s priorities for intelligence collection.   
Fourth, the US Congress regularly holds oversight hearings, and the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) is widely regarded as a highly influential 
independent oversight body.  Indeed, the Section 215 metadata collection 
programme was shuttered and reformed in 2015 pursuant to the recommendations 
of a PCLOB report as well as the report of a specially-appointed Presidential Review 
Group.   
                                                 
710 Anderson, A Question of Trust – Report of the Investigatory Powers Review, supra note 282, at 
230. 
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Each of the Illustrative Member States has its own “mix” of oversight mechanisms.  
However, none of the Illustrative Member States has a combination as extensive as 
the US.  The US uses the full menu of oversight mechanisms, where the Illustrative 
Member States are choosing à la carte.   
Legal Remedies And Redress 
The same two remedies and avenues of redress discussed above in connection with 
law enforcement surveillance are available for targets of unauthorised intelligence 
surveillance:  the exclusionary rule and civil causes of action.  Both are open to 
persons who are not US citizens and outside the US. 
The Wiretap Act, ECPA, and FISA all build on the exclusionary rule, extending the 
rule to violations of statutory law and to non-criminal proceedings.711  Under this rule, 
the government is prohibited from introducing evidence obtained directly or indirectly 
from unlawful surveillance.   
In addition, the US legal order also has created three different civil causes of action 
that permit victims of unlawful surveillance to sue in court for an injunction stopping 
the surveillance, or for monetary relief.712 These provisions, by their own terms, are 
available for US citizens and non-US persons alike.713 Accordingly, significant and 
real legal remedies and redress are available under the US legal order. 
As noted in Section 2.3.2.3, civil actions in the EU generally occur to a lesser extent 
than in the US, and the concept of ‘statutory damages’ is not known. The overview of 
Member States’ redress systems shows that, in case of secret intelligence 
surveillance, the level of protection in the Illustrative Member States does not appear 
to be higher than in the US. For example, in the Netherlands, individuals directly 
affected by surveillance can bring court proceedings and also have the right to 
complain to the ombudsman. Whereas, in Poland affected individuals only have the 
right to complain to the Human Rights Defender (the ombudsman). In terms of an 
individual's right to access and rectify their data, this can often be limited to ensure 
the effectiveness of surveillance measures deemed necessary. Likewise, only four 
Illustrative Member States (Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands) have 
explicit provisions in their surveillance laws that allow notification of surveillance to 
individuals after the fact and even then there are restrictions for national security 
purposes.  
Conclusion 
When the facts are carefully considered and unsubstantiated allegations are cast 
aside, it becomes clear that the American system and that of Europe – despite their 
stylistic differences – offer equal protections.  In many ways it can be said that the 
United States has imposed even greater procedural safeguards than those of the 
Illustrative Members States. 
                                                 
711 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(8)–(10); 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c)–(e). 
712 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a), (b). 
713  Id.  § 2520; Suzlon, 671 F.3d at 731. 
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This should be unsurprising.  Both systems have a long history of valuing and 
guarding privacy.  Both have judged that privacy rights and freedom of expression 
outweigh the value of mass surveillance in general and, while both systems 
recognise the need for law enforcement and intelligence services to engage in 
surveillance to detect, thwart, and punish crime and terrorist activities, their shared 
commitment to those rights of privacy, dignity, and personal autonomy ensure that 
any surveillance is carefully controlled and proportionate to the threat. 
On the basis of these facts, this report submits that the US laws and regulations 
governing surveillance are essentially equivalent to those in the EU legal order.   
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PART THREE: 
 
A STRONG BODY OF STATUTORY LAW, COMMON LAW, ENFORCEMENT 
AND LITIGATION, AND PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION PRACTICES 
ENSURE THAT EU CITIZENS WHOSE DATA IS TRANSFERRED TO THE US 
RECEIVE PROTECTION ESSENTIALLY EQUIVALENT TO WHAT THEY 
RECEIVE IN THE EU, ESPECIALLY WHEN COUPLED WITH A BINDING 
ADHERENCE TO EU DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES 
3.1 Despite Differences Between The EU And US Legal Systems, 
Common Principles Underlie Privacy And Data Protection In The US 
And EU Directive 95/46 
As the CJEU put it in the Schrems judgment, “when examining the level of [data] 
protection in a third country, the Commission is obliged to assess the content of the 
applicable rules in the country resulting from its domestic law or international 
commitments and the practice designed to ensure compliance with those 
rules ….”714  In practice, this assessment involves a comparison of the third country’s 
law and practices with basic provisions of Directive 95/46.715  
 
Applied to the United States, this comparison is complicated by differences in legal 
systems.  The US does not have an omnibus law as in EU Member States and as in 
most third countries judged adequate.  Instead, it has a body of laws ‒ a mosaic of 
federal and state statutes, common law jurisprudence, and public and private 
enforcement that obligate private entities to protect personal data and respect the 
rights of data subjects.  Specific and detailed statutory frameworks enforced by 
various, sometimes overlapping, federal and state regulatory agencies (and through 
private rights of action) address the most sensitive categories of data ‒ children’s 
and students’ data, medical records, financial information, and electronic 
communications.  Privacy standards in these sectors are supplemented by broad 
and elastic state and federal laws that prohibit “unfair and deceptive” practices and 
acts, as well as by other state statutes and common law that protect expectations of 
privacy more generally.  And these privacy and data protection interests are subject 
to the discipline and deterrence brought to bear by the over-arching rule of law, 
litigation and regulatory enforcement system in the US.716   
                                                 
714 Schrems, para. 75. 
715 See, e.g., Opinion 11/2011 of the Article 29 Working Party of 4 April 2011, on the level of 
protection of personal data in New Zealand , WP 182, at 3. 
716 See generally, Alan Charles Raul, Tasha D. Manoranjan & Vivek K. Mohan, Chapter on United 
States, in PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION & CYBERSECURITY L. REV. 363 (2d Ed. 2015) (“[T]he US 
commercial privacy regime is arguably the oldest, most robust, well developed and effective in the 
world.  The US privacy system … rel[ies] more on post hoc government enforcement and private 
litigation, and on the corresponding deterrent value of such enforcement and litigation, than on 
detailed prohibitions and rules …. However, US federal law does impose affirmative prohibitions and 
restrictions in certain [sensitive] commercial sectors …”).  The EU’s Article 29 Working Party looked 
favourably on Israel’s system based on the availability of certain data protections emanating from 
case law, notwithstanding the absence of directly corresponding provisions in written statutory law. 
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The specificity, diversity, and diffusion of the American system of privacy law can 
present some challenges in transatlantic translation (just as Americans can find the 
EU’s omnibus approach unduly complicated).  Indeed, when leading privacy experts 
on both sides of the Atlantic convened for the Privacy Bridges Project presented at 
the 2015 International Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners Conference, their 
first task was to write a brief paper describing their understanding of the system of 
privacy and data protection on the other side of the Atlantic; the results evidently 
showed wide divergence and misunderstanding.  If differences in legal systems can 
challenge even experts in the field, then other Europeans less familiar with the 
American system and common-law legal process may find them so 
incomprehensible as to mis-perceive the US as a Wild West of data. 
 
Such perceptions are ill-founded.  Privacy is deeply embedded in American values, 
political culture, and law.  Soon after the US established a postal system at the 
founding of the Republic, it adopted a law making it unlawful to invade the contents 
of mail.717  Part 2.2.1 of this report explains the strong constitutional tradition of 
restraints on government access to information stemming from America’s colonial 
experience and revolution.  This Part describes the numerous laws, enforcement 
agencies, and remedies that shape how businesses, government agencies, and 
other institutions in the US treat personal data.  
 
The development of these laws has been part of a dialogue across the Atlantic for 
more than 200 years, both informing and informed by European laws and principles.  
The US Constitution, adopted in 1788, shares philosophical roots with the 
contemporaneous Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen in France, as 
made plain by ratification of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights in 1791. 
   
The US Constitution does not contain an explicit right to data privacy, though it does 
recognise a “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects.”718  The US Supreme Court has recognized a right of privacy in a line of 
decisions719 that, while involving protections against the State, protect expectations 
                                                                                                                                                        
See Opinion 6/2009 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party of 1 December 2009, on the level 
of protection of personal data in Israel, WP 165. 
717 Mail Fraud Act, 18 Stat. 283, 323 (1872) (codified, as amended, at 18 U.S.C. § 1341). 
718 US Const. amend. IV. 
719  These decisions began with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which recognized the 
right to access contraception, and extended to prohibit warrantless wiretapping, Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967); to permit freedom to marry outside your race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967); to grant access to abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); to grant access to 
pornography within the home, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); to recognise the right to 
sexual autonomy, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); to recognise the privacy of location 
information tracked by vehicle GPS, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); to recognise the 
privacy of cell phone data, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); and to permit freedom to marry 
someone of the same sex, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __ (2015).   
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of privacy, interests in autonomy and freedom, and “personal dignity and autonomy” 
as “central to the liberty protected by [the Constitution].”720  Although privacy is 
implied as a right in the Constitution, it is recognized explicitly in pivotal federal 
legislation, the Privacy Act of 1974.  In the preamble to this legislation, Congress 
declared that “the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by 
the Constitution of the United States.”721   
 
Analysis of privacy as a right unto itself begins in both the US and Europe in the late 
19th Century.  A fountainhead of privacy law in the US is the famous law review 
article by the great American lawyer (and later Supreme Court Justice) Louis 
Brandeis and his law partner Samuel Warren, “The Right to Privacy,” published in 
1890.722  Warren and Brandeis discerned an existing right to privacy in US 
jurisprudence grounded in the dignity of the individual, also described as a “right to 
be let alone.”723  This right emanates from common law cases that implied 
relationships of trust based on disclosure of confidential information or that otherwise 
protected against intrusions into this right to be let alone.724  Their article became a 
foundation for the evolution of the common law tort of invasion of privacy described 
more fully below and recognized in various state constitutions and laws.   
 
This foundation overlaps with the development of a right to privacy in European law 
and represents an important cross-pollination between Europe and the US.  French 
legal scholars trace the origins of privacy jurisprudence in their country to Warren 
and Brandeis.725  Warren and Brandeis in turn cite a French law on publication of 
private information as the first explicit recognition of a right to privacy,726 and they 
were influenced by the development of the German law of personality.727 
 
This exchange of ideas continues to the present day.  In response to the advent of 
widespread computing and large databases in the 1960s and 1970s, the US 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare appointed an influential advisory 
committee that developed the first iteration of the Fair Information Practice Principles 
                                                 
720 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
721 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-579 § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a). 
722 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4. HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
723 Id. at 193. 
724 Id. 
725J. Carbonnier, Droit Civil, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 8th ed., 1969, para.. 74, at 259; 
R. Badinter, ‘Le droit au respect de la vie privée’, J.C.P. 1968, No. 2136, para. 3. 
726 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 722, at 214 n.1 (citing Loi Relative à la Presse, 11 Mai 1868 
(“Toute publication dans un écrit périodique à un fait de la vie privée constitue une contravention 
punie d’un amende de cinq cent francs.”)). 
727 James Whitman, Two Western Cultures of Privacy, 113 YALE L. J. 1151, 1182–86 (2004). 
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(FIPPs).728  Its recommendations articulated (albeit in different terminology) 
principles of transparency, consent, use limitations, access and correction, and data 
reliability that were reflected in the federal Privacy Act of 1974.  In turn, these FIPPs 
became a basis for the Privacy Guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD),729 which both the US and various EU Member 
States helped to develop.  The OECD guidelines then became a basis for the 
principles that underlie Directive 95/46.730  Today, these principles are carried 
forward in the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation and numerous US 
statutes and regulations, and they inform the practices of privacy professionals on 
both sides of the Atlantic.   
 
Thus, the US legal order for privacy and data protection has common origins and 
common principles with the legal order in Europe.  This is not to say that the two 
legal orders are identical.  In addition to its different legal process, the US most 
saliently strikes a different balance between the rights of privacy and of free 
expression.  Yet both systems both share a foundational commitment to protect 
fundamental rights and recognise privacy and free expression as fundamental.  Both 
also recognise that these rights are not absolute and must be balanced with each 
other and with other fundamental rights.731  And the Schrems judgment made clear 
that the legal order of a third country need not be identical to be deemed essentially 
equivalent to the EU data protection regime.  What matters is the substance of the 
protections that results from the legal order, not the form.  For two reasons, 
adequacy does not depend solely on the laws on the books.  
 
First, the Schrems judgment states that assessment of a third country includes “the 
practice designed to ensure compliance” with domestic laws and international 
commitments.732  Further, adequacy decisions concerning third countries must “take 
account of non-legal rules, application in practice, and the general administrative and 
                                                 
728 Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History, Version 2.15, at 2 (Dec. 4, 2015), 
http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf. 
729 Id. at 6. 
730 Id. at 10. 
731 The proposed Regulation expressly recognizes that “[t]he right to the protection of personal data is 
not an absolute right; it must be considered in relation to its function in society and be balanced with 
other fundamental rights, in accordance with the principle of proportionality.” Sec. (3a) of proposed 
consolidated version of General Data Protection Regulation; see also Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 January 2012, on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data General Data 
Protection Regulation, COM/2012/011 final, § 3.3 (summary of fundamental rights issues); CJEU 9 
November 2010, Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662. 
732 Schrems, para. 75. 
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corporate culture that exists in relation to privacy.”733  It is therefore necessary to 
look at how the legal order is put into practice.   
 
An American propensity for litigation has made compliance not only with law but also 
with best practices essential to doing business in America and minimizing the risk of 
expensive litigation.  Leading privacy scholars at the Berkeley Center for Law and 
Information conducted a multi-year empirical study of privacy practices and cultures 
among US and EU companies; they found that in spite of “sectoral, fragmented, and 
incomplete” laws on the books in the US, “corporate practices reflected a more 
integrated and robust approach to privacy management” in the US than among many 
EU peers.734  Section 3.3 below explores this “privacy on the ground” in greater 
detail. 
 
Second, where companies are legally bound to adhere to the principles of Directive 
95/46, they may undertake obligations beyond those of applicable US laws.  Such 
adherence can come about pursuant to a broad data transfer framework such as the 
2000 Safe Harbour Framework.  In Schrems, the CJEU stated that consideration of 
adequacy may take into account “a system of self-certification” provided the 
mechanisms for detection of violations and supervision of compliance are effective in 
identifying and punishing violations of fundamental rights.735  It also can come about 
pursuant to “appropriate contractual clauses” or other rules of law applicable to a 
specific data transfer or set of transfers allowed under Articles 25(2) and 26(2) of 
Directive 95/46.736  In either case, these Articles, read in light of the Schrems 
judgment, make clear that individual companies may qualify to transfer data to the 
US by binding themselves to rules that both reflect fundamental principles of the 
Directive and are subject to effective accountability and enforcement.  The next 
section shows how companies’ promises in this regard are enforceable in the US. 
 
Taken together, the robust system of privacy and data protections laws and practices 
under the US legal order, coupled with enhanced adherence to a set of principles 
based on EU law through either a broad framework or specific commitments, provide 
protection for the personal data of EU citizens transferred to the US that is 
essentially equivalent to the level of protection within the EU.  The legal order and 
the self-certification framework complement each other:  the framework addresses 
differences between the US and EU legal order, and the US legal order reinforces 
commitments to the EU principles in the self-certification framework.  The sections 
that follow show how these systems operate together.  
 
                                                 
733  Opinion 11/2011 of the Article 29 Working Party of 4 April 2011, on the level of protection of 
personal data in New Zealand, WP 182, p. 2. 
734 Kenneth Bamberger & Deirdre Mulligan, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND 6 (2015). 
735 Schrems, para. 81. 
736 Schrems, para. 4.  
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3.2 Binding Adherence To Principles Of EU Data Protection Law Ensures 
That Data Transfers To The US Comply With Directive 95/46   
Although the transatlantic data transfer framework approved in the Commission’s 
Safe Harbour Decision has been invalidated in the Schrems judgment, the CJEU’s 
judgment does not preclude another such broad framework that incorporates the 
principles of EU data protection law.  Such a data transfer framework establishes a 
company-specific “adequacy” by requiring adherence to these principles.  Adherence 
has two elements.  First, it requires that companies publicly subscribe to the 
principles.  Second, it calls for enforcement of these commitments by public bodies, 
principally the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
A company’s commitment to adhere to the principles of such a framework is legally 
binding.  The mechanism operates on a company-specific basis just as Model 
Clauses and Binding Corporate Rules do.  The latter enables transfers to third 
countries regardless of whether these countries are found adequate because they 
directly require companies to act consistent with EU law and “compensate for the 
absence of a general level of adequate protection, by including the essential 
elements of protection which are missing ….”737  Under Article 25 (2) of Directive 
95/46, such mechanisms permit data transfers “in light of all the circumstances 
surrounding a data transfer or a set of data transfers …,” and Article 26(2) allows 
Member States to authorise transfers “where the controller adduces adequate 
safeguards,” which “may in particular result from appropriate contractual clauses.”738  
A transatlantic data transfer framework based on a binding commitment to principles 
of EU data protection law accomplishes the same safeguards.739   
These commitments are legally binding because they are subject to enforcement by 
the FTC.  As described more fully below, the FTC has broad authority to regulate 
unfair and deceptive practices or acts,740 and it uses this authority to enforce 
promises that companies make to their customers.  These include promises like 
commitments to the Safe Harbour Framework.  Companies that certify falsely to a 
framework such as Safe Harbour also are subject to potential serious criminal 
liability.741 
                                                 
737 Working document of the Article 29 Working Party of 24 July 1998, on transfers of personal data to 
third countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU data protection directive, WP 12, p.16. 
738 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, OJ 1995 L281/31, as amended, Article 26(2). 
739 The question whether national security, public interest, and law enforcement requirements can 
override these binding commitments in ways that interfere with fundamental rights is addressed in 
Part 2.2 supra. 
740 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
741 See False Statements Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1001; see also Recertification: Annual Reaffirmation of an 
Organization’s Commitment to the Safe Harbor Framework(s), EXPORT.GOV (May 2013) (“Safe Harbor 
certifying ‘officer understands that misrepresentations in any information provided by the organization 
may be actionable under the False Statements Act, 18 U.S.C. [§] 1001.’”). 
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In 2009, the FTC brought enforcement cases against six companies for their alleged 
failure to fulfill Safe Harbour commitments.742  Since then, the FTC has brought more 
than 30 Safe Harbour enforcement cases.  These actions involved allegations of the 
use of consumer data without consent, inadequate disclosures, data retention and 
sharing issues, and misrepresentations involving participation in the US-EU Safe 
Harbour framework.743   
More than 4,000 companies bound themselves to the principles of the Safe Harbour 
Framework voluntarily.  The incorporation of these principles has a substantial affect 
on US law by applying the rights of EU data subjects under Directive 95/46 
regardless of whether these are explicitly reflected in US laws applying to companies 
that subscribe.  FTC enforcement provides “effective detection and supervision 
mechanisms” to give force to these self-certifications.744 
3.3 Rules And Practices In The US Correspond To The General Rules And 
Principles In Chapter II Of Directive 95/46 
3.3.1 US Statutory Law, Common Law, Enforcement And Litigation, And 
Privacy Practices Establish A Framework Of Privacy And Data 
Protection 
A review of adequacy begins with an examination of a country’s legislation.745  In the 
US since 1970, a continuously expanding array of federal and state privacy laws, 
regulations, and common law have established a comprehensive privacy regime that 
aligns with EU law.  Privacy is addressed in approximately 350 separate statutes 
                                                 
742 Privacy Enforcement and Safe Harbor: Comments of FTC Staff to European Commission Review 
of the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor 3–4 (Nov. 12, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-enforcement-safe-harbor-
comments-ftc-staff-european-commission-review-u.s.eu-safe-harbor-
framework/131112europeancommissionsafeharbor.pdf.  See also In re World Innovators, Inc., 
Compl., Docket No. C-4282 (FTC Oct. 6, 2009); In re ExpatEdge Partners, LLC, Compl., Docket No. 
C-4269 (FTC Oct. 6, 2009); In re Matter of Onyx Graphics, Inc., Compl., Docket No. C-4270 (FTC 
Oct. 6, 2009); In re Directors Desk LLC, Compl., Docket No. C-4281 (FTC Oct. 6, 2009); In re 
Progressive Gaitways LLC, Docket No. C-4271 (FTC Oct. 6, 2009); In re Collectify LLC, Compl. 
Docket No. C-4272 (FTC Oct. 6, 2009). 
743 See, e.g., In re TRUSTe, Docket No. C-4512 (FTC Mar. 12, 2015) (imposing a $200,000 fine, 
alleging that TRUSTe, Inc. failed to conduct over 1,000 annual recertification reviews for certified 
companies, despite representing that companies holding the TRUSTe Certified Privacy Seal are 
recertified annually and were in compliance with specific privacy standards, including COPPA and the 
US-EU Safe Harbor Framework); see also FTC, Thirteen Companies Agree to Settle FTC Charges 
They Falsely Claimed to Comply with International Safe Harbor Framework (Aug. 17, 2015) 
(announcing settlement of charges with thirteen companies regarding allegations that they falsely 
claimed they were abiding by the Safe Harbour Privacy Framework even though they had allowed 
their certifications to lapse or never actually applied for membership in the program); FTC, FTC 
Settles with Twelve Companies Falsely Claiming to Comply with International Safe Harbor Privacy 
Framework (Jan. 21, 2014) (announcing settlement of charges with 12 companies regarding charges 
that they falsely claimed they were abiding by the Safe Harbour Privacy Framework even though they 
had allowed their certifications to lapse). 
744 Schrems para. 81. 
745 See Part 3.1 supra. 
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within 33 of the 54 titles of the US Code (the authoritative compilation of US federal 
statutes).  Most recently, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act adopted in 
December 2015 includes provisions requiring companies to delete personal 
information not needed for cybersecurity purposes from information before they 
share cyber threat indicators with the government or other companies.746 
 
The most sensitive data – such as financial, medical, health, electronic 
communications, and children’s information – are protected by nearly two dozen 
federal sector-specific laws and numerous state laws.  These laws are backstopped 
by the broad reach of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which generally prohibits 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices and has been interpreted to prohibit a broad 
range of data processing that violates individuals’ data protection interests.747   
 
State laws apply additional privacy rights and data protections over and above the 
baseline of federal law and cover some areas not addressed by federal law.748  
States regulate information security, online privacy, cyber stalking, data disposal, 
data breach notification, medical information, financial information, employee 
privacy, consumer reports, unsolicited commercial communications, electronic 
solicitation of children, and children’s online right to be forgotten, to name a few 
subjects.749   
 
Certain states also require privacy policies for websites and impose security 
requirements for the handling of sensitive personal data.  The State of California’s 
protections are especially relevant for EU data subjects because numerous global 
technology companies are based in that state and tailor their privacy policies and 
practices to comply with its laws.  Further, any company that does business with 
California residents (which includes most online companies) must comply with these 
laws.  The California Constitution protects privacy as a fundamental right, a provision 
that is cited frequently in civil litigation against private parties.750  California also 
                                                 
746 Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–113, Division N, § 104(d). 
747 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 257 (3d Cir. 2015). 
748 For example, compare third party disclosure requirements in Title V, Subtitle A of the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999 (also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or GLBA), see infra 
note 757, that (among many detailed data protection provisions) permits affiliate sharing of certain 
information provided certain notice and other requirements are met, with the California Financial 
Information Privacy Act, Cal. Fin. Code §§  4050–4060, which provides both notice requirements and 
a right to opt out of disclosures of certain information to affiliated third parties. 
749 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575–22579 (online privacy); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§ 22580 et seq. (children’s online right to be forgotten); Cal. Fin. Code §§ 4050–4060 (financial 
information); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-701b (data breach notification); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 668.60 et seq. 
(unsolicited commercial communications); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151 § 4(9) (consumer reports and 
background checks); Md. Crim. Law § 3-805(cyber stalking and harassment); N.J. Pub. L. 2013, c.155 
(C.34:6B-5 et seq.) (employer access to social media accounts); N.Y. Penal Law § 235.22 (electronic 
solicitation of children); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 37-20-190 (secure disposal); Tex. Health & Safety Code § 
181.001 et seq. (health information); Utah Code Ann. § 13-44-201 (general information security). 
750 Cal. Const. art. 1, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty … and privacy”) (emphasis added). 
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leads the nation in detailed data protection laws and regulations, with over 100 such 
laws addressing privacy of personal data.751  
 
Federal and state privacy laws are enforced by an expanding network of federal 
regulatory agencies, federal prosecutors, state Attorneys General and other state 
regulators, and private plaintiffs.  Many states have created formal units charged with 
privacy oversight, and state Attorneys General often cooperate in joint enforcement 
actions against companies that experience data breaches or privacy violations.752  In 
the US, coordinated and comprehensive privacy regulation combined with active 
enforcement and sizable fines establish a strong deterrent to motivate compliance 
with US privacy and security requirements ‒ perhaps even stronger than in the 
EU.753 
Regulation Of Sensitive Personal Data 
 
The United States privacy regime at the federal and state levels includes special 
protections for information relating to personal finances, health and insurance, 
communications, children, and students. 
 
 Financial Data 
 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)754 was adopted in 1970, the same year that 
France first incorporated a right to privacy into its Civil Code.755  FCRA protects 
consumers against the disclosure of personal information relating to consumers’ 
creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, or 
                                                 
751 Such laws relate to personal data collected by state agencies (birth, marriage, death, court, library, 
voter and driver’s license records); Internet of Things (connected automobiles, RFID devices, smart 
meters); retail (credit card usage, personal data collection at point of sale, driver’s license swiping, 
rental car surveillance, loyalty programs); telecommunications (calling patterns and financial data); 
employment (workplace surveillance, employee social media); healthcare (access, correction, 
disclosure, confidentiality, use of information for marketing); and insurance transactions. 
752 See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Google Concedes That Drive-By Prying Violated Privacy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 12, 2013) (reporting joint privacy investigation by 38 states Attorneys General). 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/technology/google-pays-fine-over-street-view-privacy-
breach.html?_r=1&. 
753 In its Communication introducing the General Data Protection Regulation in 2012, the Commission 
observed that “[i]n some cases, [Member States] are unable to perform their enforcement tasks 
satisfactorily.”  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
Regions of 25 January 2012, on Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World, A European Data 
Protection Framework for the 21st Century, COM(2012) 9 final, p. 7.  See also Christopher Wolf, 
Delusion of Adequacy? Examining the Case for Finding the United States Adequate for Cross-Border 
EU-U.S. Data Transfers, 43 WASH. UNIV. J. LAW & POLITICS 227, 231 (2013) (noting that EU privacy 
law protections “are not matched by EU enforcement of those protections”). 
754 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. 
755  Loi No. 70-643 du 17 juillet 1970; S. Kauder, Les lois "Informatique et liberté" en France, en 
Europe et dans le monde, available at: 
http://www.legalbiznext.com/droit/IMG/pdf/Informatiqueetliberte.pdf. 
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personal characteristics.  The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)756 
amended FCRA to protect against identity theft.  The FTC, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), and banking regulators share enforcement authority, and 
violators are subject to civil liability and enforcement actions. 
 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA)757 regulates all financial institutions.758 Its 
privacy and safeguards rules require all financial institutions to safeguard consumer 
privacy.  Under its Privacy Rule,759 financial institutions must disclose their practices 
of collecting and sharing consumer personal information and are prohibited from 
sharing personal data with certain third parties without consent.  Under its 
Safeguards Rule,760 financial institutions must, among other things, implement a 
written information security programme to protect personal financial information.  
Several federal agencies ‒ including the FTC, Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), CFPB, and state insurance authorities ‒ share enforcement authority under 
GLBA. 
States also regulate financial data.  Most state laws include restrictions on the ability 
to collect and use personal financial information.761 
 
 Health And Medical Data 
Medical privacy is protected by several statutes, most significantly the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and its implementing 
regulations.762  HIPAA protects the privacy and security of individually identifiable 
health information and applies to healthcare providers, health plans and insurers, 
healthcare clearinghouses, and organisations that collect or process personal health 
information on behalf of covered entities (business associates), which include legal, 
accounting, administrative, and financial services, and claims and file management.  
The HIPAA Privacy Rule,763 a regulation promulgated by the US Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), was adopted in 2000 and recently updated; it 
limits the collection, use, and disclosure of medical information.  A complementary 
                                                 
756 Pub. L. 108-159, 111 Stat. 1952 (amending FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq). 
757 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809. 
758 Id. § 6809.  The term “financial institution” is defined broadly by reference to section 4(k) of the 
Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k), and encompasses all entities providing financial 
services that are permissible for a financial services holding company to provide, such as banks, 
securities and insurance firms, thrifts and credit unions, as well as nontraditional financial institutions. 
759 16 C.F.R. Part 313. 
760 16 C.F.R. Part 314. 
761 See, e.g., California’s Security of Personal Information Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5; Consumer 
Credit Reporting Agencies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1785.1–1785.36; Financial Information Privacy Act, 
Cal. Fin. Code §§ 4050-4060. 
762 Pub. L. 104–19 §§ 262, 264; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1320d-9; 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 & 164. 
763 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 & 164, Subparts A & E.  
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regulation, the HIPAA Security Rule,764 sets forth minimum standards for the security 
of electronic personal health data.   
 
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH)765 requires notifications to individuals, covered entities, regulators, and the 
media in the event of a data security breach.  The HHS Office for Civil Rights 
(HHS/OCR) investigates claims and assesses civil penalties for HIPAA and HITECH 
violations, and federal prosecutors may initiate criminal proceedings to enforce the 
requirements of this legislation.  The FTC also has authority to enforce HITECH’s 
standards against the providers of “electronic health records” that are not otherwise 
regulated by HHS/OCR. 
 
Genetic information is separately protected under the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA),766 which amended various statutes to limit the use 
and disclosure of genetic information.   
 
Most states also have additional protections for the use, collection and disclosure of 
health information.767 These state laws may apply to personally identifiable health 
information in a broader context than HIPAA, and indeed may provide broader 
penalty provisions than HIPAA (by, for example, authorising a private right of 
action).768 
  
 Electronic Communications Data 
Rules relating to the privacy of electronic communications are of special importance 
to the level of protection for EU citizens whose data is transmitted or stored in the 
US, as much of that data comes within the scope of these rules.   
 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), discussed above in relation to 
government access to electronic communications data, also applies to private sector 
                                                 
764 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 & 164, Subparts A & C. 
765 42 U.S.C. § 17932. 
766 Pub. L. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (note)). 
767 California, for example, restricts access by unauthorised persons to birth and death records, 
psychiatric records, blood tests (particularly HIV tests), and medical records.  Cal. Health & Safety 
Code §§ 102230–102232, 103525–103528, 120975–121020; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5328.  It also 
limits the disclosure of patients’ medical information and electronic medical information by healthcare 
and other businesses (including for marketing purposes) and guarantees the right of patients to see, 
copy, and correct their health records.  Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 1280.15, 123110; Cal. Civ. 
Code §§ 56–56.37, 1798.91. 
768 While state health privacy laws vary widely, most regulate the practices of health care plans and 
providers, or those that maintain medical information for patients or health care providers. E.g., 
California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 56 et seq. A small minority of 
state laws, however, regulate medical records held by any entity in possession of such records as part 
of a comprehensive health privacy law. E.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 146.81–146.84. Further, some state 
laws regulating health care plans and providers may also include strict limitations on re-disclosure of 
health information received from a health care plan or provider.  
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actors.769  It protects the privacy and security of certain “electronic 
communications”770 through two separate statutes that affect the private sector:  the 
Wiretap Act771 and the Stored Communications Act.772  Outside of certain limited 
exceptions, ECPA prohibits the intentional interception or disclosure of electronic 
communications such as telephone calls, email, and text messages without the 
consent of the calling or receiving parties.773  With certain exceptions, it also 
prohibits intentional, unauthorised access or disclosure of stored communications.  
ECPA also contains certain protections for “non-content” or transactional information, 
such as basic subscriber information, the recipient of a communication, or the date of 
a communication.  Violators are subject to criminal and civil enforcement. 
 
A majority of US states have also passed laws prohibiting wiretapping of 
communications or otherwise prohibiting eavesdropping. Some of these laws provide 
stronger protections than the federal law, and few are wholly preempted by federal 
law.774  In particular, a number of states require consent from all parties to a 
communication ‒ rather than just one party ‒ to permit recording communications.775   
 
The federal Communications Act authorizes the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) to regulate “unjust and unreasonable” practices by 
telecommunications providers.776  The FCC has interpreted these provisions to 
require fair privacy practices by telecommunications and broadband providers. 777 In 
addition, Section 222 of the Communications Act regulates the collection and use of 
customer proprietary network information (CPNI) by telecommunications carriers, 
and prohibits carriers from using and disclosing customer information for certain 
purposes without the customer’s consent.  The FCC has declared that Section 222 
                                                 
769 See supra Part 2.2. 
770 ECPA defines “electronic communications” as any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, 
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic or photooptical system, but does not include “(A) any wire or oral communication; (B) 
any communication made through a tone-only paging device; (C) any communication from a tracking 
device …; or (D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a 
communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds ....”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(12). 
771 Id. §§ 2510–2522. 
772 Id. §§ 2701–2712. 
773 Id. § 2510. 
774 See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 13A-11-30, 13A-11-31; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-187–53a-189. 
775 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 631–637; Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 934.03–934.43; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
Ann. § 5/14-2; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 99. 
776 47 U.S.C. § 222. 
777 FCC, TerraCom and YourTel to Pay $3.5 Million to Resolve Consumer Privacy & Lifeline 
Investigations (July 9, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-334286A1.pdf. 
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and the Communications Act apply to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and will be 
initiating rulemaking proceedings to apply the CPNI regulations to them.778 
 
Other statutes regulate particular forms of communication and technology.  The 
Cable Television Act protects consumer privacy by providing explicit requirements 
for notice, consent, use and disclosure, consumer access, destruction, and remedies 
for violations.779  The Video Privacy Protection Act protects data on consumer video 
content preferences and bans disclosure of personally-identifiable information 
without written consent.780 The Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography 
and Marketing Act (CAN-SPAM) protects individuals against unsolicited commercial 
electronic communications.781  And the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) 
protects individuals from unwanted or harassing telemarketing and other 
communications made by autodialers, pre-recorded messages, text messages, or 
faxes.782 
 
 Data Of Children And Students 
The primary federal statute protecting children’s information is the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),783 which requires parental notification and verifiable 
express consent before collecting or using the personal information (including 
geolocation information and persistent identifiers) of children under age 13.  The 
FTC has the authority to issue regulations under COPPA, and it substantially revised 
its regulations in 2012.784  It actively enforces COPPA and has assessed penalties 
for violations of the Act that range up to $3 million.785  State Attorneys General also 
may enforce COPPA. 
 
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)786 protects student data in 
education records and requires enhanced notice to students and parents, as well as 
consent before such records are released to third parties.  The Protection of Pupil 
Rights Amendment (PPRA) expanded these protections to information regarding 
                                                 
778 FCC, In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN Doc. No. 14-28 (Mar. 12, 2015). 
779 47 U.S.C. § 551 
780 Pub. L. No. 100–618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified, as amended, at 18 U.S.C. § 2710). 
781 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713. 
782 47 U.S.C. § 227 et. seq. 
783 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq.; 16 C.F.R. Part 312. 
784 FTC, FTC Strengthens Kids’ Privacy, Gives Parents Greater Control Over Their Information By 
Amending Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule (Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2012/12/ftc-strengthens-kids-privacy-gives-parents-greater-control-over. 
785 See, e.g., FTC, Operators of Online "Virtual Worlds" to Pay $3 Million to Settle FTC Charges That 
They Illegally Collected and Disclosed Children's Personal Information (May 12, 2011), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/05/operators-online-virtual-worlds-pay-3-million-
settle-ftc-charges.  
786 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 C.F.R. Part 99. 
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underage students such as political affiliation, religion, income level (including 
participation in federally-funded assistance programs), mental and psychological 
conditions, sexual behaviour and attitudes, illegal or self-incriminating behaviour, and 
critical reviews of family members.787  
 
State laws also protect children and student data.  The most comprehensive state 
privacy regime is in California, which enacted the Student Online Personal 
Information Protection Act (SOPIPA), prohibiting online services from targeting 
advertisements to students or using student information to develop profiles of 
students.788  Other states have enacted significant measures.  In 2015 alone, 46 
states introduced 182 bills focused on student privacy, and 15 states passed 28 new 
student privacy bills.789  These laws establish requirements for data governance and 
privacy oversight, and promote transparency concerning the processing of student 
data.   
 
General Regulation Of Privacy 
 
In addition to the sector-specific regulation of privacy, US privacy is governed by 
several broad statutes that prohibit unfair and deceptive acts and practices, require 
data security for the protection of personal information, and require notification to 
consumers and regulatory agencies in the event of an information security incident 
that compromises the security or integrity of personal data.  These general privacy 
protections and the state and federal agencies tasked with enforcing them are 
essential to the US privacy protection regime.  Significantly, these general statutes 
apply to data that may not be covered by the sector-specific statutes that protect the 
most sensitive categories of personal information. 
 
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)790 and its state analogues have the 
broadest impact on privacy and data protection in the US.  These laws cover areas 
not addressed by sector-specific privacy laws by permitting government prosecutors 
to bring legal action to recover damages for (or to enjoin) privacy violations.  The 
FTC, state Attorneys General, and private plaintiffs have enforced general principles 
of privacy to regulate and protect consumer privacy across all commercial sectors.   
 
                                                 
787 Id. § 1232h. 
788 Cal. Stat., ch. 839 (2014) (codified at Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22584 et seq.).  California is the 
most active state in this area, with many of its provisions being adopted in other states.  Most recently, 
California enacted the Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital World Act, which regulates 
online marketing directed to minors.  The law prohibits online service companies from marketing 
products to children that they are not legally permitted to buy, and from collecting personal data from 
children for the purpose of sharing with third parties.  It also requires that online service providers 
permit any California minor to request permanent deletion of collected and stored personal data, and 
that the provider disclose this right (including how to exercise it) to minors.  See Cal. Stat. ch. 336 
(2013) (codified at Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22580 et seq.) (Privacy Rights for California Minors in the 
Digital World). 
789 See Data Quality Campaign, Student Data Privacy Legislation (2015). 
790 Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. 
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 The Federal Trade Commission 
 
The FTC is the lead privacy enforcement agency in the US.791  It has brought 
numerous enforcement actions totalling more than $1 billion in redress or 
disgorgement.792  At the same time, the FTC has issued regulations on children’s 
privacy,793 financial privacy,794 telecommunications privacy,795 and other areas. 
Beginning with a workshop on the implications of the Internet in 1995,796 the FTC 
also has elaborated privacy standards for industry in various reports and guidance 
on issues such as Internet advertising, the Internet of Things, big data, and other 
emerging issues.  These reports and guidance carry significant weight through the 
threat of enforcement under the FTC’s flexible authority detailed below. 
 
The FTC is an independent administrative agency, led by five commissioners 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate to serve seven-year terms, 
no more than three of whom may be from the same political party.797  Although the 
President designates which commissioner shall act as Chairman, there is a limit on 
presidential influence and control. Unlike most other agencies in the executive 
branch, FTC commissioners do not serve at the pleasure of the President, and they 
have separate terms of office.  Federal law limits the authority of the President to 
remove FTC commissioners from office and direct their actions, further strengthening 
their independence and authority.798 
 
The FTC has authority to enforce privacy and security protections across a wide 
spectrum of US industries.799  Its authority derives from Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
                                                 
791 See generally, Edward R. McNicholas, Andrew J. Strenio, Jr. & Clayton G. Northouse, FTC 
Enforcement (BNA 2014). 
792 FTC, Federal Trade Commission 2014 Privacy and Data Security Update, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-
2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf.  
793 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 312. 
794 Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 16 C.F.R. Part 313; Standards for Safeguarding 
Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. Part 314. 
795 Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 310. 
796 See Bamberger & Mulligan, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 734, at 187. 
797 15 U.S.C. § 41. 
798 See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935). 
799 Those industries excepted, in whole or in part, from the FTC’s jurisdiction include banks, credit 
unions, telecommunications carriers, interstate transportation common carriers, air carriers, and 
packers and stockyard operators, all of which are regulated by other agencies under other laws.  
Financial institutions are regulated by a number of federal agencies, including the SEC, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the CFPB, pursuant to the FCRA, the FACTA, the 
GLBA, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, among others.  Telecommunications common 
carriers are regulated by the FCC under the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.).  
Interstate transportation common carriers are regulated by the Department of Transportation under 49 
U.S.C. subtitle IV, and air common carriers are regulated by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.  The 
Secretary of Agriculture enforces the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 (7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.), 
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which prohibits “unfair or deceptive” acts or practices.800  The FTC interprets “unfair 
practices” to include unexpected information practices such as inadequate 
disclosures to consumers801 and the failure to implement adequate protection 
measures for sensitive personal information,802 and the FTC interprets “deceptive” to 
include misrepresentations, false promises, and failures to comply with 
representations made to consumers, such as statements in privacy policies and 
other publicly-disclosed privacy and security practices, as well as those regarding 
Safe Harbour certifications discussed above.803  These sweeping definitions create a 
general privacy protection framework that broadly covers commercial activities 
throughout the US.   
 
The FTC’s enforcement authority includes the power to issue cease and desist 
orders, seek temporary restraining orders or permanent injunctions against 
proscribed conduct, and seek consent decrees to govern a company’s conduct 
without a judicial finding of liability.804  In the area of privacy and data protection, 
consent decrees typically require comprehensive privacy and security programs, 
robust notice and choice provisions, deletion of improperly-obtained consumer data, 
and independent third-party assessments, monetary compensation, or disgorgement 
of gains.805  A company that fails to comply with an FTC order is subject to 
substantial civil penalties.  An FTC enforcement action can result in 20 years of 
oversight and significant fines of up to $16,000 per violation per day.  The pervasive 
publicity surrounding such enforcement actions serves as a strong incentive to other 
organizations to comply with fair privacy and security practices.   
 
Through the process of bringing select enforcement actions and resolving them 
through consent decrees, with occasional actions going to litigation, the FTC has 
been able to signal a baseline set of privacy norms and principles regarding the 
collection and use of personal information. Professors Daniel J. Solove and 
Woodrow Hartzog have described this process as establishing a general “common 
law” of privacy.806 Through the enforcement of its Section 5 authority, the FTC has 
attained the authority to provide “sprawling jurisdiction to enforce privacy in addition 
                                                                                                                                                        
although that Act arguably does not reach personal privacy concerns, which would then default to 
FTC enforcement. 
800 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
801 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-01038 (D. Wash., ongoing). 
802 Gina Stevens, The Federal Trade Commission’s Regulations of Data Security Under Its Unfair or 
Deceptive Acts or Practices (UDAP) Authority, Cong. Research Service (2014) (collecting 
enforcement actions), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43723.pdf. 
803 See generally McNicholas, Strenio & Northouse, FTC Enforcement, supra note 791, at chapter 2. 
804 Id. at 706–09. 
805 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham, Civ. No. 2:13-CV-01887-ES-JAD (D. N.J. Dec. 11, 
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/151211wyndhamstip.pdf. 
806 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). 
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to the pockets of statutory jurisdiction Congress has given to it in industry-specific 
privacy legislation. The FTC reigns over more territory than any other agency that 
deals with privacy.”807  Its enforcement actions and consent orders regularly operate 
to protect EU citizens and other global customers of companies under FTC 
jurisdiction 
The FTC’s authority to levy significant monetary fines and seek consumer redress or 
disgorgement of profits gives significant weight to this broad enforcement authority.  
For example, just this past December, the FTC secured a settlement from an identity 
theft protection provider for failure to secure personal information and deceptive 
statements related to its data protection services that included a settlement payment 
of $100 million.808  By comparison, one of the largest settlements in the EU was an 
action by the UK Financial Services Authority in 2009 against HSBC related to 
alleged security failures for £3 million.809  In 2013, the FTC reportedly initiated over 
30 privacy-related enforcement actions and issued approximately $64 million in civil 
penalties810; that same year, the most active data protection authority in Europe was 
the Garante in Italy, which issued fines that totalled approximately $5.4 million.811  In 
short, the US system imposes significant penalties and fines for the protection of 
privacy and security that are just as strong if not stronger than those imposed in the 
EU.   
 
In addition to initiating enforcement actions, the FTC plays a leadership role in policy 
development, research, education, and stakeholder communications to protect 
consumers’ personal information that resembles the thought-leadership role played 
by the Article 29 Working Party in the EU.  The FTC has issued guidance or policy 
statements on the following: 
 
                                                 
807 Id. at 586.  In this light, Professors Solove and Hartzong observe, the common approach of 
classifying the US privacy legal regime as “fragmented” or “hollow” when compared with the EU is 
“outdated.” 
808 FTC, LifeLock to Pay $100 Million to Consumers to Settle FTC Charges It Violated 2010 Order 
(Dec. 17, 2015). 
809 Jill Treanor, HSBC Fined £3m for ‘Careless’ Handling of Customer Details, THE GUARDIAN (July 22, 
2009). 
810 See FTC, Federal Trade Commission 2014 Privacy and Data Security Update, supra note 792.  
811 Ghostery, Ignoring Privacy Enforcement Costing Businesses Millions Worldwide (June 5, 2015), 
available at https://www.ghostery.com/intelligence/business-blog/business/ignoring-privacy-
enforcement-costing-businesses-mi/.   
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• Big Data – addressing the effects of “big data” on consumer privacy, stressing 
the importance of de-identification, accountability, and “notice and consent” 
disclosures and highlighting areas of concern relating to discrimination, fraud, 
and exposure of sensitive data.812  The FTC also has addressed the need for 
increased transparency and accountability of “data brokers.”813 
 
• Internet of Things – addressing the ability of ordinary objects to connect to the 
Internet and send and receive data – the “Internet of Things” – and the 
associated need for increased transparency, security, data minimization, and 
new forms of notice and choice.814 
 
• Mobile Privacy – addressing the need for increased transparency, notice, and 
choices for mobile apps and online platforms,815 and the privacy disclosure 
practices for mobile apps directed at children.816 
 
• Privacy-Protecting Technologies ‒ addressing emerging technologies and 
bridging the gap between the tech industry, the academy, and regulators. In 
recent weeks, the FTC convened “PrivacyCon” to, in the words of FTC 
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, “deepen our ties to the academic and tech 
communities and ensure that the FTC and other policymakers have the 
benefit of work of leading thinkers in the privacy and data security arenas.”817  
 
The FTC conducts studies, issues reports, and testifies before Congress on 
legislative and regulatory proposals affecting consumer privacy and accountability.818 
                                                 
812 FTC, Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion? (Jan. 2016), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-
understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf.  
813 FTC, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability (May 2014), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-
report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf. 
814 FTC, Internet of Things: Privacy & Security in a Connected World (Jan. 2015), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-
2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf. 
815 FTC, Mobile Privacy Disclosures: Building Trust Through Transparency (Feb. 2013), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-
through-transparency-federal-trade-commission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf. 
816 FTC, Mobile Apps for Kids: Current Privacy Disclosures are Disappointing (Feb. 2012), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-apps-kids-current-privacy-disclosures-
are-disappointing/120216mobile_apps_kids.pdf. 
817 Edith Ramirez, Chair, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks, PrivacyCon: An FTC Workshop 
(Jan. 14, 2016). 
818 FTC personnel have testified as experts before Congress on a number of privacy issues, including 
Do Not Track legislation (December 2010); Protecting Consumers’ Privacy on Mobile Devices (May 
2011); Protecting Consumers’ Privacy (July 2011); Efforts to Protect Consumer Privacy (May 2012); 
Commercial Uses of Facial Recognition Technologies (July 2012); and Proposed Legislation 
Addressing Privacy and Security in Connected Automobiles (October 2015). 
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These studies, reports, and testimony are closely examined by industry and privacy 
professionals as policy statements that declare or shape the direction of FTC 
enforcement and, more generally, the protection of privacy in the US. 
 
Most notably, the FTC’s Privacy Report (2012) set out best practices for data 
controllers based on principles of privacy by design, enhanced consumer choice, 
and greater transparency.819  Through such guidance and enforcement actions, the 
FTC has articulated and enforced a general right to privacy and data protection in 
the US. 
 
 State Privacy Enforcement And Common Law 
 
US states enforce a broad range of laws designed to protect the right to privacy. 
They enforce unfair trade practice laws pursuant to state unfair and deceptive acts 
and practices laws patterned on the FTC Act.  They also enforce data security 
requirements for sensitive personal information, and generally require data breach 
notification in the aftermath of data security incidents.  In certain cases, states 
enable private plaintiffs to bring lawsuits and other actions to protect and enforce 
privacy rights.  This combination of laws at the state level provides state Attorneys 
General, state officials, and private individuals with considerable ability to investigate 
complaints, initiate lawsuits or proceedings, enjoin the collection, processing or 
disclosures of personal information, extract monetary awards, and enter into 
settlements or consent decrees requiring data protection. 
 
First, nearly every state has enacted what are referred to as “Little FTC Acts,” 
statutes that prohibit unfair and deceptive acts or practices in terms identical or 
similar to the FTC Act.820  Actions for alleged violations of these statutes rely on 
essentially the same theories as under the federal statute, namely, that prior 
statements regarding the processing of personal information (such as in a privacy 
policy) are deceptive, or that an act or practice is so egregious as to be unfair.  
These statutes empower state Attorneys General (and in some instances private 
plaintiffs) to bring independent enforcement actions, and they often do so by 
combining with other state Attorneys General in multi-state investigations.821  
 
Second, almost every one of the 50 states has legislation that requires companies to 
implement information security measures.  Data security laws generally require 
companies holding personal information about state residents to: 
 
                                                 
819 FTC, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses 
and Policymakers (Mar. 2012) (2012 Privacy Report), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-
consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
820 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 
821 The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) Consumer Protection Project, for instance, 
promotes information exchange between states regarding complaints, investigations, and 
enforcement actions, sometimes leading to multi-state actions. See NAAG, Privacy in the Digital Age 
(2013). 
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• implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to 
protect the information from unauthorised access, destruction, use, 
modification, or disclosure; 
 
• take reasonable steps to destroy personal information that is no longer to 
be retained or to make it otherwise unreadable or undecipherable; and  
 
• contractually require third parties to whom the company discloses personal 
information to maintain reasonable security procedures.822   
 
Some states impose more rigourous information security requirements.  
Massachusetts, for instance, requires entities to develop and implement a written 
comprehensive information security programme.823  The regulation requires 
employee training, adoption of encryption standards, and regular monitoring and 
establishes requirements for securing computer systems.824  These requirements are 
passed through to third-party vendors engaging in business with entities subject to 
the regulation.825 
 
Third, data breach notification laws in 47 states require corporate and government 
entities to take particular actions in the event of a data security breach or suspected 
breach.826  Once the notification threshold has been met, entities must notify state 
residents whose personal information was affected by a breach.  Notice to law 
enforcement, consumer reporting agencies, and the state Attorney General or other 
regulators also may be required.  
State privacy laws are enforced by a range of state and local entities. One state 
enforcement agency is the California Attorney General’s Privacy Enforcement and 
Protection Unit.  As part of the California Department of Justice, this unit enforces 
state and federal privacy laws, provides California residents with information on their 
rights and strategies for protecting their privacy, encourages businesses to follow 
best practices in privacy, and provides policy recommendations on related 
legislation.  
 
                                                 
822 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5 (2007); Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-3503. 
823 Personal information is defined as the resident’s name plus Social Security number, driver’s 
license number or other state-issued identification number, or credit or debit card number, or other 
financial account number.  This applies to electronic or paper data. See 201 Mass. Code Regs. 
§ 17.02. 
824 Id. §§ 17.03–17.04. 
825 Id. § 17.03(2)(f).  These requirements include (1) taking reasonable steps to select and retain third-
party service providers capable of maintaining appropriate security measures; and (2) requiring that 
the third-party service providers by contract implement and maintain appropriate security measures 
for any personal information or data. 
826 See, e.g., 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 530/5, 530/10; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 899-AA; Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 47-18-2107; Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 521.053. 
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Finally, individuals are in some instances afforded private causes of action to protect 
their rights to privacy.  Many state “Little FTC Acts” include private rights of action 
that can be used by deceived or unfairly injured individuals to redress privacy 
violations. 
 
At the state levels, individuals also may seek to protect their privacy rights.  State 
common-law systems recognise a web of privacy torts, including invasion of 
privacy,827 public disclosure of private facts,828 false light,829 infringement of the right 
of publicity or likeness, appropriation,830 and general negligence and 
misappropriation.  These torts are widely recognised by state law, and individuals 
who have suffered legally recognised harm may assert such claims.831  In some 
instances, damages for any of these torts can be expansive and include dignitary 
harms, mental distress, and special damages.832 
 
 Privacy On The Ground 
 
The US privacy protection regime is also informed by practices on the ground. US 
companies and industry associations have developed privacy best practices, codes 
of conduct, and certification programs that build on recommendations and guidance 
from privacy regulators such as the FTC, but often exceed legal requirements.  
 
These industry best practices often are memorialized in public-facing privacy 
policies.  Even though there is no comprehensive law in the US that requires such 
policies, they have been so widely adopted that it would be a challenge to find a 
company website without one – and California law expressly requires such policies 
for companies that collect information online from that state’s residents.  Privacy 
policies have evolved as ways of competing on privacy, building customer goodwill, 
and protecting against litigation.  In turn, these public commitments create an 
enforceable legal standard, as violations of privacy policies are litigated in breach-of-
                                                 
827 See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 100–101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (rejecting intrusion upon 
seclusion claim in the context of employer monitoring of employee e-mail). 
828 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 852 (Cal. 1998). 
829 Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 209–210 (Ill. 1992). 
830 Eastwood v.  Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
831 See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy §§ 3:1; 5:68; 5:123 (2d ed. 
2015).  Claims also may be asserted directly under a state constitution, such as in California, which 
recognizes a constitutional right to privacy.  See Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472, 477 (Cal. 
2009). 
832 Restatement of the Law (Second) of Torts § 652H (1977).  Private plaintiffs in the US have 
pursued privacy violation claims in the state and federal court systems.  For example, in March 2015 a 
federal judge gave preliminary approval to settle a class action litigation for $10 million brought by 
consumers against Target arising from the 2013 data breach in which up to 110 million consumers’ 
personal data was potentially compromised, with payments up to $10,000 for each consumer.  See 
Reuters, Target WillPay $10 Million to Settle Lawsuit From Data Breach, Fortune (Mar. 19, 2015).  
The wave of lawsuits a company can face after media reports of misuse of consumer data or a data 
security incident can serve as a strong deterrent. 
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contract claims and serve as a basis for deceptive practice cases brought by the 
FTC and state Attorneys General.  The development of the regulatory “common law 
of privacy” through settlement or litigation outcomes in these cases then influence 
the terms of privacy policies as companies adjust their practices and disclosures in 
response.833  The FTC also has influenced privacy practices by encouraging 
companies to honour “Do Not Track” browser signals and adopt other practices that 
promote privacy.834 
 
The development of breach notification and data security laws also has had a 
profound impact on privacy and data protection practices.  In the recent empirical 
study by the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology, US privacy managers 
unanimously described breach notification laws “as an important driver of privacy in 
corporations” that “called attention to the potential downstream effect of corporate 
treatment of consumers’ information.”835  In addition to legislating issues of privacy 
and security, US legislators also influence corporate activities by conducting 
investigations, issuing letters of enquiry, conducting hearings, publishing reports, and 
introducing legislation.  For instance, members of Congress issued detailed queries 
to data brokers836 and car manufacturers837 regarding cybersecurity protections and 
information collection practices. 
 
Industry self-regulation of Internet advertising is a notable example of the interaction 
of public policy discussion and privacy practices.  The Digital Advertising Alliance 
(DAA), National Advertising Initiative, and others have developed privacy principles 
for online advertising that encourage greater notice to consumers, promote 
consumer choice, and establish greater accountability. The DAA, for instance, 
promotes an “enhanced” form of notice.838  It has developed an icon to provide a 
common means for its members to provide enhanced notice and a common means 
to opt out of behavioural advertising, the display of which indicates that the 
advertising company is engaged in interest-based advertising.  By clicking on the 
icon, consumers can learn about interest-based advertising and the companies that 
may be engaged in interest-based advertising. The icon also links to a page where 
                                                 
833 See Solove & Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, supra note 806, at 590–
99. 
834 See, e.g., FTC, FTC Announces Agenda for Workshop Exploring Practices, Privacy Implications of 
Comprehensive Collection of Web Data (Nov. 23, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/11/ftc-announces-agenda-workshop-exploring-practices-privacy.  
835 Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Ground, supra note 734, at 71–72. 
836 Staff of S. Comm. on Commerce, A Review of the Data Broker Industry: Collection, Use, and Sale 
of Consumer Data for Marketing Purposes, 113th Cong. (2013). 
837 Sen. Edward J. Markey, Tracking & Hacking: Security & Privacy Gaps Put American Drivers at 
Risk (Feb. 2015), https://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2015-02-06_MarkeyReport-
Tracking_Hacking_CarSecurity%202.pdf. 
838 See, e.g., DAA, Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising (July 2009), 
http://www.aboutads.info/resource/download/seven-principles-07-01-09.pdf. 
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consumers can opt out of collection of personal information and delivery of targeted 
ads. 
 
Industry associations also have taken steps to encourage consumer choice. Privacy 
principles state that companies may collect personal information for advertising 
purposes so long as an opt-out mechanism is provided.839  Industry self-regulation 
can promote accountability even beyond hard legal obligations. DAA principles and 
practices require that at least one employee is responsible for ensuring compliance 
with privacy principles and that at least once per year, companies conduct an audit 
of compliance with industry standards.840 
Other self-regulatory regimes can create a legally-binding effect on companies.  The 
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), for instance, is a set of 
technical, operational, and procedural requirements for secure processing of 
payment card data (debit and credit cards) promulgated by an organisation founded 
by major credit card companies.841  The PCI DSS applies globally to all merchants 
and organisations that store, process, or transmit cardholder data.  Compliance with 
these standards affect the various types of actions discussed thus far, such as FTC 
“unfairness” actions,842 state data security enforcement actions,843 and private 
plaintiff negligence claims.844  These standards also are enforced contractually 
between merchants and their banks, and the contracts enable card brands to levy 
hefty fines for noncompliance. 
 
Corporate practice and management has responded to the intricate web of state and 
federal privacy laws and regulations and the rise of self-regulatory programmes.  A 
great many US companies have chief privacy officers even though no laws 
specifically require such a position,845 and professional privacy associations such as 
                                                 
839 Id.; DAA, Application of Self-Regulatory Principles to the Mobile Environment (July 2013), 
http://www.aboutads.info/DAA_Mobile_Guidance.pdf.  
840 DAA, Application of Self-Regulatory Principles to the Mobile Environment, supra note 839. 
841 Payment Card Industry (PCI) Security Standards Council, About Us,  
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/organization_info/index.php. 
842 See Leslie Fair, Wyndham’s Settlement with the FTC: What It Means for Businesses – and 
Consumers (Dec. 9, 2015) (noting that Wyndham’s settlement with the FTC requires annual 
assessment of compliance with PCI DSS), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-
blog/2015/12/wyndhams-settlement-ftc-what-it-means-businesses-consumers.  
843 State Attorneys General may look to PCI DSS as a relevant industry standard that determines a 
“fair” business practice under state data security laws. Further, while generally a self-regulatory 
regime, the PCI standards are incorporated into statutory legal standards in at least one state law, in 
Nevada.  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603-1A.215. 
844 Private plaintiff suits may look to PCI DSS to establish a duty of care for negligence and other 
claims. 
845  The GLBA and HIPAA, however, require individuals to be responsible for the implementation of 
data security procedures. 
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the International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) have emerged to train 
privacy professionals and inform industry practice.  Since it was founded in the US in 
2000, the IAPP has grown to over 25,000 members around the world, with the 
majority in the US.  An IAPP membership survey found that US companies are 
“more likely” to mention the need to be a “good corporate citizen” than their 
European counterparts,846 and “[p]rivacy practices in the U.S. are more likely to have 
certified decision-makers than their counterparts in the EU, with certification far more 
prevalent in large companies and mature privacy programs.”847   
 
IAPP also found that “U.S. firms are more likely than EU firms to be either in the 
Early or Mature stage of privacy” and devote a larger budget to privacy – US 
corporations devote more than twice as many resources than EU corporations.848  
Privacy-focused professionals occupy senior leadership positions in the majority of 
major US corporations.  The recent empirical analysis by Berkeley scholars noted 
that “corporate structures frequently include direct privacy leadership, in many 
instances by C-level executives ....  A community of corporate privacy managers has 
emerged.  Ready evidence suggests that substantial effort is made to manage 
privacy.”849  
 
Article 25 (2) of Directive 95/46 provides that a decision about the adequacy of 
specific transfers can take into account “the professional rules and security 
measures which are complied with in that country.”  A comprehensive review of the 
US privacy legal regime, therefore, must extend beyond federal and state statutes 
and regulations to also include the prevailing practices that serve to further protect 
consumer privacy. 
3.3.2 The Principles Of US Privacy Laws And Practices Correspond To 
The Basic Principles Under Directive 95/46 
The Article 29 Working Party has articulated the essential elements of Directive 
95/46 as purpose limitation, data quality and proportionality, transparency, security, 
access and rectification, and restrictions on onward transfer.850  Mapping US privacy 
laws to these principles is complex because of the multiplicity of rules and 
jurisdictions involved.  Nevertheless, consistent with the adoption of the Fair 
Information Practice Principles on both sides of the Atlantic, there are common 
themes in US and EU privacy laws and practices.  In some aspects their application 
does not match up perfectly; in other aspects such as children’s privacy, medical 
                                                 
846 IAPP, IAPP-EY Annual Privacy Governance Report 2015, at 23 (2015), 
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/IAPP-EY_Privacy_Governance_Report_2015.pdf. 
847 See id. at 6.  
848 Id. at 91–102. 
849 Bamberger & Mulligan, Privacy on the Ground, supra note 734.  
850 See, e.g., Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 11/2011 on the Level of Protection of 
Personal Data in New Zealand (Apr.  4, 2011), 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp182_en.pdf.   
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privacy, financial privacy and data security, US laws go beyond those in the EU legal 
order.  In addition, US rules for electronic communications and online marketing 
privacy may match or exceed those of the EU. 
This section evaluates the US legal framework in light of principles identified by the 
Working Party.  The examples of applicable laws are descriptive but not 
comprehensive as to the scope of each element within US privacy law.  This 
comparison does not stand alone, because “any meaningful analysis” should take 
into account not only the content of laws but also “the system in place to ensure the 
effectiveness of such rules.”851  The US privacy regime and privacy practices on the 
ground together operate to ensure the fulfilment of EU data protection principles. 
Purpose Limitation  
The purpose limitation principle requires that data be processed for a specific 
purpose and subsequently used or disclosed only as not incompatible with the 
purpose of the transfer.  The only exemptions are those necessary in a 
democratic society on one of the grounds listed in article 13 of the Directive 
(national security, defence, public safety, criminal proceedings, protection of 
the data subject, scientific research). 
US privacy laws restrict data processing to limit the collection and use of personal 
information.  Sector-specific laws, such as HIPAA and GLBA, have often very strict 
secondary use restrictions.  The FCRA requires recipients of consumer credit reports 
to specify and attest to the purpose for which they are requesting the data.  And in a 
more general context, the FTC recommends that companies obtain express consent 
before collecting or using consumer information in ways that are inconsistent with the 
context in which such information is collected.852  “For any data collection that is 
inconsistent with these contexts,” the FTC states, “companies should make 
appropriate disclosures to consumers at a relevant time and in a prominent 
manner—outside of a privacy policy or other legal document.”853  
The FTC also calls on companies to provide notice to consumers of material 
changes to their privacy policies.854  Furthermore, any business that engages in 
commercial transactions with California residents online must post a privacy policy 
that states the purposes for which personal information is collected.855  Any 
processing inconsistent with such purposes may be prosecuted as an unfair or 
deceptive practice. 
                                                 
851 Article 29 Working Party, WP 12, Working Document on transfers of personal data to third 
countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU data protection directive, p. 5 (adopted 24 July 1998). 
852 FTC, 2012 Privacy Report, supra note 819, at  ix. 
853 Id. at 27. 
854 Id. at 57–58; In re Gateway Learning Corp., Docket No. C-4120 (FTC Sept. 10, 2004) (alleging, 
among other things, that Gateway Learning changed its privacy policy without providing notice or 
obtaining consent of consumers). 
855 Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575–22579. 
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 Financial Information  
As noted above, the FCRA limits the use of information relating to creditworthiness, 
credit standing or capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, 
and mode of living to a “permissible purpose.”  Such permissible purposes include 
those expressly authorized by the consumer, to facilitate a transaction initiated by 
the consumer, or as required by law.  Under the GLBA, financial institutions may not 
share non-public personal financial information with third parties unless it previously 
offered the consumer an opportunity to opt out of such sharing and it has an 
agreement with the third party to keep shared information confidential.  A financial 
institution may not disclose an account number or similar number for a consumer’s 
credit card account, deposit account, or transaction account to any non-affiliated 
third party for marketing. 
 Health And Medical Information  
HIPAA and HITECH authorise the collection and use of certain protected healthcare 
information for purposes that are essential to the provision of healthcare, including 
treatment, payment, and operations only.  No data may be collected and used for 
any other purpose, including marketing, without the data subject’s express written 
authorisation.  HIPAA limits the disclosure of personal health information to the 
“minimum necessary” to accomplish the stated purpose of collection and use.  
Although a healthcare entity may disclose personal health information to a business 
associate (such as a billing company), it must ensure prior to disclosure that it has a 
valid contract with the business associate under which the associate is held to the 
same requirements as the healthcare entity.  Ultrasensitive healthcare information is 
subject to even more stringent safeguards.  Under separate legal requirements, 
employers and insurers are prohibited from requiring genetic testing or using genetic 
information as the basis for insurance premiums, employment decisions, or benefits 
coverage.   
 
 Electronic Communications Information  
ECPA restricts the collection and use of communications information.  It prohibits 
intentionally intercepting or divulging an “electronic communication,” without consent 
or unless an exception applies.  Section 222 of the Communications Act limits the 
use and disclosure of (and access to) information that relates to CPNI.  Similarly, for 
example, consumer preferences evident from audiovisual media purchases and 
rentals are protected from disclosure under the VPPA absent informed written 
consent of the data subject.  Laws in many states provide similar protections against 
interception or collection of personal electronic communications information. 
 
 Data Of Children And Students  
COPPA sets limits on the collection and disclosure of children’s personal 
information.  For most purposes, website operators must obtain express, verifiable 
parental consent for use and disclosure of the personal information of children under 
age 13, and the purpose of the collection must be made clear to parents.  State laws 
provide additional purpose limitations on data collection, use and disclosure.  For 
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example, the Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital World Act restricts 
online companies from collecting personal data on, or marketing to, children who are 
not old enough to purchase the product.  Other state laws limit the use of biometrics 
and student tracking devices, or provide for the protection and restricted disclosure 
of data collected through the use of such identification.  SOPIPA restricts website 
operators and mobile application developers from developing profiles of students 
based on personal data and preferences, thereby establishing a strict purpose 
limitation on data collection.  FERPA incorporates notice and consent provisions, 
and requires written consent for disclosure of such records with limited exceptions.  
PPRA similarly limits disclosure, and specifically incorporates sensitive data – such 
as political affiliation, religion, income level, mental health status, and sexual 
behaviour and attitudes, among others – into these limitations. 
Data Quality And Proportionality  
The data quality and proportionality principle requires that data should be 
accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.  The data should be 
appropriate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which it 
is transferred or subsequently processed. 
The FTC has developed and enforced the principles of data quality and 
proportionality.  In its comprehensive statement of the right to privacy, the FTC 
declared that “[c]ompanies should incorporate substantive privacy protections into 
their practices, such as data security, reasonable collection limits, sound retention 
and disposal practices, and data accuracy.”856  And the FTC has relied on this 
principle in bringing enforcement actions against companies that collect a 
disproportionate amount of information without demonstrating its relevance to the 
purpose and context of collection and adequately disclosing the collection 
practices.857 
 
Principles of data quality and proportionality are also enforced through privacy 
policies.  US privacy laws generally require data collectors to provide notice to 
consumers, usually through an online privacy policy, of the types of information 
collected by the entity, the purpose for the collection, and how the data is used and 
disclosed.  Failure to disclose, or to limit collection in accordance with the disclosure, 
may be prosecuted as an unfair or deceptive act or practice, as well as direct 
violations of the law.  These enforcement threats give data controllers an incentive to 
collect only appropriate and relevant information that is connected with the business 
purpose of the organisation and not excessive for the purpose for which it is 
collected.  Data quality is also important in the US privacy regime.  In addition to the 
notice requirements, a number of federal and state laws provide for access to and 
correction of personal information.  It should be noted that a company’s failure to 
comply with the terms of its online or published privacy policy could readily become 
                                                 
856 FTC, 2012 Privacy Report, supra note 819, at 30. 
857 See, e.g., In re Designerware, LLC, Docket No. C-4390 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 2013) (alleging that the 
collection of real-time location information, keystrokes, screenshots, and photographs from rented 
computers without notice or consent was an unfair business practice); In re Sears Holding Mgmt. 
Corp., Docket No. C-4264 (FTC Aug. 31, 2009) (alleging that collection of all browsing information by 
an application was unfair because it was not sufficiently and prominently disclosed). 
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the subject of private litigation to the extent that individuals rely on and are injured by 
any such failure.  Breach of contract claims could also discipline a company’s failure 
to comply with promises or misleading statements communicated publicly or to the 
customers. 
 
 Financial Information  
FCRA and FACTA protect consumers from disclosure of inaccurate and arbitrary 
personal information held by consumer reporting agencies, which is directly relevant 
to credit, employment or insurance decisions.  FCRA requires any entity that 
ordinarily furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency to promptly notify the 
agency of any inaccuracies, corrections, or updates.858  
 Health And Medical Information  
The HIPAA Security Rule requires covered entities and business associates to 
ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic health information 
they collect and maintain.  HIPAA and HITECH require implementation of 
administrative, physical, and technical measures to protect the integrity of health 
information.  By imposing requirements to ensure data integrity, the HIPAA Security 
Rule is designed to ensure accuracy of data. 
 Electronic Communications Information  
Section 222 of the Communications Act imposes limitations on the type of 
information telecommunications carriers may collect and requires 
telecommunications carriers to implement procedures to maintain the integrity of 
CPNI.  The Cable Communications Act restricts the collection, use and disposal of 
data.  
 Data Of Children And Students  
COPPA requires website and Internet operators that collect personal information of 
children under age 13 to maintain the accuracy and integrity of the personal 
information they collect.  Such operators may only maintain personal information to 
fulfil the purpose for which it was collected, and operators must provide access to 
children’s data for parents to ensure its accuracy. 
                                                 
858 FCRA, 15 U.S.C.  § 1681s-2(a)(1)–(2). 
 160 
datamatters.sidley.com   
Transparency  
The transparency principle requires that data subjects should be informed 
about the purpose for which data is processed and, when data is transferred 
onward, the identity of the processing controller in the third country, and any 
other aspect required to ensure fair treatment.  The only exceptions are as 
stated in Articles 11(2) and 13 of the Directive.859   
US companies doing business online are generally expected to post data privacy 
policies publicly.  In 1998, only two percent of websites had privacy policies; by 
2000, “virtually all” of the most popular commercial websites had privacy policies.860 
Today, privacy practices of US businesses (and laws like California’s statute 
requiring most businesses to post a privacy policy)861 have spread the use of privacy 
policies throughout the marketplace.  Commercial websites are expected to post 
plain, straightforward, and conspicuous online policies that explain the personal 
information collected, how it is processed and disclosed, and the choices consumers 
have regarding collection, use, and sharing.  The FTC has recommended that 
privacy disclosures also be provided “just in time” and in the relevant context of the 
collection.862  In many cases, federal and state enforcement actions are premised on 
the adequacy of disclosure and differences between a company’s actual practices 
and the promises made regarding data collection, use, sharing, disclosure, and 
disposal practices.  
 
 Financial Information  
In general, GLBA requires all financial institution to disclose and describe their 
privacy practices to consumers on an annual basis.  The notice must state what 
information is collected, how it is used, to whom it is disclosed, and which 
disclosures may be controlled through consumer consent.  FCRA requires consumer 
reporting agencies to provide detailed disclosures to consumers regarding the 
disclosure and use of personal data included in credit reports.   
 Health And Medical Information  
HIPAA generally requires a detailed privacy notice describing the collection, use, and 
disclosure practices and enumerating individuals’ rights regarding personal health 
                                                 
859 Article 11(2) provides an exception for “processing for statistical purposes or for the purposes of 
historical or scientific research [where] the provision of such information proves impossible or would 
involve a disproportionate effort or if recording or disclosure is expressly laid down by law,” requiring 
instead that member states provide “appropriate safeguards.”  Article 13 provides that member states 
may enact measures to restrict certain data subject rights for the purpose of national security, 
defense, public security, criminal investigations, “important economic or financial” interests of a 
member state, government enforcement of these activities, or the protection and rights of the data 
subject or other members of the public. 
860 FTC, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: A Federal Trade 
Commission Report to Congress (May 2000). 
861 Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575–22579. 
862 See, e.g., FTC, Mobile Privacy Disclosures: Building Trust Through Transparency 15 (Feb. 2013). 
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information.  Entities also must provide notice of any security breaches that reveal 
protected health information.  Such disclosures are made publicly available on the 
HHS’s website. 
 Electronic Communications Information  
The Communications Act requires telecommunications carriers to provide annual 
CPNI compliance certifications and to disclose complaints of unauthorised 
disclosures.  The Cable Communications Act requires cable operators to provide 
annual privacy notices personal data processing and consumers’ rights to access, 
correct and delete their data. 
 Data Of Children And Students  
COPPA generally requires website operators that collect children’s personal 
information to post a children’s privacy policy and provide direct notice to parents of 
personal data processing.  Educational institutions must provide annual notice to 
students and their parents regarding their personal data processing under both 
FERPA and PPRA. 
Security  
The security principle requires adoption of appropriate technical and 
organizational measures against risks presented by processing and 
restrictions against processing except on instructions from the controller.   
Data security is an area where the US indisputably goes beyond measures in the 
EU.  While the EU is finalizing adoption of a new General Data Protection Regulation 
that will apply data breach notification requirements, the US has had data breach 
notification laws in place for more than a decade.   
 
California was the first state to enact such a statute in 2003.  Such safeguards are 
now incorporated in the GLBA (financial data), HIPAA (healthcare data), the 
Communications Act (telecommunications data), and 47 state laws, plus the laws of 
numerous US territories and the District of Columbia (for broad categories of 
sensitive personal information).  The laws generally require notification to individuals 
of incidents in which their personal information has been compromised, and often 
require direct notification to a regulator. 
 
Generally state laws apply to “personal information” like the consumer’s name, plus 
other identifying information (such as Social Security number, driver’s license 
number, medical information).  The state laws identify the data controllers 
(companies and governmental entities) covered by the law, as well as the notice 
requirements (to whom and when notice must be given) and any exemptions (such 
as for encrypted data).  As discussed above, a significant effect of these widespread 
data breach laws is to promote a high degree of awareness of the governance and 
care of personal information.  Many states, in response to highly-publicized data 
breaches, recently have amended their data breach laws to sweep in more personal 
data, establish minimum encryption standards, and require implementation of risk-
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based information security programs.863  Many states also permit private redress for 
data breaches under other laws, and many of these are brought as class action 
lawsuits. 
 
Further, the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,864 the federal Identity Theft and 
Assumption Deterrence Act of 1988,865 and multiple state laws criminalize 
unauthorised access of computer systems and identity theft.866  These laws impose 
punishments of incarceration, forfeiture, restitution, and payment of attorneys’ fees to 
the victim. 
 
The US government also has focused attention on cybersecurity.  Across the 
financial, critical infrastructure, communications, and other sectors, federal and state 
agencies have issued directives that require the implementation of comprehensive 
information security programs and compliance with detailed security requirements 
regarding the handling of sensitive personal information.  At the encouragement of 
government, industry has gravitated towards implementation of a cybersecurity 
framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST),867 and US industries have deployed more robust and sophisticated practices 
to combat the threat of cyber attacks. 
 
 Financial Information  
The GLBA Safeguards Rule requires financial institutions to protect the security and 
confidentiality of their customers’ non-public personal information and implement a 
written information security plan.  Each financial institution must designate an 
employee to coordinate its information security programme, conduct a risk 
assessment, and contractually obligate service providers to maintain safeguards.  
The FACTA Red Flags Rule requires financial institutions and other entities to 
develop programs that identity and respond to theft of personal information.  
Financial regulatory agencies ‒ including the SEC, CFPB, Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, the New York State Department of Financial Services, and 
state insurance regulators, just to name a few ‒ have focused on cybersecurity 
regulatory enforcement. 
 Health And Medical Information  
The HIPAA Breach Notification Rule imposes significant reporting requirements and 
provides for civil and criminal penalties for the compromise of personal health 
                                                 
863 E.g., Cal.  Civ.  Code 1798.29 (SB-570); Conn. Pub. Act No. 15-142; Mont. H.B. 74; N.H. H.B. 322; 
Nev. A.B. 179; N.D. S.B. 2214; Or. S.B. 601; R.I. Identity Theft Protection Act of 2015 (SB134); Wash. 
H.B. 1078; Wyo. S.F. 35 & S.F. 36. 
864 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq. 
865 Id. §§ 1028, 1028A. 
866 E.g., Cal. Penal Code § 368 (“Crimes Against Elders, Dependent Adults and Persons With 
Disabilities”). 
867 NIST, Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Feb. 12, 2014). 
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information.  HIPAA also has a Safeguards Rule that requires entities to maintain 
administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity and security of health information.  It also requires that each entity identify a 
privacy official responsible for implementing privacy protections.  The HITECH Act 
further promotes security by incentivizing covered entities to use encryption.  In 
recent years, HHS has levied millions of dollars in fines (and in some cases referred 
criminal charges to the Department of Justice) against hospitals, health care 
providers, insurance companies, and pharmacies. 
 Electronic Communications Information  
The Communications Act requires telecommunications carriers to implement data 
security protections for personal information.  It requires notification of data breaches 
involving CPNI, and the FCC has interpreted the Communications Act to impose 
more general cybersecurity requirements regarding the handling of all sensitive 
personal information.868  By regulation, the FCC extended these protections to 
personal information collected and maintained by Internet service providers.   
 Data Of Children And Students  
COPPA imposes requirements on website operators to maintain confidentiality, 
integrity and security of child’s personal information.  SOPIPA requires data security 
measures and deletion upon request of the student.869  
 
Access, Rectification And Opposition 
The principle of rights of access, rectification and opposition state that an 
individual is entitled to a copy of all data relating to him or her, and the right to 
rectify any data that is inaccurate.  In certain circumstances, the individual 
should be able to oppose having his or her data processed, subject only to the 
exceptions in Article 13 of the Directive.   
Although federal and state laws do not provide for the data subject’s access to 
personal information held by companies in all circumstances, numerous statutes 
involving sensitive data provide for access as well as disclosures of what is collected 
and ways to correct errors or request deletions. 
 
                                                 
868 See, e.g., In re TerraCom, Inc. & YourTel America, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, 
FCC 14-173 (FCC Oct.  24, 2014). 
869 Data covered by SOPIPA includes but is not limited to information in the student’s educational 
record or email, first and last name, home address, telephone number, email address or other 
information that allows physical or online contact, discipline records, test results, special education 
data, juvenile dependency records, grades, evaluations, criminal records, medical records, health 
records, social security number, biometric information, disabilities, socioeconomic information, food 
purchases, political affiliation, religious information, text messages, documents, student identifiers, 
search activity, photos, voice recordings, or geolocation information.  Six states (Arkansas, Delaware, 
Georgia, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Oregon) passed similar laws in 2015. 
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 Financial Information  
FCRA requires that data collected by credit agencies be accurate and relevant, and 
provides mechanisms for data subjects to review and dispute the data collected.  
FACTA provides data subjects the right to obtain free copies of credit reports 
annually.  Many state laws also cover consumer reporting information and require 
data subjects be provided rights of notice, access and correction. 
 Health And Medical Information  
The HIPAA Privacy Rule provides data subjects the right to access their records, 
seek correction, and receive information regarding disclosures of their personal 
health information.870  Although entities retain the right to deny a request for 
amendment in limited circumstances, HIPAA requires covered entities to include the 
individual’s statement of disagreement or the individual’s request for amendment 
with any subsequent disclosures of protected health information.871  State laws 
relating to health records also permit access to and correction of records.  
California’s law is typical of these in restricting access by unauthorised persons to 
birth and death records, sensitive testing records (such as HIV tests), psychiatric 
records, and medical records.  It also guarantees patients’ rights to see, copy, and 
correct health records pertaining to them. 
 Electronic Communications Information  
The Cable Communications Act provides for data subjects’ access to their personal 
information and the right to correct any such data.  Consumers’ personal content 
rental preferences, including audiovisual media and reading material, are protected 
against processing absent express consent.  The VPPA provides strong protections 
against such disclosure, including a requirement that any consent be re-obtained 
every two years. 
 
 Data Of Children And Students 
COPPA requires each website operator provide parents access to, and ability to 
delete, their children’s personal information.  The website operator must also give 
parents the opportunity to opt out of future data processing.  FERPA ensures that 
students or the parents of underage students control access to their educational 
records and the right to correction.   
                                                 
870 HIPAA 45 C.F.R. § 164.526(a)(1). 
871 Id. § 164.526(d)(5). 
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Restrictions On Onward Transfers 
The onward transfers restriction principle states that successive transfers of 
personal data from the destination country to another country is permitted only 
if the third country ensures an adequate level of protection, subject only to the 
exceptions in Article 26 paragraph 1.   
Generally, federal and state law do not distinguish between data that is transferred 
within the US and data that is transferred outside the country, and thus do not 
separately address onward transfers to other countries.  Nevertheless, the 
restrictions on data sharing and disclosures within each sector-specific laws, the 
need to adhere to use limitations and other commitments in privacy policies, and 
data security and breach laws discussed above operate to limit transfers to third 
parties.  These restrictions also serve to limit onward transfers to foreign 
jurisdictions.  In general, the transferring company or organisation retains legal 
responsibility for the personal data it transfers to third parties – whether they are in 
the US or otherwise.   
 
Heavily regulated entities, like financial firms, are under particular obligations to 
scrutinise and monitor the suitability of third parties to which they transfer personal 
data.  GLBA and Massachusetts law, for example, require onward transfer contracts 
for personal data provided to third parties.872  While foreign transfers are not 
prohibited, banking agencies in particular have noted that extra due diligence may be 
appropriate where the transferee is located in a foreign jurisdiction.  The FTC also 
has held companies responsible for the practices of third parties to which a company 
has transferred personal data.873 
 
The US has further taken steps to provide compliance mechanisms for companies 
subject to onward data transfer restrictions imposed by other countries.  In addition 
to the provisions within each law for general onward transfer of data, businesses in 
the US are also subject to compliance with the EU-US Safe Harbour Framework,874 
the US-Swiss Safe Harbour Framework, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Cross-Border Privacy Rules system.  The FTC’s Office of International Affairs works 
with consumer protection agencies globally, including APEC and the Global Privacy 
Enforcement Network, to promote cooperation, combat cross-border fraud, and 
develop best practices.  Organizations that operate under the 2000 Safe Harbour 
Framework must apply the notice and choice provisions of the framework before 
disclosing covered information to a third party which will be a controller of that 
information.  The organisation must provide notice and obtain consent unless 
                                                 
872 See Office  of Comptroller of the Currency, US Dept. of the Treasury, Third Party Relationships: 
Risk Management Guidance, OCC Bulletin 2013-29 (Oct. 20, 2013); 201 C.M.R. § 17.03(f). 
873 See, e.g., In re GMR Transcription Services, Inc., Docket No. C-4482  (F.T.C. Jan. 31, 2014) 
(alleging that a company failed to “adequately verify that their service provider … implemented 
reasonable and appropriate security measures to protect personal information ... on [the service 
provider’s] network and computers”). 
874 Companies that certify to the US Department of Commerce their adherence to the Safe Harbour 
Framework are subject to FTC enforcement of their public commitments to their customers even 
though the CJEU has invalidated the Framework from the standpoint of EU law. 
 166 
datamatters.sidley.com   
transferring data to an affiliate whose practices are deemed “adequate” or who 
contractually agrees to provide the same level of privacy as set out in the 
Framework. 
 
3.3.3 An Effective System Of Enforcement And Compliance Ensures 
Effective Application Of These Principles 
According to WP 12, the objectives of a data protection system are (1) to deliver a 
good level of compliance with the rules; (2) to provide support and help to individual 
data subjects in the exercise of their rights; and (3) to provide appropriate redress to 
the injured party where there is noncompliance.875  The US privacy protection 
regime, which combines enforcement of broad privacy protections by the FTC and 
state Attorneys General together with sector-specific regulations, establishes a 
comprehensive privacy protection regime that fulfils these objectives. 
 
Good Level Of Compliance With Rules 
A good system is generally characterised by a high degree of awareness 
among data controllers of their obligations and among data subjects of their 
rights and the means of exercising them.  The existence of effective and 
dissuasive sanctions can play an important part in ensuring respect for the 
rules, as can systems of direct verification by authorities, auditors or 
independent data protection officials. 
 
Compliance with rules is motivated by the significant enforcement authority wielded 
by the FTC and other federal and state regulators.  The FTC alone has levied more 
than 40 privacy lawsuits, 50 data security cases, 100 credit-reporting cases, 130 
spam and spyware cases, 25 cases for violations of privacy notice and security 
requirements, 20 cases relating to collection of data from children, and 100 cases 
enforcing consumers’ rights to be left alone from telemarketers.876  As discussed 
above, the FTC also enforces voluntary promises made by participating 
organisations and has brought numerous cases relating to the US-EU Safe Harbour 
Framework.  The FTC also acts as a privacy enforcement authority for the US in the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Cross-Border Privacy Rules system.877  
These enforcement actions have been against data controllers of all sizes, from tech 
giants to small start-up companies.  Collectively, the FTC’s cases have imposed 
nearly $200 million in civil penalties and more than $1 billion in redress or 
disgorgement.878 
 
                                                 
875 See European Commission, Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data, Transfers of personal data to third countries: Applying Articles 25 and 
26 of the EU data protection directive (Jul. 24, 1998). 
876 FTC, 2014 Privacy and Data Security Update, supra note 810. 
877 Supra Part 3.3.1 (“The Federal Trade Commission”). 
878 Id. 
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More recently, additional federal regulators have increased their profiles as 
regulators of privacy and data security, including the FCC and SEC.  The SEC’s 
authority over publicly-traded companies, and recent announcements about their 
examination priorities as well as statements about material disclosures regarding 
risks to data, have greatly expanded attention to privacy and cybersecurity 
compliance from management and corporate boards.879 
 
Compliance with the rules is also motivated by businesses themselves through 
voluntary commitment to best practices and self-regulatory principles.  Many 
businesses ‒ mostly by choice rather than legal obligation ‒ have privacy officers 
whose primary responsibility is to ensure compliance with state and federal data 
privacy and security laws as well as best practices.880  Such individuals are generally 
responsible for the organisation’s data privacy and security practices and 
procedures.881  These individuals commonly look beyond the letter of the law to 
develop practices that anticipate best practices, government data management 
policy guidance, and requirements imposed in enforcement actions.882  Such 
managers credit the deterrent threat and unpredictability of enforcement actions by 
the FTC and state consumer protection officials, as well as the expectations of 
consumers with the development of policies and practices that exceed the 
requirements of law.   
 
As an additional layer of privacy protection, industry stakeholders have worked with 
government and privacy advocates to build a number of co-regulatory and self-
regulatory initiatives that adopt domain-specific, robust privacy protections 
enforceable by the FTC and state Attorneys General.  Examples of these 
accountability programs include the About Advertising icon by the DAA, the opt-out 
for cookies set forth by the Network Advertising Initiative, and the Children’s Privacy 
Seal Program.883  Some laws incorporate self-regulatory programs as part of the 
multi-faceted compliance scheme.  For example, COPPA permits self-regulation by 
industry groups whose compliance programs have been approved by the FTC as 
providing equal or greater protection for children, with mandatory mechanisms for 
assessing compliance and incentives for complying.884  Under these programmes, 
organisations will report violations that have not been corrected to the FTC.   
 
The multi-level attention to consumer privacy – at the data controller level, through 
oversight by federal and state agencies, federal and state enforcement actions, 
consent decrees, and the imposition of punitive sanctions and decades-long 
                                                 
879 See, e.g., SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, OCIE’s 2015 Cybersecurity 
Examination Initiative (Sept. 15, 2015). 
880 Supra Part 3.3.1 (“Privacy On The Ground”). 
881 Id. 
882 Bamberger & Mulligan, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND, supra note 734.   
883 Supra Part 3.3.1 (“Privacy On The Ground”). 
884 See, e.g., Children’s Advertising Review Unit, Self-Regulatory Program for Children’s Advertising 
(2009). 
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oversight, and private litigation, as well as the negative publicity effect of media 
reports – combine to create an environment of strong privacy protection in the US. 
 
Support And Help For Data Subjects 
The individual data subject must be able to enforce his/her rights rapidly and 
effectively, and without prohibitive cost, including through institutional 
mechanisms allowing independent investigation of complaints.   
Consumers have numerous mechanisms to enforce their rights and seek assistance.  
As an initial matter, many federal and state laws require data controllers and 
processors to provide information regarding the information being collected, the 
process for seeking additional information and for filing any complaints.885  For 
example, data subjects have the right under FACTA to receive an explanation of 
their credit scores and receive free annual credit reports.  And under FCRA, data 
subjects have the right to dispute credit information and seek correction.  The right to 
review and seek correction of personal information also exists under COPPA for 
children’s information, HIPAA for health information, and other federal and state 
statutes and regulations.886 
 
Many other federal and state agencies have similar mechanisms for collecting 
complaints about privacy concerns and providing mechanisms by which consumers 
may increase the protection rights.  Telephone customers, for instance, may register 
their telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry in order to restrict 
telemarketers from contacting them on that telephone number at home.887  If a 
telemarketer contacts a consumer on a registered telephone number after an initial 
grace period, then the consumer may file a complaint on a website dedicated to this 
process. 
 
In addition, federal and state enforcement agencies provide a process by which 
consumers may alert agencies of potential issues or violations.  For instance, HHS’s 
Office of Civil Rights has the authority to assess penalties for violations associated 
with HIPAA, and consumers may lodge complaints with OCR.  Similarly, consumers 
may lodge complaints with the FTC regarding the data collection practices of a 
regulated company.  The FTC has a complaint website that provides consumers with 
an easy mechanism for lodging complaints.888  The FTC’s website provides a 
mechanism to lodge a general complaint about how a company is handling personal 
information, as well as separate mechanisms for complaints regarding identity theft, 
scams and rip-offs, unwanted telemarketing, texts and spam, mobile devices and 
telephones, internet services, online shopping, computers, education, jobs, credit 
and debt, and other issues.  The FTC provides notice that it does not resolve 
individual complaints but does provide information on the next steps that a consumer 
should take.  State Attorneys General offices also have easy mechanisms for 
                                                 
885 Supra Part 3.3.2 (“Transparency” and “Access, Rectification And Opposition”). 
886 See id. 
887 FTC, National Do Not Call Registry, http://www.donotcall.gov.   
888 FTC, FTC Complaint Assistant, available at https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/.   
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individuals to file privacy and other consumer-related complaints against 
companies.889  
 
Redress And Compensation 
The redress element must involve a system of independent adjudication or 
arbitration that allows compensation to be paid and sanctions imposed where 
appropriate.   
The US privacy regime provides mechanisms of redress to injured parties for 
violations.  The system of privacy governance includes the enforcement muscle of 
the FTC, the FCC, the SEC, the CFPB, the HHS, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Department of 
Education, state Attorneys General, and other federal and state entities.  The 
Department of Justice also may bring criminal enforcement actions and seek 
imprisonment for violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Privacy Act, 
HIPAA, ECPA, and other statutes.  This system permits a variety of flexible 
enforcement alternatives.   
 
The FTC is the most influential data protection agency in the US because it oversees 
such a wide range business conduct affecting consumers and imposes coercive 
corrective action as well as significant fines.890  The case against Google for 
allegedly misrepresenting its privacy practices and circumventing the cookie settings 
of the Safari internet browser is a paradigm of tough enforcement by the FTC and 
state Attorneys General.  In that case, the FTC obtained a settlement payment of 
$22.5 million from Google, and a consortium of nearly 40 state Attorneys General 
received an aggregate settlement payment of $17 million.891  Through these 
enforcement mechanisms and the independent authority of US federal and state 
entities to investigate, levy fines, and seek redress, consumers are afforded privacy 
protections and, when appropriate, compensation. 
 
The common law system recognizes a web of common law torts, including invasion 
of privacy, disclosure of public facts, showing the individual in a false light, 
appropriation or infringement of the right of publicity or personal likeness, and 
general misappropriation or negligence.  Common law privacy torts include invasion 
of privacy,892 public disclosure of private facts,893 false light,894 infringement of the 
                                                 
889 See, e.g., California, Complaint Submission Page, https://oag.ca.gov/contact/consumer-complaint-
against-business-or-company; Massachusetts, Complaint Submission Page, 
http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/government/oca-agencies/dob-lp/file-a-complaint.html.  
890 Supra Part 3.3.1 (“The Federal Trade Commission”). 
891 See FTC, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges it Misrepresented Privacy 
Assurances to Users of Apple's Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 9, 2012); N.Y. Off. of Att’y Gen., A.G. 
Schneiderman Announces $17 Million Multistate Settlement With Google Over Tracking Of 
Consumers (Nov. 18, 2013). 
892 See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 100–101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (rejecting intrusion upon 
seclusion claim in the context of employer monitoring of employee e-mail). 
893 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 852 (Cal. 1998). 
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right of publicity or likeness, appropriation,895 and general negligence and 
misappropriation.  These torts are widely recognized by state law.896  Damages for 
any of these torts can be expansive and include dignitary harms, mental distress, 
and special damages.897 
 
The plaintiffs’ bar in the US vigilantly pursues privacy violation claims in the state and 
federal court system. For example, in March 2015 a federal judge gave preliminary 
approval to settle a class action litigation for $10 million brought by consumers 
against Target arising from the 2013 data breach in which up to 110 million 
consumers’ personal data was potentially compromised, with payments up to 
$10,000 for each consumer.898  The wave of lawsuits a company can face after 
media reports of misuse of consumer data or a data security incident is a strong 
deterrent.   
 
These common law torts described above899 help protect the collection, use, and 
potential abuse of personal data and can provide injured private parties with the right 
to bring actions against companies in the US.  The common law from which Louis 
Brandeis and Samuel Warren derived a right to privacy in 1890 continues to evolve 
from covering the then-new technology of mobile photography to ever newer 
technologies that implicate personal data. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
894 Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 209–210 (Ill. 1992). 
895 Eastwood v.  Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
896 See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy §§ 3:1; 5:68; 5:123 (2d ed. 
2015).  Claims also may be asserted directly under a state constitution, such as in California, which 
recognizes a constitutional right to privacy.  See Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472, 477 (Cal. 
2009). 
897 Restatement of the Law (Second) of Torts § 652H (1977). 
898 See Reuters, Target WillPay $10 Million to Settle Lawsuit From Data Breach, FORTUNE (Mar. 19, 
2015). 
899 Supra Part 3.3.1 (“State Privacy Enforecement And Common Law”). 
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CONCLUSION 
This in-depth comparison of the legal orders for privacy and data protection in the 
European Union and the United States shows that the level of protection for data that 
is transferred from the EU to the US is essentially equivalent to the level of protection 
of personal data in the EU.   
With respect to government surveillance, the judgments of the ECtHR make clear 
that the key to ensuring proportionality is to have safeguards against abuse.  The US 
applies such safeguards to surveillance under the intelligence programs that affect 
the data of EU citizens stored in the US by the use of defined selection terms, and 
steps taken by both the President and Congress to extend the elaborate system of 
existing US safeguards to EU citizens.  Under principles deeply embedded in the US 
legal order and political system, surveillance is constrained by a further array of 
safeguards including ‒ specific limitations on purpose, on use and retention of data, 
ex ante and ex post review by neutral judges and other independent authorities, and 
available redress.   
These safeguards ensure that this surveillance is proportionate and within the range 
permitted and necessary in a democratic society. Given the greater level of 
independent judicial involvement in approving surveillance orders, the range of 
transparency obligations imposed by law upon the intelligence agencies, and the 
extensive array of oversight mechanisms in place in the US, safeguards in the US 
legal order are in general more protective than those in effect in the EU – and, taken 
as a whole, they are certainly at least essentially equivalent to the legal order in the 
European Union. 
With respect to privacy and data protection in the commercial sector, the layers of 
federal and state sectoral protections for sensitive data, active and broad 
enforcement of privacy and security obligations, common law remedies and litigation, 
the public commitments to industry self-regulation in the US, and the empirical 
comparison of the practices of privacy managers in US and EU companies provides 
concrete evidence that the US legal order is as effective in practice as the level of 
protection under Directive 95/46. 
This report accordingly provides a substantive basis for the European Commission to 
make the findings required by the Schrems judgment in order to approve a new, 
strengthened transatlantic data transfer framework, especially where companies bind 
themselves to adhere to the basic principles of the Directive.  In addition, because 
the EU and US legal orders are essentially equivalent, the European Commission 
should formally recognise under Article 25(6) that data subjects in the EU and US 
have comparable privacy rights.  Such recognition would establish the most 
straightforward legal basis to comply with the EU’s WTO trade obligations and 
facilitate transatlantic data flows and mitigate the disruption of global commerce and 
cooperation that continues in the wake of the Schrems decision.  Such a recognition 
can readily be predicated upon a conscientious analysis of the law and practices in 
both the US and the EU.   
The comparison for individualised adequacy determinations under Article 25(2), is 
specific to the laws and practices applicable in Member States rather than the EU 
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legal order as whole.  However, no decision-makers may assume – without specific 
and verified evidence – that particular data flows from the EU to the US will 
effectively reduce the level of protection for data subjects in a Member State, nor 
could they conclude that a transfer to the US in a specific situation will lower the level 
of protection without evidence that the level of protection in the exporting Member 
State itself meets the EU Benchmark.  This report furnishes evidence to the contrary 
and provides a basis on which in individual cases a supervisory authority or national 
court can find that the level of privacy and data protection in the US is equivalent to 
that in a particular Member State. 
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